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.(1 . 
Prosperity is not without many fears and distastes; 
and adversity is not without hopes and comforts 
.......... Francis Bacon (1561-1626) 
ABSTRACT 
Business cycles as a distinct type of economic behaviour originated in the severe 
instabilities experienced by European banking systems in the nineteenth century. A large 
number of divergent explanations of the phenomenon were proposed by contemporary 
economists; but by 1900 a consensus had emerged about how they were propagated, if 
not about causes. Business cycles were thought to be induced by disequilibrium relations 
among real and monetary variables. This quantity-theoretic view was formulated as 
self-sustaining sequences of phases of prosperity, recession and depression in 'general 
conditions' by Wesley Mitchell in 1913. Mitchell, with Arthur Burns, attempted to 
document these 'comovements' between the wars, but found that actual behaviour was 
complex and that all episodes were effectively unique. Their results were taken as 'proof 
of the comovement hypothesis by later economists, and most current research assumes 
such behaviour. Econometric research proposes an a priori decomposition into 'trend' and 
'cycle' on the identifying assumption of separate data generating processes for each 
component, following the standard interpretation of Burns and Mitchell. Most empirical 
studies find that such decompositions either are rejected by the data or else fail to 
capture important empirical properties. Theoretical research assumes comovements to be 
the effects of random shocks propagated through moving average processes. This model 
is not in general supported empirically owing to the difficulties in identifying shocks from 
time-series data. The current literature mostly describes growth-rate rather than levels 
fluctuations, and models are increasingly being formulated explicitly in terms of growth. 
Evidence from undecomposed time series in levels suggests that the comovement 
hypothesis is not supported and further, that timing relations among economic variables 
are not stable. 
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CHAP1ER 1 
INTRODUCTION: 1HE PROBLEM OF 'BUSINESS-CYCLE' ANALYSIS 
In the late summer of 1945 reports of impending economic crisis began to appear 
in the national press in Britain and the United States.1 Government departments were 
confidently predicting, so it was said, ten million unemployed in the United States by the 
winter, as personnel were released from the forces. In the event this doomsday forecast 
was not fulfilled, though output did fall in the US by about one quarter in real terms 
from its wartime maximum and more than ten million men were actually demobilized 
from September 1945 to the end of 1946. The chronic mass unemployment of the 1930s, 
which everyone had reason to fear, did not return, and economic growth quickly resumed, 
stimulated by rearmament and sustained by postwar reconstruction. It then became 
fashionable to claim that the short-run economic fluctuations known as 'business cycles' 
had been 'conquered', the proof being the strong growth experienced by most national 
economies up to the late 1960s. Such a fashion was not new: during three of the last eight 
decades - the 1920s, 1950s and 1980s - such claims have been made, usually in support 
of an ideological position. The capitalist economies, so the argument goes, will by rational 
allocations of resources provide growth sufficient to prevent economic collapses. Any mild 
fluctuations experienced along the way are the natural market adjustments of a dynamic 
equilibrium. These three decades all coincided with governments of the Right; and two 
of them were characterized by speculative bubbles ending in stock market crashes. 
Business-cycle research, which was ignored in the expansive periods, attracted fresh 
attention in the aftermath of these events. 
The phrase 'business cycles', as denoting a distinct class of economic behaviour, 
was first used by Wesley Mitchell in the early years of the current century. The empirical 
findings of his seminal work with Arthur Burns at the National Bureau of Economic 
l See• for example, the front page of the Observer VJ-Day edition. 
1 
Research between the wars have been taken as the point of departure in most subsequent 
research. These results appeared in Measuring Business Cycles [1946] (MBC), summarized 
in the now-famous 'definition' on page 3: business cycles are continuous sequences of 
'recurrent but not periodic ... expansions occurring at about the same time in many 
economic activities' followed by contractions of similar character, with durations of 
approximately one to twelve years. The definition, however, was not intended by its 
authors as more than a working hypothesis. Mitchell was in fact primarily a theoretician, 
a point which was later forgotten, and his view of 'business cycles' as self-perpetuating 
sequences of expansions and contractions, each phase being 'caused' by its predecessor, 
arose from the history and intellectual climate of the nineteenth century. Mitchell's 
quantitative methods were the means of formulating and verifying this theory, rather than 
an end in themselves; yet despite an intensive search over 60 years, he never found 
unambiguous empirical evidence of the general 'comovements' among 'many variables' 
predicted by the hypothesis. Indeed, he emphasized in all his writings that short-run 
fluctuations are very complex, and that interpretations other than business cycles are 
available to characterize and explain them: fluctuations in growth patterns, the effects of 
exogenous shocks, of structural changes, etc. 
For one reason or another these caveats were largely forgotten, and late twentieth 
century perceptions are chiefly founded on the 'empirical evidence' of MBC, a work 
originating in ideas, methods and data originating in the years before 1914. Behavioural 
assumptions evident in the current literature thus rely on an hypothesis formulated as 
early as 1913 and considered definitive by 1946. They furthermore ignore the 
extraordinary circumstances of the US economy in the period 1918-1939 which 
conditioned it: the occurrence of three exceptionally severe downturns in levels of output 
and a collapse of growth (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2).2 The latter had not been experienced 
previously, nor has it occurred subsequently; for as authorities such as Blanchard and 
'These data are taken from the Balke and Gordon estimates given in Appendix B of R.I. Gordon (ed.) [1986). 
2 
Fischer [1989] have pointed out, the dominating feature of industrial economies in the 
past 200 years has been persistent growth. 
Economic historians, with their interest in the nineteenth century, have always 
been concerned with short-period instabilities; but with the renewed disturbances of 
recent years there has been a revival of interest among macroeconomists and 
econometricians. The original econometric approach to the modelling of business cycles 
- moving averages of random shocks - was proposed by Slutsky [1927] and Frisch 
[1933]. So persuasive were these propagation mechanisms that, according to Blanchard 
and Fischer, they are now preferred by macroeconomists to Mitchell's idea of 
self-sustaining phases. However, although 'simple linear propagation mechanisms appear 
to [explain] the stochastic behaviour of economic variables ... beyond this shared general 
framework there is little agreement as to the main sources of disturbances'.3 
Business-cycle theory has been subject to much revisionist thinking since 
Mitchell's death in 1948. His hypothesis was re-interpreted by the Cowles Commission 
in the 1950s as a single, unobserved, common stochastic variable driving all 
macroeconomic fluctuations. In the 1970s Lucas proposed a 'rational expectations' model 
of dynamic equilibrium, subject to Slutskyian exogenous shocks, as a theoretical 
explanation of the empirical 'findings' of MBC; and this has been followed by a large 
theoretical literature known as 'real business cycles' (RBC). 'Neo-Keynesian' 
macroeconomists have disputed the RBC understanding ofthe nature and persistence of 
these shocks. Among econometricians Stock and Watson [1988, 1989, 1991, 1992] and 
Hamilton [1989] have proposed probability models as formalizations of the 'indicator 
variables' which supposedly track and anticipate the dates of cyclical 'peaks' and 'troughs'. 
Stock and Watson, while taking the Burns and Mitchell definition as 'primitive', argue 
that the 'comovements' in many activities 'can be captured by a single underlying, 
unobserved variable [which] in the abstract...represents the general "state of the 
3Blanchard and Fischer (1989] p. 277. 
3 
economy"'.· Hamilton considers business cycles to be 'the broad-based swings in 
economic activity'. While not directly alluding to Burns and Mitchell, he compares his 
results with the 'reference cycle' chronology compiled monthly by the NBER based on 
Mitchell's original methods from the 1930s which supposedly represents a set of dates 
when 'business cycles [reach] troughs and peaks's. Recent econometric studies of the 
observed asymmetries between amplitudes and durations of expansions and contractions 
also quote Burns and Mitchell as authority for the empirical behaviour of business cycles. 
Most macroeconomists accept the 1946 definition as 'proved'. Lucas, for example, while 
differing in certain respects from Mitchell in his theoretical views, asserts in a 1977 essay 
that 'business cycles are all alike'; and again in 1981, that Burns and Mitchell found 'the 
similarity of all peacetime cycles with one another'.6 The RBC literature has always 
assumed that the 'comovement' behaviour was established as 'fact' in MBC. Historians, 
on the other hand, have become sceptical of any such homogeneity. 
Burns and Mitchell did not identify 'reference' with 'business cycles', but rather 
argued that any one-to-one correspondence must be an empirical issue. They never 
claimed to have found satisfactory evidence to resolve this issue, mainly because of the 
inadequate coverage of the available time-series data; and hence any argument relying 
on an assumption of such a correspondence from MBC is circular. Moreover they always 
insisted that business cycles are diffused throughout the economy. If Mitchell's 'many 
activities', or 'comovements', criterion is thus to be satisfied, then the significant 
fluctuations (in both the general and the statistical sense) in observed time series will 
either be in phase or else have their phase shifts predictable. Such conditions cannot be 
assumed, as some of the current literature seems to do. 
·Stock and Watson (1989) p. 1. 
.5Hamilton (1989) p. 352. The 'reference cycle' is defined in MBC p. 24. 
6[19771 p. 10; (1981) p. 274. 
4 
The understanding of historical business cycles thus appears to be at the least 
incomplete, if not in error, relying as it does on empirical results now nearly 50 years out 
of date and upon time-series data sets that are unrepresentative, or inaccurate, or both. 
In order to put recent research in its proper context, as well as to assess its value, it is 
essential to re-examine the Mitchell hypothesis with the perspective of half a century of 
additional theoretical research and time-series data. The following specific questions are 
suggested by the literature: 
1. How did the experience of the nineteenth century condition later 
theoretical, historical and statistical business-cycle research? 
2. What were Mitchell's original intentions and objectives and how did 
they influence his quantitative research programme? 
3. What were the results of Burns and Mitchell's investigations? 
4. How have these ideas been interpreted subsequently? Do these 
interpretations accurately reflect the authors' views? How have they 
affected later research? 
5. What has been the contribution of developments in the econometrics 
literature? 
6. What empirical methods are available for identifying 'business cycles' 
as distinct behavioural types? How objective are these methods? What 
assumptions are required? What scope is there for improving them? What 
light does the analysis of modern time-series data shed on the problem? 
How successful are the theoretical explanations? 
7. What, therefore, can be said about the nature of short-run economic 
fluctuations? Is the comovement hypothesis supported empirically? Is 
there a relationship between short-run and long-run behaviour? What are 
the implications for policy? 
5 
These questions imply a reexamination of the historical record for quantitative evidence; 
but they also suggest the need to re-examine the historical and theoretical prior 
perceptions that influenced Mitchell's research programme, and to assess whether the 
increased information available since 1946 alters the historical as opposed to the 
econometric view. 
This dissertation is organized into four substantive chapters in an exploration of 
these issues. Chapter 2 discusses the cultural background in the period up to 1914, the 
prolific explanations of business cycles engendered in this period, their eventual 
coalescence into a single consensual explanation and its effect on Mitchell's approach. 
Chapter 3 analyses the work of Mitchell and the NBER, how it has been interpreted and 
followed, and offers new interpretations of its results. Chapter 4 assesses the 
econometrics literature on business cycles and presents the results of a Monte Carlo study 
of short-run 'cyclical' asymmetries and their link with long-run secular behaviour. 
Chapter 5 implements an amended algorithmic approach to turning-point analysis and 
reports the results of its application to US and UK statistics. Chapter 6 discusses the 
general conclusions of the study and their implications for future 'business-cycle' 
research.' 
'Statistical tables are placed in the text of each chapter. Because of their extensive nature, charts and graphs appear in 
appendices to each chapter. 
6 
Figure 1.1. US Quarterly Real GNP, 1875-1983 
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CHAPlER2 
BUSINESS CYCLES BEFORE 1914: THEoRY AND EVIDENCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Interwar commentators such as Keynes held an optimistic opinion of nineteenth 
and early twentieth century conditions as a 'Golden Age' of peace and economic stability, 
especially monetary.! This is not a readily explicable view: far from being economically 
or politically stable, the history of that era is a recurrent sequence of manias, panics, 
crises, financial collapses and depressions, shortages and 'gluts' of money and goods and 
rises and falls of prices, all maintained against a background of war, famine and 
revolution. Popular memory of crisis goes back only as far as 1929, and even economists 
tend to accept the Victorian myth when confronted by authorities like Keynes. The only 
'golden' feature of the earlier epoch was the monetary standard, which was what Keynes 
may have had in mind. 
It is evident on closer examination that actual conditions in the 'long nineteenth 
century' were complex, and that the concurrence of long-run growth and short-run 
instability is not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, the record shows that they 
appear often to have coexisted, and the consequent difficulties in interpreting 'general 
economic conditions' have shaped the development of both theory and empirical data 
sources.2 In particular, the relative weights given by contemporary observers to these 
juxtaposed behavioural strands were largely responsible for understanding of 'business 
cycles' that emerged in the late nineteenth century; and these weights themselves 
depended on beliefs about both 'causes' and transmission mechanisms. It was the latter 
that formed the basis of Mitchell's 'business-cycle' hypothesis, and hence of beliefs about 
the nature of short-run behaviour down to the present day. 
ISee 'Inflation and Deflation' in Essays in Persuasion (1930). 
2Mitchell later noted that the 'multiplying solutions' proposed to explain these complexities were 'confusing' rather then 
'illuminating'. See Chapter 3 below. 
9 
This chapter examines historical conditions prior to 1914, their interpretation and 
its intellectual provenance, that Mitchell would have considered when he began his 
research in the early years of the present century. Section 2.2 traces the development of 
theory from Ricardo to Irving Fisher. Section 2.3 examines nineteenth century 
business-cycle chronologies, which reveal diverse historical behaviour. Section 2.4 
discusses the time-series methods that influenced Mitchell. 
2.2. nIE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS-CYCLE nIEORY: nIE SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS 
As the industrialization of England gathered pace in the nineteenth century, so 
also did the frequency of 'crisis', 'mania', 'panic' and 'depression'. Although the classical 
economists of that period preferred to address problems of long-run equilibrium, they 
were generally forced to concede that short-run phenomena had different dynamic 
properties, and thus from time to time found it necessary to discuss links between the two 
types of behaviour. Explanations for instabilities proliferated. The problem was that 
equilibrium was unobservable, while observed phenomena were perceived by the end of 
the period to be so complex as to defy generalization. Nineteenth century economic 
analysis of short-run behaviour thus became a search for unifying explanations of 
markedly divergent processes. 
2.2.1. The Classical Economists and the Debate about Capital 
Theoretical debates about 'causes' are ancient and have always been motivated 
by contemporary conditions. As early as the seventeenth century Sir William Petty 
commented on 'cyclical' mechanisms and distinguished the various signals emitted by real, 
nominal and psychological effects - the 'intrinsick' and the 'extrinsick' - the former 
being related to productivity, and the latter, or 'accidentall', a function of money. Petty 
may have been the first economist to use the word 'cycle' to mean a sequence of 'Dearths 
10 
and Plenties' in crop yields, thus indicating its Biblical origins.3 Chapter IX of his other 
great work, the PoliticalArithmetick, is an early example of an (implicit) quantity relation, 
equating the total circulation of money with total output (i.e., volume x value). Also, 
from the Treatise, P=kxC, the level of prices (,rates of commodities') is proportional to 
the stock of money. 
With the development of banking and credit systems in England came a 
succession of severe economic crises, which in the hundred years after 1790 occurred at 
frequent intervals, a disquieting state of affairs that stimulated much heated debate. Say, 
Sismondi, Ricardo, Malthus and J.S. Mill all attempted to explain the phenomenon. Say 
is remembered for his loi des debouches, largely because it was criticized by Keynes in the 
General Theory. Ricardo interpreted this law to mean that demand and supply are always 
in equilibrium 'because demand is only limited by production'.· Sismondi was among the 
leading opponents of Say's law, and in several works published between 1803 and 1837, 
he advanced three separate explanations for the occurrence of economic crises. The first, 
an 'oversaving' argument, formed the core of his analysis of disequilibrium between 
production and consumption. The second held that wages were too low to permit workers 
to consume their own product, the causes being the unequal distribution of incomes itself 
as well as unemployment arising from the mechanization of industry; and the third 
introduced the idea of lags in the adjustment of purchasing power to the level of output.s 
Questions of disequilibrium in the classical literature usually centred on the role 
of prices and profits, and their effect upon the rate of capital formation (,accumulation'). 
The issue was whether scarcities or 'gluts' in all commodities could be general or at most 
partial. Ricardo thought that long-run general disequilibrium was impossible: although 
there may be a 'glut' of a particular commodity in a high-profit regime, simultaneous 
'Treatise of Taxes (c1662). See Collected Works (1899), C.H. Hull (ed.), Volume I, p. 43. 
·Principles of Political Economy. Volume I. p. 290. 
'See the discussions in Schumpeter (1954). p. 740 and Mitchell [1927]. p. 6. 
11 
gluts in all markets cannot occur owing to general unsatisfied demand for other 
commodities. When profits temporarily fall, however, the better-off save and reduce their 
demand for luxuries, leading to a short-run 'universal glut' of all goods.6 Apart from this 
case, exogenous shocks, or 'sudden changes in the channels of trade' could induce crises.7 
These arose from 'the influence of fashion, prejudice, or caprice' on the purchasers of 
commodities, or from the levy of a new tax, or 'the effects of war' which increased the 
transport costs of exports. Shocks caused 'considerable distress and .. .Ioss', not only at the 
time but during the whole transition period, and could lead to a permanent diminution 
of the national capital. The dominant condition was nevertheless growth: national 
economies had a 'tendency to continue for ages, to sustain undiminished their wealth, and 
their population'. 
Mill's Principles of Political Economy (1848) gave greater attention to commercial 
crises - which by the time this work was published were increasing in perceived severity 
- than did either Ricardians or Malthusians. He distinguished two types, the first of 
which occurred when 'in speculative times money-lenders [and traders were] inclined to 
extend their business by stretching their credit'.8 During the 'revulsion ... there [was] a 
disinclination to lend' - a 'panic' - and 'a most pressing need to borrow', the result 
being a severe and rapid contraction of the monetary and credit base. In the intervals 
between crises, a 'gradual process of accumulation' took place, with a consequent drop 
in interest rates. The latter was 'sufficiently rapid to account for the almost periodical 
recurrence of these fits of speculation' because investors were inclined to take excessive 
risks to protect their incomes.9 The other type of crisis occurred, as in 1847, when 
'circumstances [tended] to withdraw from the loan market a considerable portion of the 
6Principles of Political Economy, p. 293. 
'/bid., Chapter XIX. 
'Book III, Chapter XII, Section 3. 
'/bid. 
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capital which usually supplies it'. In that instance, a mania for railway shares on the stock 
market locked up capital in fixed assets which, combined with a large export of gold to 
pay for food imports in the wake of the Irish famine, put severe pressure on the supply 
of loan capital. Interest rates rose, share prices collapsed, short term credit became 
unobtainable and firms stopped payment. 
Mill's conception of the 'almost periodic' crisis, although influential, was by that 
time far from novel. (In particular, Tooke's great empirical work of the 1840s, the History 
of Prices, had become the reference standard for empirical evidence of recurrent crisis. 10) 
Mill's greater concern was with theories of value and price determination. Analysis of the 
former was along cIassicallines, that is, related to labour-costs of production. However, 
when considering the 'value of money' (Le., its 'purchasing power') the discussion became 
quantity-theoretic: although in the short run 'other things being the same [it] varies 
inversely as its quantity' in the long run, value depends upon the costs of production. In 
other words, prices (the inverse of the 'value of money') are directly proportional to 
quantity or, more precisely, vary directly 'as its quantity multiplied by what is called the 
rapidity of circulation' (i.e., velocity).ll This relation applies to a system in which gold and 
silver money are the only instruments of exchange, and is a rudimentary 'equation of 
exchange', P=MV, where M, V are the quantity and velocity of money respectively.I2 
There are no terms for physical volume (1) as in later formulations; nor are bank 
deposits included, because Mill thought the relation applied only to currency. 
Complications arise mainly through the medium of trade credit, which produces 
an effect on prices proportionately greater than that of ready money, 'and this is 
produced, though none of the written instruments called substitutes for currency may be 
I°See Section 2.4 below. 
\llbid., Chapter VIII, Section 3. 
12Ricardo proposed the quantity relation in a pamphlet of 1811. Its origin has also been attributed to Hume. Wicksell 
claimed to have found the idea in the Roman literature or the second century A.D. 
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called into existence'.13 Inflations of credit are induced by expectations of rising prices 
which in turn increase profit expectations (an hypothesis whose eventual Ubiquity in the 
literature declined only after World War II). Such speculation can occur in all 
commodities at once. In the ensuing 'mania' or 'epidemic fit of gambling', shortages 
induce price inflation even without an increase in money or credit, 'the ideal extreme case 
of what is called a commercial crisis'.14 Mill's theory predicted that all commodities 
gravitated towards a 'Natural Value', that is, 'that at which it exchanges for every other 
thing in the ratio of their cost of production'. Prices, however, coincide with natural 
values 'only on an average of years', varying otherwise according to market conditions 
above and below equilibrium. Although market forces are self-correcting, resulting in a 
'general convergence' in the long-run, 'dearth ... and ... glut are incident to all 
commodities'. IS 
2.2.2. 'Business Cycle' Theorists and the Debate about Money and Prices 
'Revulsions' of trade in England, in Ricardo's phrase, were noted by 
contemporary observers in 1815-6, 1825, 1836-41 and 1847.16 As the century progressed 
the debate about both causes of and remedies for these episodes intensified. Instability 
of prices and credit was in one sense a subsidiary issue in the deeper controversy about 
the nature of money and the means of regulating it. The debate about the cyclical nature 
of crises took place in the shadow of this more fundamental controversy and was, at least 
to begin with, inseparable from it. Hence an overlap exists between the bank-regulation 
literature and that dealing with the causes of cyclical fluctuations, because of the apparent 
periodicity of crises. Interest in the first half of the nineteenth century was concentrated 
U Book III, Chapter XII, Section 2. 
14/bid., Chapter XII, Section 4. 
IS/bid., Chapter XIV, Section 1. 
16See, for example, Tooke, Op. cit.,Volumes II and III. 
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on the role of the Bank of England in controlling the supply of currency - bullion, specie 
and bank notes - which by the Quantity Theory was essential to price stability. As well 
as issuing notes, the Bank operated at this time a commercial deposit and discount 
business. The bridge between the technicalities of Bank practice and the general 
condition of trade was the gold standard, which necessitated the export of bullion from 
time to time to pay for imports, normally after poor harvests, which often resulted in a 
critical shortage of credit. 
The debate about the amount of 'money' available to the banking system (the 
'circulation') divided commentators into two factions, known as the 'banking' and 
'currency' schools. Their most prominent partisans were Loyd (later Lord Overstone) for 
the currency school, and Tooke and Bagehot for the banking school. In common with 
other English political disputes, the debate is rather obscure, not only because the two 
positions intersect at some points, but also because the members of the respective 
factions disagreed amongst themselves. The controversy ranged over such issues as how 
the term 'money' should be defined, how its value was determined and how its markets 
should thus be regulated. Advocates of the 'currency' position argued that inflows or 
outflows of gold on the foreign exchanges would automatically adjust the circulation in 
corresponding amounts. The banking school thought that, because of the existence of 
bank deposits and bills of exchange, neither a pure metallic standard nor its mixed variant 
would behave as the currency school believed. On the contrary, the needs of the ordinary 
commercial banking system would adequately control supply, providing that convertibility 
(with gold) was maintained.17 Since crises were seen as effects of fluctuating money 
supply, prices and profits, their control was a function of money-market regulation. The 
immediate outcome of the controversy was the Bank Charter Act of 1844, a measure 
distinguished only by its lack of effect: during each succeeding crisis it had to be 
17See Viner [1932], pp. 221-238. 
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suspended in order to save the banking system from its harshest effects, and the economy 
from collapse. 
The important point for present purposes is what the debate implies about 
contemporary conditions, rather than which of the two positions is correct.18 Opinions 
about what caused crises, as expressed in the emergent business-cycle literature, tended 
to be conditioned by the school to which the writer adhered. For example, Overstone 
described the relationship between the state of trade and the volume of credit as early 
as 1819, in evidence before a House of Lords committee.19 'Private credit', which can be 
seen as the printing of 'virtual money' by private individuals (in the form of bills of 
exchange), inflates the volume of trade and eventually induces the revulsion. By 1837 
Overstone had a more explicit vie~ of crisis as a recurrent sequence of phases - a cycle 
- and of the role of the Bank of England as either irritant or emollient. 
The .. .'state of trade' is .•. subject to various conditions which are periodically 
returning; it revolves apparently in an established cycle. First we find it in a state 
of quiescence, - next inlprovement, - growing confidence, - prosperity, -
excitement, - overtrading, - convulsions, - pressure, - stagnation, - distress, 
- ending again in quiescence.20 
Wade, in his History of the Middle and Working Classes, expressed the popular view of 
crises as manifestations of divine law, as periodic in their occurrence as 'the seasons, or 
as the plague, sweating-sickness, and the cholera-morbus'21. Over the previous 70 years 
the period had been 'ordinarily completed in five or seven years', with 'alternate periods 
of prosperity and depression'.22 
liThe answer to the latter question is likely to be 'neither' or 'both'. 
I"As cited by Wade [1833], p. 45. 
:ZOOverstone [1837). This passage was quoted by Bagehot in the essay 'Investments'. See his Collected Works, St. John Stevas 
ed.,Volume IX, p. 272-5. 
211bid., p. 46. 
22lbid., p. 211. 
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The problem of the 'value of money' was integral to the developing theory of the 
'trade cycle'. The History of Prices, published in six volumes between 1841 and 1857, 
attempted to examine price behaviour empirically from the point of view of the banking 
school. Chapters IX and X of Volume II describe a recurrence mechanism in terms of 
an excess of demand in the 'phase' of rising markets, and of an excess of supply in the 
phase of 'stagnation'. These phases, discussed in Volume VI, are 'alternations between 
periods of confidence and discredit, of the spirit of enterprise and despondency'. In an 
1844 pamphlet Tooke argued that (1) the money supply was directly proportional to the 
price level; (2) that prices are limited by the amount of the 'revenues of the different 
orders of the State, under the heads of rents, profits, salaries, and wages'; and that (3) 
rather than inducing price increases, reduced rates of interest tended to reduce prices by 
reducing production costS.23 (The latter point was in response to a collapse of investment 
yields in the 1840s.) 
Walter Bagehot advocated the banking-school position regularly through the 
pages of the Economist, of which he was editor from the mid-1840s. Bagehot's strongly 
held views about commercial crises originated in his concerns about the stabilization of 
the 'money market', as summarized in Lombard Street [1873]. He was perhaps the first 
to distinguish two types of crises: the purely monetary and those originating in the great 
technological changes of the second half of the nineteenth century. His main concern was 
that the growth of the banking sector had increased the severity of fluctuations through 
the price effects of changes in investment yields and in the accessibility of credit. Because 
the English had become accustomed to deposit their surplus capital in banks, in contrast 
to other European countries, a very large loan fund was available for commercial and 
investment purposes, and credit was thus nearly always available. This increased risks to 
the stability of trade by reducing barriers to entry, so that established merchants in each 
2JRepublished as Appendix XV, Volume VI of the His/my, p. 636. 
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generation were 'pushed out, so to say, by the dirty crowd of little men',24 The 'phases' 
of the money market, prosperity and depression, arose not only from exogenous shocks 
(,accidental events'), viz., 'a bad harvest, an apprehension offoreign invasion, the sudden 
failure of a great firm which everybody trusted .. .', but also from 'regular internal 
changes',2S The source of the latter lay in the lags which occurred in the operation of 
trade as firms began to produce goods for a general market. The development of the 
banking system further increased price instabilities as a result of over-accumulation and 
chronically depressed investment yields - the so-called 'era of two percent', 
Bagehot also distinguished real and nominal effects related to price changes,26 The 
causes of inflation were threefold: 'cheap money, cheap corn, and improved credit'. An 
increased money supply was a necessary but not sufficient condition, In most periods of 
industrial expansion, the three causes were seen to have acted together. However, in an 
echo of the classical position 'real' prosperity came from increased physical output, 
whereas prosperity in which the only effect is increased price was 'imaginary', The 
question was a moral one: a real prosperity might on occasion be destroyed by a single 
bad harvest; but an 'apparent' prosperity, during which plentiful credit inflates prices, 
would invariably be destroyed, because more loan capital would be needed to sustain 
given level of trade, and eventually a sudden and steep rise in interest rates would occur, 
bringing about a 'reaction'. This 'severe alternation of opposite causes' produced both 
'cycles' and panics, largely owing to the 'delicate' balance of supply and demand and its 
action on discount ratesY 
It is not clear whether Overstone, Tooke or Bagehot understood cycles as a 
continuous process of depression, revival, prosperity and crisis, although all of these 
24Lombard Street, 1915 edition, p. 9. 
zslbid., Chapter VI. 
2<lSee Economist, 30th December 1871, leading article. 
'rILombard Street, 1915 edition, p. 149. 
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elements seem in one form or another to have entered their analysis. If not continuous, 
then by 1850 crises were at least seen as regular occurrences. ObseIVers were increasingly 
struck by the apparent irrationality of these episodes. Both Bagehot and John Mills saw 
pathological behaviour in the great speculative booms of the period.28 John Mills, in 1867, 
argued that 'the periodicity of commercial crises is at any rate a fact [emphasis in 
original]'. The instances of crisis 'are already too numerous, regular, and persistent, to 
allow ... for a theory of fortuitous coincidence'. It being logical to try to classify the various 
regular 'phases', the idea of continuity in commercial cycles appears to have arisen 
directly out of the search for a general taxonomy. Following this approach, Mills 
proposed an early version of a generic, phased business cycle: revival, speculation/crisis 
and post-panic. However, although all cycles followed the same sequence, the common 
element was the evolution of commercial psychology, the only real uniformity that Mills 
could identify over the preceding 60 years.29 Foreign trade had 'enormously increased in 
volume'; there had been regimes of inconvertible paper currency, of free issues of 
convertible paper, and finally of regulated convertible issues; the legal framework had 
been 'modified in every conceivable way'; world commerce had moved from monopoly 
to free trade; and the gold backing for currencies had received 'a vast and sudden 
addition' from discoveries in California andAustralia. Amidst this 'bewildering diversity' 
the only regularity appeared to be that of recurrence, suggesting that the phenomenon 
was one of 'mind' rather than 'purse'. 
During the 1870s and 1880s, the debate about causes of economic variation came 
increasingly to encompass theoretical relations among money, prices and physical output, 
supported by growing volumes of economic statistics. Giffen, Marshall and Jevons were 
the principal theoretical protagonists. Jevons was an innovator of empirical methods, 
especially the use of index numbers and early forms of correlation analysis, but is perhaps 
ZI'A panic, in a word, is a species of neuralgia .. .' Lombard Street, p. 51. 
29(1867) p.29. 
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best remembered for his attempts to find an empirical link between commercial and 
sunspot cycles.30 Fluctuations from 'commercial causes' (speculation) were considered to 
have a 'more sudden and considerable effect' on the fortunes of the propertied classes 
than the depreciation of gold (inflation).31 Despite the price and commercial instabilities, 
Jevons believed that the economic changes of the previous 20 years had produced a 
'general increase of wealth and of mercantile industry and profits', implying that growth 
and cyclical instabilities could coexist. The benefits of these changes forbade any assertion 
that anyone had 'suffered positive loss of the necessaries and comforts of life by the 
depreciation of his income'.32 
The essay 'Periodicity of Commercial Crises and its Physical Explanation' (1878) 
was a response in part to the trade depression of the 1870s but more generally to an 
awareness that the 
present depression is ... only one [of] a long series of events of the same kind, 
occurring with remarkable regularity at intervals of about ten years. ([1884] p. 
187) 
The essence of Jevons's theoretical work was an attempt to link this decennial cycle 
causally to crop yields as determined by sunspot variation. From a study of statistical 
sources he asserted that ' ... trade reached a maximum of activity in or about the years 
1701,1711,1721,1732,1742,1753,1763,1772,1783, 1793, 1805, 1815, 1825, 1837, 1847, 
1857, 1866'. Owing to his obsessions Jevons has been dismissed as a crank by later 
commentators; yet it must be remembered that his sunspot hypothesis was not seen a 
priori as implausible. For example, the socialist writer H.R. Hyndman appeared to regard 
Jevons' hypothesis as an attempt to avoid embarrassing explanations of an increasingly 
serious problem, by referring 'the whole of our social troubles ... to these strange changes 
in that great body [the Sun],. 
lOOn which see Morgan [1990] Chapter 1. 
n[1884] pp. 74-5. These comments may also indicate the difficulty of separating real and nominal effects. 
'2Ibid., p. 90. 
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This theory was actually accepted for a time, until ... the worst crisis of the century 
came in the same year as one of the finest haIVests ever known on the planet, 
and when also the sun's disc was exceptionally afflicted with spotS.33 
Jevons agreed with Bagehot that temporary rises in commodity prices are induced 
by expansions of credit through bills of exchange and other banking instruments. Prices 
and credit 'mutually inflate each other'. The 'exhaustion' of loanable capital limits credit 
and eventually checks price increases. Unlike Bagehot, however, Jevons argued that the 
loan fund is limited by the 'reserve of notes, equivalent to gold, in the banking 
department of the Bank of England', Although temporary price fluctuations may be 
independent of monetary gold, 'ultimately they must be governed by this quantity [emphasis 
in original],.34 
2.2.3. 'Multiplying' Explanations 1873-1914 
Commentaries in the fifty years before the First World War imply increasingly 
complex economic conditions. After the crisis of 1873 the 'state of trade' appeared 
generally to deteriorate, led by commodity prices falls and followed to a debatable extent 
by declines in physical volumes. Three royal commissions in the UK, the Bureau of Labor 
and several congressional committees in the USA investigated the underlying 'causes' of 
the apparent deterioration, which by the mid-1880s was characterized as a 'Great 
Depression', In 1886 the results of these inquiries were reported in both countries.3S The 
British commission found no single decisive factor, but that the 'chief features' were: 
(a) a very serious falling off in the exchangeable value of the produce of the soil 
[i.e., the 'agricultural depression']; 
"Henry Mayers Hyndman (1842-1921), Commel'Cial Crises of the Nineteenth Century, (1892), p. 9. According to the 
Dictionary of National Biography, Hyndman became acquainted with Marx's works about 1880 and was chieny responsible 
for introducing them to a popular readership in England. (See D.N.B., 1921 Supplement, p. 180.) 
34[1884) pp. 24-29. 
3SFinai Repof1 of the Royal Commission on the Depression in Trade and Industry, Parliamentary Papers 1886, Volumes 
XXI-XXIII. The analyses of 'alleged causes' of depressions by US congressional committees and the US Commissioner 
of Labor, are reported in Hull (1926] Appendices Band C. 
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(b) an increased production of nearly aU other classes of commodities; 
(c) a tendency in the supply of commodities to outrun demand; 
(d) a consequent dinliuution in the profit obtainable by production; and 
(e) a sinlilar dinlinution in the rate of interest on invested capital. (P.P. Volume 
XXIII, p. xv) 
The fall in the profitability of industry and agriculture 'has given rise to a widespread 
feeling of depression among all the producing classes', whereas those on fixed incomes 
or in regular employment 'have apparently little to complain of. The 'distress' caused by 
the displacement of workers by technological innovation and by the 'fluctuating' nature 
of the demand for labour had, in the previous year or two, been 'more marked than 
usual'; but 'the increasing consumption by the working classes prove[s] that their general 
prosperity has not materially diminished in recent years. This complacency was not 
entirely unjustified, because such indicators as existed were contradictory. The difficulty 
lay in distinguishing changes in output from structural shifts, at a time when output data 
were almost entirely unavailable for the real sector, and both from price effects. Thus the 
commissioners believed that production in general had increased through the period 
'described as depressed', with decreasing costs owing to the decline in prices; and that 
moreover, capital 'continued to accumulate', 
Such apparent confusion perhaps implies not one but several factors, short-run 
and long-run, real and nominal, acting concurrently, whose effects were impossible to 
separate. 'Causes' of depression in America as found by the congressional committees 
numbered some 178, and by the Commissioner of Labor, 143. A sample of these from 
the 1886 report, as catalogued in Hull [1926], reveals the drift of contemporary thought 
and suggests that not only did observers fail to understand what was going on, but that 
they did not even agree that anything at all was happening.36 The Royal Commission, for 
example, were not unanimous in their acceptance of the existence of a general trade 
~1926J Appendix B. 
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depression. There was in fact a dissenting minority report, and the scepticism was shared 
by other commentators. 
The issue seemed so obscure that Giffen, in an 1885 article aimed at a lay 
audience, interpreted commercial sentiment as being almost entirely a psychological 
reaction to the protracted price falls. He agreed with the Royal Commission that the 
meaning of 'trade depression' itself was by no means unambiguous and did not 
necessarily indicate that 
the whole industry of the country is being ruined ... 'Depression' ... may exist when 
almost all the statistical signs point the other way; when production and 
consumption are on a large scale and there is real prosperity, although without 
the glow of a period of inflation. ([1885], p. 801) 
Giffen argued that in a deflation, the 'leaders of industry', accustomed to look at nominal 
values, 'are all poorer, and feel even poorer than they really are'. Thus 'the moral is that 
economists and public men should beware to some extent of the outcry from the 
market-place?7 
The article presented a theory of prices as determined by changes in the quantity 
of monetary gold. The other possible factor, 'a great multiplication [in the supply] of 
commodities and diminution of the cost of production' was thought to have little weight. 
In a paper given before the Royal Statistical Society in 1888, Giffen remarked further on 
'the theory of the relation of the quantity of money to prices'. He argued that prices may 
induce changes in money supply and vice versa. The direction of this action became an 
issue in later debates about the role of prices, but at the time Giffen thought that the 
'quantity of money in supply and the demands upon it were certainly assumed to have 
some connection with prices'.38 He was more interested in long-run than short-run 
movements in purchasing power, and was trying to show that once the 'ebb and flow of 
"[1885), p. 803. 
31[1888) p. 165. 
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credit' were filtered out, a longer run deflation ('rise in the purchasing power of gold') 
had taken place since 1850. That a scarcity of specie accounted for it was demonstrated 
by a diagram ([1888] p. 214) showing the supply of 'money' stationary after 1873, with 
commodity volumes rising and prices falling. 
In written evidence to the Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry, 
Alfred Marshall also expressed scepticism about 'any attempt to divide the recent 
fall .. .into that part which is due to the changes in commodity supply and that which is due 
to available gold supply'. He, like most commentators, saw those 'causes' not originating 
purely in 'changes in the supply of money' as a combination of factors, short-run and 
structural, real and financial: (1) increased foreign supplies of gold, (2) cheaper transport 
costs, including tariffs, and increased speed of distribution, (3) technological 
developments in production and (4) a reduction in interest rates. However, 'changes in 
the available supply [of gold] are not accountable for more than a small part of total 
fluctuations in the purchasing power of money'; since 1850, for example, only about 
one-sixth of the variation in aggregate prices could so be accounted.39 
Marshall's response to the commissioners' question about effects of inflation and 
deflation on the state of trade was that 
other thillgs being eqlUll, an increase in the supply of precious metals inflates 
credit, because it goes in great measure into the hands of the dealers in credit. .. 
(OffICial Papers, p. 23) 
However, the 'volume of business and the methods of payment. .. are of importance 
commensurate' with changes in the supply of precious metals. Moreover, technological 
developments would induce a fall in production costs and an increase in the volume of 
output, and this fall was a 'true cause' of the general deflation, in line with classical 
theory. The evidence at this point becomes ambiguous, but Marshall seemed to be 
"Official Papers, pp. 8-13. 
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proposing a quantity relation under which total output is proportional to the quantity of 
monetary gold. 
As to the true severity of trade fluctuations, Marshall (in evidence to the Gold 
and Silver Commission in 1887) thought that claims of both prosperity and depression 
were exaggerated. Thus in 1872, for example, when Gladstone described the prosperity 
as increasing 'by leaps and bounds ... real prosperity was not increasing at anything like the 
rate at which it appeared to be if one neglected the fact that prices were rising ... '40 The 
current depression (1887) was thus nominal- i.e., of 'prices, interest and profits' - but 
Marshall could not 'see any reason for believing that there is any considerable depression 
in any other respect'. He argued, as had Giffen, that exaggerated claims of the severity 
of depression were lobbying attempts by commercial circles whose felt their interests 
compromised. Because periods of price inflation produced 'exceptionally high returns' 
they were considered prosperous, but when prices were falling, real incomes actually 
increased, so that nominal and real effects had become confused. Furthermore, 
unemployment had not been higher 'during the last ten years than during any other 
consecutive ten years'. However, 'irregularity' of employment was emerging because of 
the 'transitional stage in which a great number of industries are', i.e., structurally from 
advancing technology. 
The same problems were examined in the monetary context by Clement Juglar, 
who from 1862 to 1900 produced empirical studies of the balance sheets of the central 
banks of France, England and the United States. Juglar, as much concerned with 
theoretical explanations as with data, expatiated on the underlying mechanism of a 
continuous cycle and its 'causes' (an idea which strongly influenced Mitchell). In the 1889 
edition of his main work, des crises commerciales et de leur retour periodique en France, en 
Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis, he concluded that 'we move ceaselessly from a prosperous 
period to a period of crisis, and reciprocally'.41 Such crises 'only appear in societies in 
4OIbid., p. 98. 
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which commerce is highly developed'.42 Prices were the primary indicator, with their 
'turning points at the maximum ... coinciding with crises'.43 The movement had three 
phases and was found to be continuous: national economies were always placed in a 
recurrent 'cycle' of 'prosperity, crisis ... or Iiquidation.44 The features of commercial crises 
were so universal that they could not be confused with 'simple accidents' and panics 
which result from shocks or exogenous influences. 
From a survey of the theories then current, Juglar distilled the following common 
features of crises: 
first, the price increases that precede them; second, the drain of gold that 
determines the explosion; third, the price falls that allow and facilitate the 
liquidation. ([1889], p. 20) 
The three phases follow each other always in the same order, but with different historical 
features, depending upon the epoch. The critical determinant of instability is credit rather 
than money (but here credit includes bank notes). The importance of money is in its 
'rapidity' of circulation through credit media (bills of exchange, letters of credit, etc.) 
rather than its quantity. From the official accounts of the Banks of France and England, 
it could be established that 'there has been no prosperous period without an increase', 
virtually continuous, of the prices of the 'principal commodities', and that invariably the 
crisis occurs when prices are at their maximum. Credit is the 'prime mover' of the 
mechanism. The crisis ends when prices, having fallen, begin again to rise. 
Juglar denied the 'periodicity' of crises and strongly contradicted Jevons's notion 
that they are linked to sunspots. It would be stretching the point to fix the 'periodic 
recurrence to five or ten years', The retour periodique can thus be interpreted, not as 
41AII translations mine - P.E. 
42Cf. Mitchell's institutionalist ideas about the 'money economy' (next chapter). 
43(1889) p. 10. 
44(1889) p. 10. 
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meaning 'periodic recurrence', but rather as 'recurrent but not periodic'.4s Juglar also did 
not hold with the idea that crises could arise from exogenous influences, the 'accidents' 
or 'extraordinary events'. Each industry had its own special history which could not be 
fitted into a recurrent pattern: such events could only act as a 'fuse' and only when 'the 
charge is already primed'.46 Crises were by this argument always predictable because the 
precondition of 'unhealthy speculation' is always observed before the 'tempest'.47 
By the turn of the century Juglar had begun to examine fluctuations in the real 
sector more closely. In a pamphlet of 1900, Des Crises Commerciales et Financreres et les 
Crises Economiques Generales, he distinguished two types of crisis: those arising from 
credit-market conditions and those in the real sector generated by 'overproduction' (crises 
de surproduction) or from structural change. The latter, 'general', crises were described 
as 'breaking when .. .improvements, sudden and deep, in production and in land and sea 
transport, modify the usual proportions of supply and demand'. Nevertheless, a 
crisis of overproduction brought on from a very rapid change in production 
techniques, in means of transport or in public tastes, brings an ordinary 
commercial crisis with its accustomed phases. ([1900], p. 18) 
Prices fell in either case, and the years after 1873 were explained as a combination of the 
two types of crisis. Juglar thus acknowledged, in common with other observers, the 
diversity of both the causes and effects of instabilities. Because he considered the velocity 
of bank-note circulation to be an important factor, his ideas about money do not differ 
greatly from later quantity-theoretic formulations. 
4Slbid., pp. 162-9. 
46lbid., p. 165. 
4'lbid. 
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2.2.4. Early Twentieth Century Writers: the Acceptance of Quantity-Theoretic Explanations 
Every nineteenth century writer so far discussed believed that short-run 
fluctuations were effects of monetary and price instabilities. By the end of the century a 
consensus had developed that in the steady state, nominal output was directly 
proportional to the intensity of the monetary circulation. The idea, of course, was an 
ancient one, as Wicksell had found. An 'equation of exchange' appeared explicitly in 1857 
in the tract The Present Crisis by the American writer George Dutton, who was attempting 
to distinguish real and nominal effects in the events of that year; and again in 1885 in 
Newcomb's Principles of Political Economy. This work was significant because Irving 
Fisher later took Newcomb's equation as the basis for his own. Although the purpose of 
quantity equations was to describe the steady state, most authorities attempted to adapt 
their expressions to account for ,-),clical instabilities. Since the repeal of the Usury Laws 
in England and the United States in the 1830s and 1840s, the role played by interest rates 
in economic disturbances had attracted increasing attention as a component of price 
determination. The most influential of such theories was probably Wicksell's idea of a 
'natural rate of interest', defined as 'neutral in respect to commodity prices [tending] 
neither to raise nor to lower them'.48 
The provenance of the natural rate lay in the Quantity Theory, to which Wicksell 
devoted a full chapter. He accepted that ceteris paribus the determination of prices by the 
quantity of the circulation could be valid. However, the 'things' required to 'remain 
equal', especially velocity, were so often found in practice to be volatile that he judged 
it 'impossible to decide a priori' whether the theory could hold. His chief reservation was 
the direction of causality: 
Incomes determine prices; but we might just as well say ... that the fornler are 
deternlined by the latter ... [There] is no category of income that is not, to a 
"Interest and Prices (1898] p. 102. 
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greater or lesser degree, dependent on, or regulated by, the prices of goods and 
services. ([1898] p. 45) 
The problem of validating Quantity Theory thus became a question of 'chicken and egg' 
and the solution lay in disturbances caused by differences between the 'natural rate' and 
market, or 'money rate' of interest: if 'the money rate is relatively too low all prices rise', 
and vice versa. Such a mechanism could in theory be self-equilibrating; in practice a 
'fairly constant' difference between natural and market rates could be maintained for long 
periods, although they would 'eventually coincide'!9 
To Thorstein Veblen, the great Institutionalist, crisis and depression were 
primarily phenomena of price disturbance [affecting] industry because industry 
is managed on a business footing, in temlS of price and for the sake of profits.5O 
Increases in money supply, arising for example from an increase in gold or government 
purchases, resulted in price rises through increased demand and speculation. Increased 
prices brought an expectation in the markets of future increases in profits which, through 
the medium of the stock exchanges, increased the total capitalization of industry. This 
increase in the asset base allowed an expansion of commercial credit, a process repeated 
until it was undermined as costs began to rise faster than prices. A crisis developed as the 
speculation began to appear excessive to the markets, usually precipitated by the calling 
in of loans by a major creditor. Veblen argued that the depressed conditions following 
a crisis would perpetuate themselves from a combination, first of technological 
innovations which forced the scrapping of partially amortized equipment and second, of 
the capital restructuring which reduced fixed costs and turned the hitherto weakest 
competitors into the strongest ones. 
George Hull published Industrial Depressions, a study of economic fluctuations in 
the United States, in 1911, with a revised edition in 1926. His writing was somewhat 
<I9/bid •• Chapter 8. 
5IlSee The Theory of Business Enterprise [1904]. Chapter VII. Institutionalism was the philosophical school to which Mitchell 
adhered. 
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eccentric and is in the tradition of mid-nineteenth century American polemical literature 
of the rather than of the later, more scholarly approach of, say, Irving Fisher. Hull 
dissented from the quantity theory, emphasizing conditions in the real sector, especially 
the construction industry. Like Juglar, with whose works he was familiar, he distinguished 
between commercial crises (,panics') and depressions, the first psychological and the 
second material; and like Juglar, he criticised Jevons's sunspot theory, whose untenability 
rested in Hull's opinion on empirical rather than a priori grounds. The two types of 
instability operated independently, the evidence of the government commissions 
emphasizing that on many occasions one had occurred without being followed by the 
other. Periods of industrial prosperity were marked by increases in manufacturing and 
construction, and of depression by the decrease in these sectors. The phase indicator was 
the price of manufactured goods (a function of supply conditions), the onset of 
depression being signalled the when it reached a maximum. Overproduction did not cause 
depressions. The 'checking of manufacturing and construction' because of high prices 
caused the slump in demand for industrial goods. If anything, underproduction was the 
real cause of depression, a view Hull seems to have shared with earlier American writers. 
The idea that industrial depressions could be periodic was considered 'absurd ... the actual 
divisions [ranging] all the way from one to fifteen years'. Other theories, such as excess 
of fixed capital, were also rejected. 
In 1911 Irving Fisher published The Purchasing Power of Money, a study of the 
quantity theory. The relation M V + M ' V' = E p Q = P T - where M ,M' are currency 
and demand deposits respectively, V, V I their respective velocities, p and Q individual 
commodity prices and quantities, and P, T their aggregates - was borrowed from 
Newcomb, to whom the book is dedicated. In its pure form it is a theory of the 
determination of the price-level (or its inverse, the 'purchasing power of money'). The 
five variables (,groups of causes') affecting price levels are 'money, deposits, their 
velocities of circulation, and the volume of trade'. However, the 'five causes in turn [are 
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found to] be themselves the effects of antecedent causes .. : such as diversification of 
industry, increased efficiency and decreased cost of transport, and increased gold supply 
and bank credit. Behind these 'antecedent causes', if pursued to 'remoter stages' emerged 
yet an increasing number of causes as 'the number of one's ancestors increases with each 
generation into the past'. Causality in Fisher's version of the quantity theory is expressed 
by the proposition' ... the normal effects of an increase in the quantity of money is an exactly 
propOrlional increase in the general level of prices [emphasis in original)', all other things 
being equal.Sl However, this holds as a 'normal or ultimate effect after transition periods 
are over'. 
Chapter IV discussed the dynamics of disequilibrium effects. A disturbance may 
occur, for example, through an increase in the quantity of gold: prices increase, inducing 
a rise in profits, because even if costs rise proportionally, increases in the costs of 
borrowing lag behind the general price rise. Loans expand, and hence deposits rise faster 
than currency, which induces further price rises. 
In other words, a slight initial rise of prices sets in motion a train of events which 
tends to repeat itself. Rise of prices generates rise of prices, and continues to do 
so as long as the interest rate lags behind its normal figure [emphasis in original]. 
([1911] p. 60) 
Furthermore, the volume of trade will be disturbed by relatively cheap loans, as will the 
velocities. In such a 'boom' the debtor will benefit and the creditor suffer. With money 
'spoiling .. .Iike ripe fruit', the tendency is a flight into goods, which further disturbs the 
Q's. Because prices are further inflated, the process repeats itself, with what appears to 
be an implicit multiplier. During the inflationary period real interest rates fall: the 
nominal rate rises, but prices rise faster. In due course, the banks raise rates faster than 
prices to protect their reserves and eventually the boom collapses into a credit crisis as 
profits vanish and debtors default. The period of this 'commercial pendulum' is seen to 
51(1911] p. 157. 
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be about ten years; and these periods of transition are the rule, with periods of 
'equilibrium the exception,.s2 
Natural and man-made disasters were identified as the main features of crises in 
earlier centuries; but as late as 1914, Prof. M.T. England argued that exogenous disasters, 
both natural and man-made, could provoke crises distinct from ordinary cyclical 
phenomena.s3 The most complete summary of pre-industrial conditions (which Mitchell 
later distinguished from those of the 'money economy') is given by William Scott in his 
1912 study of late-medieval commerce (see Section 2.4 below).s4 Scott found crises on 
average every 11112 years from 1558 to 1720, but was sceptical of Jevons's periodicity 
hypothesis because 'disturbances of this kind were so frequent in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries that it is possible to extend the list very considerably'. In the end, 
based on the data for the whole period, Scott came down in favour of an explanation 
resulting from 
the joint action of subjective and objective conditions, which in the period under 
review takes the form of what may be described as the occurrence of 'unforeseen' 
conditions ... Things that are unpredictable are liable to cause crises, if of 
sufficient importance. ([1912] Volume I, p. 469) 
2.3. CHRONOLOGIES UP TO 1914 
The transition to a theory of continuous business cycles was not complete until 
the 1920s. Most of the pre-1914 evidence was historical rather than statistical, 
emphasizing events rather than processes. Thus, as late as 1913, writers such as England 
5lIbid., Sections 2 and 3. 
53England still considered crop failure to be important. See [1914] p. 351. A footnote to this discussion indicates that 
Jevons's sunspot theory might even at that date have had some residual credit. Prof. England taught at the University of 
Nebraska, which may partly account for this interest. Before dismissing the effects of agricultural disasters too quickly it 
is well to remember the 'dust bowl' conditions oC the 19305 in America. 
54The Constitution and Finanee of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720. Scott was a lecturer in political 
economy at the University of St. Andrews. 
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could attach significant weight to 'unforseen' calamities. Scott's chronology of economic 
conditions from 1558 to 1720 gives a good sense of the emphasis on crises as explanations 
of trade fluctuations which still flourished at a comparatively late stage in the prewar 
period. Of the 33 occurrences of crisis between in that long period, all but 29 had some 
non-economic factors (famine, plague, war, etc.). This was thought in the 1920s, by 
Wesley Mitchell and others, to demonstrate that commercial business cycles did not 
emerge until the banking system (the 'money economy') had become fully developed (see 
next chapter). 
Jevons's chronology is suspect because he was inclined to ignore years of crisis 
that did not coincide with bad harvests and sun-spot maxima; but numerous other 
accounts were kept in the ninetee~th century, and, beginning with the annual survey of 
trade in the Economist in the 1840s, these developed into statistical series. The 
chronologies which have been cited in recent studies, and which were compiled for most 
of the events of the century, are those of Juglarffhom and Hyndman, for commercial 
crises in various countries, and of Hull, for industrial 'depressions' in the United States.55 
The dates of crises (or 'panics'), 1815-1892, are given in Table 2.3.1, and show broad 
agreement. Hull's dates of depressions (for the US) are: 1836-9, 1855-8, 1865-70, 1882-5 
and 1890. This bare chronology conceals vivid accounts of almost continuous distress, an 
interpretation of events which would have had wide acceptance at the time. It is well to 
bear in mind, however, that historical accounts, with their preoccupation with events, 
sometimes fail sufficiently to emphasize the underlying processes that distinguish 
economic from political history: in this case continuous growth throughout the period.56 
An analysis of the histories of Hyndman for British, and Juglarffhom for United States 
55Decourcy w. Thorn, Juglar's American acolyte, published a posthumous English language version of Crises commerciales, 
updated to 1915, incorporating ideas and statistics of his own. 
'"No one, from Jevons onward, underestimated the expansion. The chronologies emphasized crisis because growth was seen 
as 'natural' and beyond regulatory control. 
33 
'crises', and Hull for US industrial disturbances suggests that although sharing some 
common features, these episodes were each unique in most important respects. 
Close reading of Hyndman especially shows that he was aware of multiple 
economic states coexisting during each of the episodes. He emphasizes the transition in 
the British economy during the first 40 years of the nineteenth century from an 
agricultural economy to the 'workshop of the world', with its share of sea trade similarly 
extended to a position of near monopoly. All factors grew at an accelerating rate: 
population (e.g. by one-sixth from 1821 to 1831), agricultural yields, industry, 
infrastructure and the banking system. Throughout the whole century the 'well-to-do 
c1asses ... were becoming steadily richer' as the economy continued to grow despite the 
disturbances. Annual rents of land increased by £40 million in the period, and wheat 
yields increased at the rate of 44 million bushels per annum (far more in percentage 
terms than the increase of farm labour).s7 Growth was both monetary and real: for 
example, the years 1847-1857 saw annual increases in UK domestic gold stock of about 
£25 million. This, combined with price increases and increases in industrial output 
combined to mislead businessmen into believing that the economy was richer than was 
really the case. The instabilities thus induced, largely by nominal factors, led to a crisis 
when a speculative bubble burst in 1857. The real distress was concentrated upon the 
labour market where hundreds of thousands were temporarily thrown out of work. The 
crisis was thus 'industrial' but precipitated by irresponsible behaviour in the financial 
sector. 
57[1892] Chapter III. 
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Table 2.3.1. Dates of Nineteenth Century Crises 
Juglar/Thom Reference Dates Hyndman Reference 
Dates 
us UK UK 
1814 1815 1815 
1818 1818 
-
1826 1825 1825 
1829-31 1830 
-
1837-9 1836-9 1836-9 
1848 1847 1847 
1857 1857 1857 
1864 1864-6 1866 
1873 1873 1873 
1884 1882 1882 
1890-1 1890-1 1890 
After 1850 the underlying process became the explosive growth of foreign trade, 
which among the industrial powers 'doubled' from 1857 to 1873, making the respective 
economies increasingly interdependent. As the royal commissions had found, 'a great 
advance in the production of wealth', a fall of transport costs and an improvement of the 
speed of movement coexisted with the 'bad trade and stagnation'. Unemployment was 
thought to be caused by technical improvements, and a theory of 'overpopulation' again 
became fashionable,58 Productivity improvements cited by Hyndman include, for the ten 
years to 1883, a 16 percent increase in coal production with a fall of 4 percent in the 
number of miners; and in iron and steel, an increase of 26 percent in production with an 
increase of 0,3 percent in the work force. Income tax receipts grew by 4 percent per 
annum. The same trends were manifest in America, where 'productive power' increased 
58 percent in the same period, while the employed labour force increased by only 33 
percent, with trading conditions 'stagnant' overall.59 
511t yet again became so between the wars, in the guise of 'Eugenics', Although at its most extreme Germany, the 
movement attracted respectable figures in the Western democracies (including Keynes and Dr. Marie Stopes). 
59(1892) Chapter VIII. 
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Hyndman argued that although crises were of diverse origin, they were commonly 
associated with some failure of capitalism. The following table shows a summary of his 
analysis. 
Table 2.3.2. Hyndman's Account of Nineteenth Century Crises 
Year 'Cause' 
1836-9 Collapse of credit speculation 
1847 Exogenous shocks and collapse of boom in capital markets 
1857 Collapse of speculative boom 
1866 Bank failure 
1873 Collapse of Vienna stock market diffused though world 
economy 
1882 Bank failure diffused though world stock markets 
1890 Collapse of Barings Bank 
The Juglarffhom version was similar in its account of events to Hyndman's, but implicitly 
followed Juglar's theories of price/credit behaviour rather than Marx's critique of 
capitalism. Hull was more concerned with supporting his own theory of price cycles in the 
construction industry. Economic growth and the multiplicity of 'causes' was acknowledged 
by all, either implicitly or explicitly. 
2.4. TIME SERIES BEFORE 1914: DATA AND METIIOD 
Although aggregate output series, even at annual frequencies, were hardly known 
before the 1930s, price records were available from very early times. The first writer 
systematically to analyse large amounts of data was Tooke in the 1840s, and this work 
became the basic reference for later research. An example Tooke's approach is the series 
of maximum and minimum cotton prices, 1782-1820, reproduced in Mitchell [1988], and 
plotted here as Figure 2.4.1. These prices were sampled at unequal intervals and so are 
not directly comparable to modern time series. Tooke, moreover, did not transform his 
data - e.g., by moving averages or indexation - but merely presented them as an 
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historical record. In addition to prices he also compiled data on banking and currency 
operations, including the balance sheets of the Bank of England. Jevons's price data were 
based on Tooke's and that of the Economist, and writers as late as Rostow refer to those 
series to support their arguments. 
2.4.1. levons's Time-Series Analysis 
Jevons published a tract on purchasing power in 1863 which used both index 
numbers and averages to investigate possible changes following the gold discoveries in 
Australia and California. His method was to construct indices of commodity prices and 
the note circulation for the years 1845-1862. Jevons thought that they showed a general 
fall of purchasing power from 'about 1853', and also that 'an expansion of the currency 
[occurred] one or two years previous to a rise of prices'.60 An 1865 tract amplified the 
statistical method, using Tooke's time series; but Jevons thought that such raw data 'were 
in want of some method of [redu,cing] and elucidating the general facts contained in 
them'. The proposed method was modified by the use of a geometric mean to calculate 
an index of price changes, i.e., ~ ! x !l for two commodities, where the price of the first 
a p 
commodity changes from a to b, and the second from p to q.61 Index numbers were 
calculated for 12 individual commodity groups and an aggregate of 40 commodities, 
examples of which are shown in figures 2.4.2(a)-(d). For the individual commodities both 
money-price and relative-price changes (,actual' and 'comparative') are given. Jevons's 
purpose was to find evidence to support his belief that prices rose in the Napoleonic 
Wars while specie payments were suspended, fell after 1815 and then rose again with the 
gold discoveries of the 1840s. He also experimented with seasonal analysis, using 
note-circulation statistics for England, Scotland and Ireland, and found evidence of 
110(1884) pp. 76 and 101. 
61/bid" pp, 113-114. I..aspeyres apparently criticised this, arguing that the simple arithmetic mean was more appropriate 
for measuring changes in 'purchasing power'. 
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recurrent fourth-quarter pressure on the reserves of the Bank from seasonal increases 
in the circulation.62 
2.4.2. Later Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Data 
Until the first decade of the present century, nearly all time-series analysis was 
of price behaviour, which is comparatively easy to measure. Beginning in 1871, the United 
Kingdom Board of Trade collected information and published indices of wholesale prices 
for most commodity groups, as well as an aggregate index. Nine of these series are shown 
in Figure 2.4.3. The Sauerbeck index of commodities and precious metals appeared 
annually in the Statist from 1886 (Figure 2.4.4). Beveridge published a UK wholesale 
price index in his 1909 book Unemployment, covering the period 1871-1907, reproduced 
here as Figure 2.4.5. He also plotted a number of real and nominal variables in per capita 
terms: prices, employment, bank rate, foreign trade, etc. - perhaps the first instance of 
output estimates. These were plotted as 'The Pulse of the Nation', an early example of 
graphical trade-cycle analysis.63 Beveridge believed that employment levels rose and fell 
as waves, and at very much the same times in all his industrial groups. The price series 
shown here all appear to confirm the commonly held view that prices fell from about 
1873 to about 1896 and rose thereafter. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
Keynes's assertions not withstanding, and despite the 'multiplying' explanations, 
economists of the 'long nineteenth century' were preoccupied with the problematical 
stability of purchasing power. The debate was as much social and political as economic. 
Recurrent financial crisis, with associated price volatility, undermined the banking system, 
62Jbid., pp. 151-174. 
6'JUnemployment, p. 44. 
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and its backwash regularly embarrassed large sections of the middle class. Debasement 
of the currency was hence seen as a threat to the 'natural' social order which was still 
thought, at least by conservatives, to be equivalent to divine right. This is the import of 
Bagehot's commentary (and perhaps of Jevons 's). The efforts of the 'dirty crowd of little 
men' to elbow their way into established power was seen almost as a species of economic 
and social warfare - an attempt to usurp the existing order by the unrestricted printing 
of money, threatening the ruin of both usurper and usurped. Up to the publication of 
Mill's Principles at least, economic debate about the stability of money - and in extreme 
form about finding an intrinsically valuable medium of exchange - was, in fact, really a 
coded debate about the distribution of wealth. The formal link between prices, real 
output and money in the various quantity equations, each of which was an expression of 
an equilibrium relation, were designed to suggest an immutable order, and were therefore 
unsuitable for explaining observed phenomena. 
The Quantity Theory was an attempt to demonstrate that economies were stable 
because both prices and output were completely determined 'in the long run' by monetary 
conditions. This formal idealization had some intuitive appeal: it was plausible and could 
be used to justify a fairly severe monetary regime if required. However, it suffered, as did 
all neo-classical theory, from being static, which is surprising in view of the acknowledged 
dynamic properties of the nineteenth century economy: the persistence of growth and 
continuous structural change. Thus even the most committed quantity theorists were 
forced to modify their ideas to take account of disequilibrium. 
Apart from price and financial data, statistical sources were limited in the 
nineteenth century. Quantity Theory was primarily interested in the Ms and the P's 
rather than the Q's, which were considered exogenous. Accounts of trade fluctuations, 
as in Hyndman, Juglarffhom and Hull, were anecdotal in the sense that they did not 
make use of real output data sampled at regular intervals, but rather adduced ad hoc 
quantitative evidence in support of particular points, much in the way of legal briefs. 
Beveridge, for the first time in 1909 plotted real variables, but these were in per capita 
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terms because of his preoccupation with labour market conditions. The advantage of 
time-series plots is that they give an impression of longer-run processes, if any, as well 
as of short-run irregularities. Even if long-run tendencies may have been dominant, the 
absence of information about them gave the false impression that economies were 
governed solely by short-run disturbances. This is the point Marshall was trying to make 
in his royal commission evidence: that the depressed state of the British economy in the 
1880s was as much apparent as real, and that depressed prices, yields and profits masked 
persistent real growth and structural, technical and demographic change. Juglar's 1900 
pamphlet speculated that the long price declines were really evidence of increased 
technological efficiency, a consensus shared by most late nineteenth century writers. By 
1914 the debate had focused on transmission mechanisms rather than underlying 'causes' 
and there was a firm consensus among economists that monetary instabilities drove prices 
and that prices drove profits and their expectations. While prices continued to have long 
swings, sometimes rising and sometimes falling, this consensus continued; and the debate 
about 'causes' became a non-operational debate about the existence of equilibrium. 
When pressed, however, all writers of the period conceded that a number of different 
processes might be going on concurrently. The consensus about lagged adjustment 
implied that 'causes' were 'chickens and eggs', a view which later came to reside at the 
core of Mitchell's business-cycle hypothesis. In other words, the 'cause' of current 
conditions was previous conditions. 
There remains, however, the question whether the state of any economy can ever 
be described historically by a single phrase: as 'depressed', 'prosperous', etc. Juglar's 
belief in two types of crisis - financial and the industrial, each arising from a different 
set of conditions - indicates that by 1900 he no longer supported the single-state model. 
Although price and credit-market behaviour indicated that unitary 'states' could occur, 
anecdotal information from the real sector suggested that such conditions were unlikely. 
Marshall and Giffen, as well as Juglar, were sceptical of a 'general state of trade', and 
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thought that the recurrent credit 'manias' and collapses were only part of the story. As 
early as the 1660s Petty had distinguished between real depressions of trade and apparent 
depressions merely of mood, and this psychological theme emerged again in the work of 
Bagehot, Mills and Juglar. Both Juglar and Hull thought that real and nominal variables 
could follow independent paths. The 'state of the economy' at any time was thus largely 
a subjective assessment dependent upon the strength of mood of particular interest 
groups, as Marshall and Giffen argued. The difficulty for nineteenth century economists 
was lack of information: although all accepted (even those on the Left) that growth 
continued strongly throughout the period, none had much quantitative evidence of where 
and how much growth there actually was. Information on fluctuations was nominal rather 
than real, and so equally unreliable. Both Left and Right emphasized the disturbances, 
the former because of their effects on employment, and the latter because of their 
implications for profits. Neither view was objective or balanced; yet their juxtaposition 
constituted a political sub-text to nineteenth century economic analysis. 
Even allowing for the known lacunae in data sources, the impression given by all 
contemporary writers is of perceptions of behaviour in the period to 1914 as having 
complex and multifarious patterns, among which they distinguished 
(1) short-run fluctuations in output, prices and the money supply; 
(2) long swings in prices, which as contemporary sources show, fell 
consistently from 1815 to the mid-1890s, and then rose until 1914; 
(3) the long-run tendency of most sectors to grow; 
(4) the structural changes, e.g., technology, the decline of agriculture, etc., 
which appeared to accelerate towards the end of the century, leading 
many observers to distinguish their effects from those of financial crises; 
(5) and the economic effects of demographic changes, which were 
controversial. 
In addition were the nominal versus real effects which price movements rendered difficult 
to separate or interpret, and the psychological effects - the 'outcry from the 
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market-place'; and these 'multiplying solutions' had serious implications for later students 
of short-run fluctuations. 
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CHAP1ER3 
BUSINESS CYCLES, MITCHELL AND THE NBER: THE 'EMPIRICAL' VIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The political and economic conditions that Wesley Mitchell found when he first 
considered the problem of business cycles at the turn of the century were at the least 
ambiguous in character. Theoretical explanations had proliferated in the previous 
hundred years to the extent that they threatened 'to be confusing rather than 
iIIuminating'.l On the other hand statistical evidence was 'sufficiently abundant ... to make 
hopeless a purely empirical investigation'.2 The 'multiplying' explanations, each 
'inadequate' on its own, were in the main mutuaIly exclusive. Catalogued under three 
main and 25 sub-headings, they provided 'persuasive demonstrations that each one of a 
dozen different processes reveals the factor of crucial importance'.3 Mitchell therefore 
saw his work as an attempt either to choose between them, or to synthesize them in a 
coherent theoretical framework, or else to find a more satisfactory theory of his own 
based on empirical evidence rather than on the neoclassical practice of deduction from 
first principles. His research programme and results fiIled three large volumes, Business 
Cycles (1913] (BC), Business Cycles, the Problem and its Setting (1927] (BCPS) and 
Measuring Business Cycles [1946] (MBC). 
The complexities of the topic and the encyclopedic nature of Mitchell's writing 
have obscured his objectives and findings from later view. Nowadays, Measuring Business 
Cycles is thought to have established 'definitive' evidence of recurrent fluctuations 
diffused throughout the economy. It is also generally believed that Mitchell had no 
interest at all in theory, and indeed that the techniques employed are 'measurement 
without theory'. This interpretation is wrong; yet nowadays practically every research 
1(1927] p. 47. 
zIbid., p. 3. 
'Ibid. 
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paper on business cycles cites the 'definition' on p. 3 of MBC and implicitly accepts an 
empirical interpretation of that work. It is the purpose of the present chapter to show 
what Mitchell's real intentions were, the extent to which his work has been 
misunderstood, and how this misunderstanding has led to distortions in the assumptions 
and results on which all recent business-cycle research is based. For it is can be 
demonstrated that in many ways Mitchell's ideas were surprisingly close to the 
mainstream economic theory of his day, notably Professor Irving Fisher's quantity theory, 
but that this was forgotten in the wake of cultural shifts in economics after 1945 - the 
Keynesian revolution and its rejection of monetarism. 
The most perplexing aspect of Mitchell's work is that despite the expenditure of 
enormous intellectual resources on theoretical argument and empirical investigation, he 
constantly speculated against the very existence of the phenomena described by his own 
hypothesis. Antiphonal voices of argument and counter-argument are evident on 
practically every page of the three volumes. The clue to what he really believed and found 
lies in these spasmodic expressions of self-doubt. It is shown below that rather than 
finding clear-cut evidence of 'business cycles', Mitchell's analysis was inconclusive. 
Unfortunately such an inference is itself buried in a voluminous and discursive text and 
obscured at every turn by the very ambiguities he was seeking to avoid. 
Section 3.2 of the current chapter discusses Mitchell's approach to theoretical 
explanations of business cycles and how this approach was influenced by his 
Institutionalist views and by the prevailing quantity-theoretic consensus of the period. 
Section 3.3 examines the results of his empirical work and the extent to which its 
direction was pre-programmed by the search for a theory. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss 
interpretations of Mitchell's work by other economists, the errors propagated by these 
interpretations, and their consequences for later research. 
50 
3.2. MITCHElL'S TI-IEORY OF BUSINESS CYCLES 1890-1939 
Social conditions in the United States during Mitchell's formative years in the 
1890s were far from ideal. The background of events was depression, falling prices and 
incomes, monetary instability and social unrest; agrarian revolt whose extreme expression 
was the Populist movement; bimetallism and a panic out of dollars into gold; and finally 
the restoration of 'sound money' after the defeat of the Populist candidate in the 
presidential election of 1896. Pressure for more moderate reforms crystallized in the 
so-called 'progressive' movement, which has been described in a large literature beyond 
the scope of the present study. The true motivation for change, according to a recent 
account in McElvaine [1984], was the social effects of economic distress, especially in 
agriculture. So alarmed were the middle classes by growing unrest that by the turn of 
century even conservatives had been forced into a reforming mode in an attempt to 
thwart the gathering revolutionary forces. The scope of the proposed measures was 
strictly limited, designed as it was to deflect the 'discontent that had been so evident 
among farmers and workers in the nineties' rather than to promote social justice. 
Reforms would thus be imposed from above, rather than being 'won by the struggle of 
the lower classes'.4 
Manifestations of this philosophy can be seen, for example, in Theodore 
Roosevelt's anti-trust legislation and the expansion of the national parks (a movement 
that Mitchell actively supported), and later in Woodrow Wilson's moralistic view of 
America's European policy. The First World War had an additional effect on the 
American political consciousness: the US government, in order to mobilize the nation, 
had embarked, for the first time, on serious social and economic planning. 
Indeed, its has been ... argued that the models for many programs and practices 
of the New Deal [FDR's political programme of the 1930s] are to be found in 
wartime Washington rather than in the proposals of progressive reformers. John 
'[1984J p. 9. 
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Dewey, for one, took note in 1918 of 'the social possibilities of war'. ([1984] p. 
11) 
Dewey was one of Mitchell's professors at the University of Chicago in the 1890s. 'Social 
possibilities' meant, for example, increases in real wages and the growth of collective 
bargaining, all objectives with which progressives would have agreed. (They also implied, 
controversially, some form of public direction of resources and control of prices and 
incomes.) 
3.2.1. Progressivism and Institutionalism: Mitchell's Ethical Foundations 
Mitchell had the progressive's strong sense of rational optimism and social justice. 
The former is shown by his faith in science for both positive and normative purposes, the 
latter by his dissent from the rigours of classical theory which he thought dealt too lightly 
with the disturbances threatening to overwhelm the existing order. These values were 
acquired in the economics and philosophy faculties of the University of Chicago from 
1890. Arthur Burns, in a memorial essay published in 1952, asserts that this turbulence 
in 'large affairs .. .imparted a monetary slant to Mitchell's early economic thinking'.s It was, 
however, the philosophers Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey who exerted the most 
profound influence. Dewey argued that because economic agents were not in general 
rational it was impossible to predict their actions from theoretical first principles. 
Economic behaviour must rather be 'a matter of observation, which the economic 
theorists take all too Iightly'.6 Veblen's virtuoso performances 'got nothing more certain 
[about the motivation and behaviour of agents] with another set of premises'. Mitchell 
objected to the anti-empirical nature of economic theory from the very beginning; yet 
adopted much of Veblen's thinking, especially the ideas (a) that economic behaviour was 
habituated by institutional influences such as the 'money economy', and (b) that dynamic 
'Wesley Qair Mitchell, the Economic Scientist, p. 10. 
6Described by Mitchell in a letter to J.M. Clark, 1928, reprinted in Ibid., p. 95. 
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paths were evolutionary sequences rather than rational adjustments to market conditions. 
Classical value and distribution theory were unsatisfactory because they only dealt with 
'what happens in an imaginary "static state" ... [and] therefore [possess] but meager 
scientific interest'.' Habit created customs and conventions, principles of conduct and 
preconceptions 'cumulatively', with only indirect reference to native instincts (i.e., the 
hedonistic model of pain and pleasure). This emphasis distinguished Veblen's approach 
from the neo-classical. Such processes implied adjustment-lags as conditions changed, 
and explanations of current behaviour were thus found in 'preceding instalments of the 
story', rather than in the idealized, immutable and platonic properties of individual 
behaviour. 
Mitchell shared the Veblenite position that the interposition of money and 
financial institutions between the agent and his need for goods had distorted economic 
behaviour. 
Money becomes a most significant thing in the economy of society, because it 
shapes the habits of thought in which our native propensities grow ... [The ] use of 
money 'exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own' ... We wish to seem 
well-lo-do ... In practice we make goods in order to make money. ([1937] p. 304) 
Economic instabilities are the side-effect of this dichotomy. The 
recurrent crises and depressions which ever and again reduce that flow of goods 
to consumers are due to business, not to industry. There is no technological 
reason why every few years we should have idle factories and unemployed men 
walking the streets, while thousands lack the goods employers and men would 
like to supply. «(1937] p. 307 ) 
Classical theory, with its emphasis on equilibrium, addressed such problems only by 
denying them. 
7The Backward Art of Spending Money, (1937), p. 292. 
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3.2.2. Mitchell and the Quantity Theory 
Mitchell's writings on monetary economics have two distinct strands. The first is 
a critical appraisal of the Quantity Theory in the form proposed by Irving Fisher; the 
second, the idea that the workings of the 'money economy' are the source of the 
instabilities leading both to 'business cycles' and financial crises. Mitchell initially disliked, 
but later found much common ground with, the quantity theorists, as is shown by his 
comments on The Purchasing Power of Money.8 He accepted Fisher's 'inductive 
verification' of the equation of exchange from a statistical study of prices for the years 
1896-1909 in the United States. As might be expected, Mitchell was more interested in 
the process of dynamic adjustment, described by Fisher in Chapter IV for 'abnormal' 
periods, than in the steady state. This redeemed the theory for Mitchell; it was the lags 
in adjustment that were important, not the resultant position after the adjustments had 
worked through. The 'transitional' adjustment process was 'real', whereas the steady state 
was merely 'notional'. Fisher's work might thus be improved by addressing lags, not only 
'of interest rates to changes in the price level', but also in all parts of the 'system of 
prices', as well as in raw materials, etc.9 
This view that the distress caused by short-run adjustment-lags was more 
important than long-run relations led Mitchell to search for a description of the 
underlying institutional conditions that generated lags: the fundamental idea behind the 
'business-cycle' hypothesis. He did not, however, entirely break with Fisher over the 
relation between money supply, the price level and aggregate output: the discussion of 
Quantity Theory in BCPS, analysing the conditions under which the equation is valid, 
follows Fisher's argument very closely. Like most contemporary economists Mitchell held 
that business cycles were driven by changes in expectations of business profits and, by 
'Political Science Quarterly, 1912. 
9(1912) p. 164. 
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implication, prices; but that both short- and long-run behaviour were compatible with 
Fisher's framework. 
In temlS of the equation of exchange [the lags] mean that of the payments 
(MV + M'V') made today, the bulk are payments for goods transferred (T) some 
time ago, at prices (P) most of which were agreed upon still earlier ... [The] 
day-by-day relations between MV + M'V' and PT are indetemlinate - the 
payments made to-day are most unlikely to equal the prices quoted to-day 
mUltiplied by the goods exchanged to-day ... 
However, in the 'long-run' the relation was valid: 
Quite different is the position when we test the equation of exchange as 
summarizing the transactions of a large community for some interval such as a 
year ... On that basis, we can say both that the payments, prices and transfers 
represented all refer to approxinlately the same period of time, and that the two 
sides of the equation are nearly equal in fact. ([1927] p. 131) 
In Mitchell's model, 'revival' emerges out of 'depression' because the quantity of 
money in circulation 'exceeds current requirements'. Velocity is depressed and 'idle 
money' accumulates in banks, with a consequent reduction in interest rates. The money 
supply adjusts itself to conditions in the real sector. With higher expected profits, loans 
increase unchecked by monetary constraints, promoting 'an ascending spiral' in trade 
volumes and prices. Lags between contracts, deliveries and payments allow businesses to 
arrange finance. 
In Professor Fisher's terms ... an increase of P, which swells the value of 
inventories, becomes the basis for an increase in M' ... An increase in T ... plays the 
same role, unless it is offset by a decline of prices ... Thus most of the tinle P and 
T are the 'active' factors in the equation of exchange ... ([1927] pp. 134-137) 
Elasticities of all factors affecting payments are such that occasionally, but not invariably, 
PT reaches the limits of money supply, bringing a liquidity crisis. The key to reconciling 
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the 'contradictory statements' lies in an understanding of the lag mechanisms governing 
Fisher's variables: 
Relations which hold in long periods do not hold in short ones ... I do not think 
that anything said here is incompatible with Professor Fisher's 
exposition ... provided his tern) 'normally' is not taken in the sense of usually. Nor 
is the present discussion inconsistent with the celebrated theorem: 'Other things 
being equal, prices vary directly as the quantity of money in circulation.' ... [or] 
'Other things being equal, prices vary directly as the physical volume of trade.' 
([1927] p. 138) 
Mitchell was consistently hostile to the classical idea of equilibrium, and its 
complementary notion of a 'normal' economic state, because of their static nature. The 
true dynamics of economic adjustment are lagged and frictional, a view which for its time 
was surprisingly modern. As an alternative to the steady-state he proposed the concept 
of a dynamic equilibrium based on balance sheet and profit-and-Ioss accounting 
identities, since 'business enterprises cannot "carry on" unless in the long run their 
incomes exceed their outlays by a satisfactory margin of profits'.lO 
3.2.3. Mitchell's Theory of Business Cycles: a Problem of the 'Money Economy' 
Quantity-theoretic ideas were accepted at least until the outbreak of war in 1939. 
The contentious issues continued to be Fisher's 'antecedent causes' and the nature of lags 
in price and profit adjustments. Mitchell's theory of business cycles can be described as 
Institutionalist philosophy superimposed on the framework of equations of exchange. In 
the letter to Clark cited above, he commented that his interest in the 'ebb and flow' of 
economic activity originated during Ph.D. research on price fluctuations during the 
suspension of the gold standard in the US from 1862 to 1879: the period of the 
'greenbacks'. He soon became as dissatisfied with the purely quantitative approach as he 
1'11927] pp. 187-8. 
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was with classical abstractions. The ideas crystallized into a monetary theory, and this in 
turn required him to work out the subject of 'business cycles as a Vorarbeit to the [more 
general study of the] Money Economy'Y The result of his investigations was the 1913 
monograph, Be, regarded as 'an introduction to economic theory'. 
Mitchell saw three institutions as critical to the propagation of economic 
fluctuations: (1) the money economy; (2) business enterprise (based largely on Veblen's 
book of 1904, The Theory of Business Enterprise); and (3) the 'system of prices'.12 The 
goods/money dichotomy had been neglected by the classical economists, who rather 
sought the essence of behaviour beneath 'the money surface of things', Thus the 
hypothesis that periodic financial collapse in the business world precipitated physical 
'gluts' - theories of 'overproduction' - wrongly inverted the chain of causality, and 
financial institutions were by this reckoning of real rather than merely superficial 
importance, The third 'institution' was of paramount importance. Prosperity depended 
upon profits, which in turn reacted with changes prices through a process of feedback, 
thus constituting a system. It served 'as a social mechanism for carrying on the process 
of providing goods', It was also the source of family incomes on which the economy 
depends, thereby permitting 'rational direction' of activity by providing an accounting 
basis. Most important, the margins obtaining 'hold out that hope of pecuniary profit, 
which is the motive power of the business world'. 
Price behaviour together with the cumulative nature of fluctuations were the key 
to the Institutionalist view of business cycles. Each phase grows out of the conditions of 
the previous phase and gives rise to the next phase, Prosperity 'breeds' crisis because 
increased costs and over-stretched financial markets 'undermine the conditions upon 
which prosperity rests',13 The 'cause' of each new development is the preceding economic 
IlLetter to Lucy Sprague Mitchell. published in Wesley Clair Mitchell. pp. 62-6. 
12[1913] Chapter II. 
IJlbid., Chapter XIV. 
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state rather than some underlying factor, so that when considering the nature of business 
cycles, the object must be to try to determine 'how they run their course' rather than 
what 'causes' them. This was, of course, an interpretation of Fisher's equation: the p's 
drive the cycle in real volumes (the Q's) through lag structures, with the role of the 
circulation MV being determined secondarily through changes in expected profits (and 
presumably, though not explicitly, through investment). The point which distinguished 
Mitchell's theory from, say, that of Fisher and Marshall was the refusal to interpret 
cyclical behaviour as adjustment towards a 'normal' or equilibrium state. This is the 
significance of seeing 'causes' as preceding states, i.e., as a cumulative and evolutionary 
process. 
These themes were elaborated, rather than developed, in BCPS. Mitchell framed 
an explanation of business cycles based on lagged relations among Fisher's variables. The 
motivation for the phenomena was 'certain technical exigencies of profit-making' by 
businessmen.14 Prosperity is initially an effect of rising prices caused by such exogenous 
factors as an increase in the gold supply or government expenditures. This stimulates 
investment by a few sectors, but soon extends to the 'remoter branches of trade' as profit 
expectations rise. 
The sequence of growing demand, rising prices, increasing expectations of profit, 
swelling capitalization ... and expanding credit keeps repeating itself on an ever 
growing scale ... But eventually the process undemlines its basis. ([1927] pp. 42-3) 
Increased labour costs bring increased production costs which in turn lead to increased 
commodity prices. In the end 'these costs gain so much upon prospective selling prices 
as to narrow the anticipated margins of profit'. The 'confident tone of business 
expectations' gives way to apprehensiveness. Mitchell agreed with Veblen that a 
depression, once begun, persists, rather than giving way naturally to recovery. 
Mitchell's final statement of the theory of business cycles was given in Chapter 
14Specifically, as discussed in The Theory of Business Enterprise, Chapter vii. 
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V of BCPS, pp. 451-455. In the nineteenth century the debate had 'centered in the 
validity of rival doctrines' with only 'occasional citations of evidence'. It was a scholastic 
debate, the character of which was 'dialectical' rather then empirical. Crises, which were 
conceived of as discrete events, and consequently appeared 'abnormal', lying 'at the edge, 
rather than in the center, of the theoreticians's domain', hidden 'under the blanket [ceteru 
paribus] assumption'Y Although the work of Wade on the commercial cycle was evidence 
of the beginnings of a broader conception, Mitchell considered Juglar's study of credit 
cycles to be the 'turning point'. As well as being empirical, it attempted to show that the 
phases of 'prosperity, crisis and liquidation ... "always follow one another in the same 
order"'. Juglar subsumed a theory of cycles in his theory of commercial crises, rather than 
the other way round, and later work was of much the same character, but carried out 'on 
a larger scale and more intensively'. Thus, many ideas 'which seem fresh to us' can be 
read 'between the lines of Juglar's book, if not in the text itself. However, Mitchell 
criticized Juglar for failing to address the problem of a more general cycle. The intervals 
between his crises 'frequently contain two, and sometimes three, alternations of prosperity 
and depression', which must be identified from time-series data and annals. Furthermore, 
Juglar's use of the term 'periodic' was misleading, as it implied a regular cyclical 
frequency to later researchers!6 Both Juglar and Wade appeared to see the cycle as a 
sequence of unitary swings between prosperity and depression, and 'a ghost of this dim 
notion still haunts' the minds of those looking for single 'causes'. 
Despite the elegance and symmetry of these quantity-theoretic/institutionalist 
formulations, Mitchell had discovered, as had others before him, how complex and 
divergent economic behaviour could be. Inductive verification thus presented an almost 
intractable problem, for most observers had come to accept the existence 
U[19271. p. 45l. 
l°lt is unclear from this discussion whether Mitchell had read the 1900 pamphlet. 
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not of one phenomenon, but a congeries of interrelated phenomena. Increasing 
emphasis upon the diversities in respect to amplitude and tinling found among 
the cyclical fluctuations of different processes is highly characteristic of recent 
work. ([1927] p. 454) 
Mitchell argued for a 'general term to designate the whole', yet antiphonally, and 
characteristically, cautioned against generalization: 
the words we use set a trap for us. Starting with a vague conception of a group 
of seemingly interrelated phenomena we wish to study, we name it ... If the name 
is a compound of words familiar in other uses, we may take their implications for 
facts. Assuming tacitly that we know what we have named, we may begin 
contriving explanations, when we should be trying to find out what our words 
mean. ([1927], p. 454) 
This passage implies that Mitchell thought the business-cycle hypothesis itself to be 
premature and that taking 'implications for facts' might itself prejudice the necessary 
empirical enquiry. In a footnote, he argued for using the term in the plural rather than 
the alternative 'the business cycle' because he wanted to indicate that each sequence was 
a unique episode. The whole discussion indicates how shaky he judged the historical 
evidence to be. He nevertheless attempted a 'definition' of business cycles which would 
summarize its salient features for empirical testing.17 
Business cycles are a species of fluctuations in the economic activities of 
organized communities. The adjective 'business' restricts the concept to 
fluctuations in activities which are systematically conducted on a commercial 
basis. The noun 'cycles' bars out fluctuations which do not recur with a measure 
of regularity. ([ 1927] p. 468) 
This ruled out (1) changes in conditions between the dates of crises (2) fluctuations not 
widely diffused throughout the economy (3) seasonal fluctuations and (4) 'long waves', 
Hence 
"Although he used the term 'definition' consistently, Mitchell really meant 'hypothesis'. This caused confusion later. 
60 
the generic features and the distinguishing characteristics of business cycles ... are 
recurrences of rise and decline in activity, affecting most of the economic 
processes of communities with well-developed business organization, not divisible 
into waves of amplitudes nearly equal to their own, and averaging ... from about 
three to about six or seven years in duration. ([1927] p. 468) 
This definition had its own problems: there were always 'doubtful cases'; and the 
empirical evaluation of the above 'definition' revealed 'some fluctuations which are 
difficult to classify on any scheme'. 
3.3. TIlE SEARCH FOR EMPIRICAL BUSINESS CYCLES 
Mitchell's theoretical ideas are all but forgotten, eclipsed by a contribution to 
statistical studies which was both more direct and more radical for the time; yet as 
indicated above he saw the two lines of enquiry as complementary rather than as mutually 
exclusive. The impetus for the development of theories, however, must come from 
observation, and so in the later stages of his work the empirical came to dominate the 
theoretical, if only as a means to an end. Having rejected pure theory as 'qualitative 
analysis', he argued that the new analysis must attack the problem through 'broad 
observation upon average behavior' of agents in the 'money economy', defending the 
approach by analogy to statistical mechanics with its idea of predictable motion of 
aggregate gases rather than of individual molecules. 18 
3.3.1. Early Statistical Work on Price Behaviour 
Mitchell practised what he preached from the outset. In his Ph.D. dissertation, 
published as the History of the Greenbacks, the main emphasis was on the effect of a 
paper currency on prices and the distribution of wealth. In the chapter on profits he gave 
evidence that real wages and incomes fell during the greenback regime, and hence that 
.1(1937) p. 34. 
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'as a rule profits must have increased more rapidly than prices'. The theme was further 
developed in the 'frightful second book', and this shows and early dissatisfaction with the 
orthodoxy of 'normal', or equilibrium, behaviour and an interest in the 'frictional' 
properties of short-run adjustment.19 The greenback period featured 'two revolutions' in 
prices: 'first a great rise, then a great fall'. In both swings, fluctuations of 
'extraordinary ... violence, rapidity, and inclusiveness' were experienced, a consequence 
chiefly of instabilities in monetary policy. 
Although Mitchell intended the 1913 volume as a theoretical discussion, it also 
contained substantial empirical data on prices. That its publication established him as a 
public figure was largely a result of the theoretical content, and the research programme 
set out there remained substantially unaltered for the rest of his life. Neither the 
theoretical nor the empirical enquiry was ever completed. War and depression intervened, 
and the second volume was delayed until 1927. Nevertheless, three important landmarks 
in his intellectual development were passed in the intervening period: (1) The Making and 
Using of Index Numbers was published in 1915; (2) the National Bureau of Economic 
Research was established in 1920; and (3) the classification of economic conditions from 
contemporary records (Business Annals) was published in 1926. 
Index Numbers became the standard work upon the subject in the interwar period. 
By 1915, there were numerous published series, both commercial and official, although 
they were 'both difficult and troublesome to compile' when attempting to measure price 
changes. The need for accurate measurement was now compelling because of the price 
inflation since 1896. Mitchell was already aware of divergences in behaviour, as shown 
in the paths of 230 wholesale commodity prices for the years 1890-1913. In fact, 
(1) ... no two of the commodities quoted underwent the same changes in price ... 
(2) In every year a considerable proportion of the commodities rose in price, a 
considerable proportion fell, and a somewhat smaller proportion remained 
19Go1d, Prices, and Wages under the Greenback Standard [1908). 
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unchanged. (3) The range covered even by the fluctuations from one year to the 
next was very wide ... ([1915] p.13). 
The techniques of indexation - weighting, averaging and aggregating - and the 
rudiments of a 'leading indicator' forecasting approach were also explored (pp. 21-2). 
All methods were seen to have drawbacks, an example of his constitutional ambivalence: 
careful and detailed explanation of a novel technique, followed immediately by a 
discussion of its inapplicability to the issue in question. He concluded that while index 
numbers are a 'convenient concentrated extract' of variations, they did not competently 
represent 'all the facts' which they summarize, and that hence both the index and its 
constituents should be published. 
3.3.2. Empirical Methods at the National Bureau of Economic Research to 1929: 'Business 
Cycles' Crystallized 
During the war years, Mitchell served as head of the Price Section of the Division 
of Planning and Statistics of the War Industries Board, and so had direct experience of 
the 'social possibilities'. As Director of Research after 1920, he collaborated in the 
NBER's first project, Income in the United States: Its Amount and Distribution, 
1909-1919.20 However, he always intended the NBER to implement a business-cycle 
research programme as soon as possible. The problem became urgent with the severe 
decline in output in 1920 (the postwar 'return to normalcy', as President Harding 
expressed it in 1921). Two works which emerged in this period, Business Annals and 
BepS, became the foundations of the concept of 'business cycles' as it has been known 
ever since. 
Business Annals represents a logical discontinuity in Mitchell's thinking. It was an 
attempt to characterize 'general business conditions' in the economies of the US, the UK, 
France and Germany in every year from 1790, as deduced from contemporary press 
lOSee Dorfman in Wesley Clair Mitchell, pp. 134-5. 
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reports. Mitchell was by this time increasingly conscious of the particularity rather than 
the generality of time-series behaviour, and it is not at all clear what purpose he thought 
these characterizations might selVe. Although the nominal authority of Business Annals 
was that of Willard Thorp, the research strategy and direction were Mitchell's. A 
four-phase cycle was assumed a priori - 'prosperity', 'recession', 'depression' and 'revival' 
- but no empirical basis for this schema was given. 'Recession' was proposed as an 
alternative to 'crisis', which Mitchell considered ambiguous. In a long introductory 
chapter he questioned the 'trustworthiness' of the press reports on which the work was 
based. Correspondences with the 'truth' were conceded to be only 'approximate', but 
results could be tested 'objectively' by comparison with time-series evidence. Such 
analyses were shown for the US economy against the Persons, Snyder and AT&T indices 
of trade volumes, and for the UK against Dr. Thomas's Index of British Business Cycles, 
1855-1914.21 The correspondences among the American series and the annals were very 
close; but less so in the case of the British index. 
Thorp was less confident about synoptic summaries of the 'phases' of the cycle: 
Both industrially and geographically, quite different business conditions may exist 
within one country at the same time ... [so the] phase-summary ... gives the central 
tendency from which reviewers state exceptions. 'Prosperity except in textiles' is 
obviously not complete prosperity ... [For example] although observers generally 
agree that 1925 was a prosperous year for the United States, they also note that 
although construction activity reached new records, the textile industries were 
depressed, and that although the Florida boom created great activity in the 
South, parts of New England were virtually in a state of depression. ([1926] p. 
103) 
21These were known generically as 'business barometers', and were meant as coincident, leading and lagging indicators of 
the 'trade cycle'. Their chief proponents in the US were Warren Persons, Thomas Babson and Alvin Hanson. The usual 
procedure was to 'de trend' and then smooth the data either by moving average or by eye to remove noise. Although widely 
accepted at the time, they are of questionable value because of biases inherent in the data transformations. Barometers 
are discussed at greater length in Chapter 4 below. See also Morgan (1990), Chapter 2. 
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Mitchell apparently hoped that evidence of 'general business conditions' would support 
his institutionalist ideas, yet true to form he was sceptical of any evidence he actually 
thought that he had found. The suspicion is that Business Annals was judged by its 
authors to have been a failure. 
BCPS is also characteristically full of antiphonal statements, as the opening 
passage shows: 
In trying to prove their divergent explanations correct, successive theorists did 
prove that business cycles were more intricate phenomena than any of them had 
sumlised ... This lesson from experience ... has been confimled in recent years by 
work with statistics ... But we have no statistical evidence of business cycles as 
wholes. What the data show us are the fluctuations of particular processes ... In 
certain cases we ... average the data ... and say that we have 'indexes' of cyclical 
fluctuations in wholesale prices, physical production, the volume of trade, or even 
'general business conditions'. Yet even the most inclusive indexes we can make 
fall far short of showing all that we mean by business cycles. The more intensively 
we work the more we realize that this ternl is a synthetic product of our 
imagination - a product whose history is characteristic of our ways of learning. 
Overtaken by a series of strange experiences, our predecessors leaped to a broad 
conception, gave it a name, and began to invent explanations, as if they knew 
what their words meant. But in the process of explaining they demonstrated how 
inadequate their knowledge was .... An enquiry into business cycles, then, cannot 
wisely begin by defining the general concept ... It should begin rather with the 
individual processes which can be studied objectively, seeking to find what these 
processes are, how they affect each other, and what sort of whole they make up. 
([1927] p 1) 
Mitchell's emphasis changed over the three volumes. The 1913 work was largely 
theoretical: only four of the 14 chapters contain any statistics. By 1927 the theoretical 
content had shrunk to under one-half, and by 1946 the emphasis had become entirely 
empirical. In BCPS he commented that most business-cycle theory was still governed by 
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intellectual processes 'which would have seemed familiar to Sismondi and Ricardo'. It was 
hoped that theoretical and empirical sources would each contribute to the advancement 
of the other. Such a programme would ensure that 'rational hypotheses' would focus the 
attention of the empirical investigator, who would in turn 'determine the relations among 
and the relative importance of the numerous factors stressed by business-cycle theories'. 
The potential circularity of such a process was not lost on Mitchell. Although 
basing his hopes on correlation and filtering techniques for the advancement of the 
'knowledge' of business cycles, he felt that the data were inadequate to the purpose 
because the behaviour 'from case to case' was so diverse that generalization about 
individual processes was impossible. In addition, both the length of available time series 
and the comparability among those of sufficient length were inadequate. He plotted 
several time series to illustrate the point, reproduced here as Figure 3.3.1. This chart 
indicates how the secular tendency dominated real-sector series in contrast to price, 
monetary and labour market indicators. Because the latter appeared stationary, Mitchell 
speculated that if the 'trend' were 'removed' from the former it might then be possible 
to identify business cycles across a wide spectrum of activity. He proposed the standard 
scheme of four unobserved components: trend, cycle, seasonal and irregular, yet on the 
other hand was fully aware of the disadvantages of moving average filtering and curve 
fitting. For example, Chart 2, p. 217, demonstrates how different linear trend lines 
produced different residuals, and how difficult it was to find an optimal fit. The main 
difficulty was that of interpretation. A linear 'trend', for example, must be interpreted as 
a 'future increase without limit'. Thus, if a 'straight line fitted a given series well', were 
such 'fits of mathematical curves discoveries in economics?' Alternatively, could not the 
investigator 'choose curves whose mathematical implications correspond to [his] causal 
hypotheses', which could then be modified in the light of empirical evidence?22 Mitchell 
thought it likely that growth dominated the industrial economies, that the 'great 
22[1927] p. 221. 
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commercial nations' were showing a tendency 'to produce an ever larger supply of goods': 
On this basis, cyclical fluctuations appear as alternating accelerations and 
retardations in the pace of a more fundamental process. ([1927] p. 224) 
The main difficulty with time-series data was, however, seen at the time as the 
estimation of the several unobserved components, and especially the separation of 
cyclicals from noise. The problem was that the latter came not from zero-mean, serially 
independent random shocks as, for example, Edgeworth had hoped, but from a diversity 
of both random and persistent disturbances -wars, floods famines, strikes, technological 
changes, etc. - and from a superposition of measurement errors on these. The remedy, 
an attempt to isolate 'true' noise from persistent disturbances, had its own problems. It 
was hence impossible satisfactorily to identify the components of interest: they were all 
to an extent contaminated by each other and each component was effectively stochastic. 
Rather than abandoning time-series analysis in the face of such difficulties, 
Mitchell sought to make it 'more rigorous'. He failed to specify the exact methods for 
achieving this, but seemed to be saying that each component, together with noise, could 
be estimated in some way and then smoothed by moving average or other means. The 
irregularities still there would make the transformed series inappropriate for forecasting, 
but would give the theorist some information. Even so, past changes in the cyclical 
components had been 'so sudden, so frequent and so considerable [that they made] the 
notion of a "normal cycle" inappropriate'. He seemed to be saying that a theory of 
business cycles would propose some kernel of common behaviour, while at the same time 
arguing that the idea of a 'typical' cycle was meaningless. 
Mitchell was also sceptical about the crude filtering methods used in the 
construction of business barometers. For example, Babson claimed that he employed 
'Newton's Second Law' in fitting linear time-trends, by which he meant that as much of 
the series was 'above the line' as 'below the line' (see Chart 8, shown here as Figure 
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3.3.2). Apart from distrusting the smoothing technique, Mitchell was also not very hopeful 
that empirical business cycles could ever be tracked with any reliability. It was 
highly improbable that all the curves will reach the crests and troughs of their 
successive cycles in the same months. As a rule the crests and troughs of the 
various curves are distributed over periods of several months - often over 
periods of more than a year. ([1927] p. 280) 
Inspection of leads and lags in the timing of the various peaks and troughs presented 
'that mixture of uniformity and differences with which economic statistics commonly 
confront us'. The lead-lag relationships were found to be in general as variable as any 
other measure and therefore of doubtful value. None of the existing business barometers 
give, or are meant to give, an adequate picture of business cycles. For, as has 
been said several tinles, business cycles are congeries of cyclical fluctuations ill 
a large number of economic activities, fluctuations which differ widely in 
amplitude and considerably in timing ... A real chart of one business cycle would 
be a hopelessly complex tangle of hundreds of curves. ([1927] p. 309) 
(See Figure 3.3.3.) 
Mitchell had thus found, even at this comparatively early stage, evidence against 
a cycle in 'general conditions' capable of being captured by a single index. Unfortunately, 
having already invested so much 'human capital' in these ideas he felt obliged to persist, 
bravely, groping in the dark, as it were, for 'typical' business-cycle behaviour. Although 
barometers might be of some use in comparing the amplitude, duration and timing of 
successive cycles, they were of little value 'for intensive theoretical work'. The problems 
of summarizing data as 'general conditions' were both technical and interpretative. 
Aggregates obtained merely by averaging index numbers of such diverse series as prices, 
interest rates and output volumes had no direct interpretation because the constituent 
series were 'incommensurable'; yet such indices as Dr. Thomas's and the AT&T were 
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constructed in just such a mannerY No index could be 'general' unless it included all 
activities. Those constructed merely from data conveniently to hand would be misleading 
for the study of business cycles. Nor was there any obvious method of finding appropriate 
weights for the constituents empirically. 
The application of statistical distributions to turning points in the business 
barometers was not much more promising.24 Histograms were plotted for each in respect 
of monthly percentage changes, durations and amplitudes of cycles. Identification of 
historical cycles was attempted from turning points in five such series: the AT&T, 
Frickey's Clearings, the two Snyder indices and Persons's trade index. The inferences 
from these were obscure: some of the 'lesser' fluctuations were noisy, and there 
sometimes occurred 'double or triple' peaks or troughs.2s The 'irregularities of 
contour ... causes considerable difficulty when one tries to count the number of business 
cycles in a given period'. Nevertheless, by comparing turning points, in this case monthly, 
Mitchell managed to find 13 cycles for the United States for the years 1878-1924. For 
many of these the span was greater than 12 months, but Mitchell thought that smoothing 
by means of 'free-hand' curves would improve the agreement among the several series. 
Those 'cycles' culminating in 1882,1893,1907,1917 and 1920 were clearly visible in the 
curves; but in all periods 'there are stretches when the cyclical fluctuations are less easy 
to identify', especially the later 1880s, the mid-1890s, the early 1900s, 1910-1913 and 
1923-1924. It 'would be hard [from these curves] to lay down rules for determining ... what 
movements ... shall be counted a business cycle'. Also, multiple peaks and troughs 
'frequently' occurred. 
Mitchell concluded from this extensive statistical analysis that 
2"Morgan has described Persons's attempts at such inappropriate composites as 'a strange collection' of variables. See Chapter 
4 below. 
2%id., pp. 337-54. 
251n fact, an examination of Table 14 shows 27 turning points between 1878 and 1924 in the AT&T index, of which ten were 
multiples. 
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As one analyzes successive business cycles in various ways, one find evidence, 
even in the bleak statistical records here used, that each cycle has special 
characteristics of its own, or rather a special combination of characteristics. More 
intensive study carried over a wider range in tinle and space would strengthen 
this inIpression. Strictly speaking, every business cycle is a unique historical episode, 
differing in signifLCant ways from all its predecessors, and never to be repeated ill the 
future [emphasis mine]. ([1927] p. 354) 
He hoped that the study of particularities would enable the investigator to 'see that a 
given rule does apply to cases which at first sight seems to form exceptions', although it 
is not specified exactly how such a contradictory process could operate. A synthesis of 
historical, quantitative and theoretical studies should elucidate the problem, beginning 
with a synopsis of prevailing conditions from contemporary sources: 
... some of the statisticians ... have supplemented their time series on occasion by 
preparing annual summaries of business conditions. But the histories have dealt 
largely with what was common in the episodes treated, and the summaries have 
been confined to rather brief periods in a few countries. For theoretical uses 
[emphasis mine], there is needed a systematic record of cyclical alternations of 
prosperity and depression, covering all countries in which the phenomena have 
appeared, and designed to make clear the recurrent features oCthe alternations ... 
In the present book, we can use the volume of Busilless Annals much as we use 
the coordinate statistics. ([ 1927], pp. 361-2) 
It might be possible thus to see common elements in episodes which at first seemed 
unconnected, recognizing at the same time the methodological pitfalls of subjectivity and 
circularity. The disadvantage was in the subjectivity both of the compiler and the sources, 
and so business indices must be used as corroboration; yet these, because of trend 
adjustments and smoothing were also not wholly satisfactory. Comparisons were seen as 
tests as much of one source as another. The 'broadest conclusion' of the Annals was that 
there is no 'nomlal state of trade.' The phrase is common both in treatises upon 
economic theory and in the talk of business men. Yet the historical record shows 
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no reality corresponding to this figment of the imagination ... [The] annals show 
that the only normal condition is a state of change ... ([1927] p. 376) 
Mitchell justified the use of the term 'cycle' by an appeal to the evidence of the 
annals that different phases recur, and that these recurrences 'lend themselves to 
measurement'.26 However, 'the term "periodicity" we should not use with reference to 
business cycles' because of the irregularity of 'time intervals', and moreover 'no two [of 
them) in all the array seem precisely alike'.27 
Business cycles differ in their duration as wholes and in the relative duration of 
their component phases; they differ in industrial and geographical scope; they 
differ in intensity; they differ in the features which attain prominence; they differ 
in the quickness and the unifomlity with which they sweep from one country to 
another. ([1927] p. 383) 
The answer to such behavioural divergences lay in frequency distributions, 'variations 
around a central tendency, a technique which reveals the existence of formerly 
unsuspected uniformities among variations themselves'. 
Objections to existing theories lay not in their level of abstraction but in their 
reliance upon the idea of equilibrium, the assumption of which would preempt the 
investigation by focusing it on how the equilibrium 'is overcome at times and how it 
presently reasserts itselr.28 Mitchell, in rejecting such a 'point of departure' in favour of 
the four phases of Business Annals, was himself making a strong and preemptive 
theoretical assumption: 
The best framework for a discussion of how business cycles run their course is 
that provided by the phases of these cycles - prosperity, recession, depression 
and revival. Our collection of business annals and of theories lend themselves 
26A 1922 conference at the Carnegie Institution had attempted to find a definition of 'cycle' applicable across all the sciences. 
Mitchell quotes that of Dr. F.E. Clements as the most satisfactory: 'a recurrence of different phases of plus and minus departures, 
which are often susceptible of exact measurement'. (BCPS, p. 311) 
TI/bid.. pp. 311-8. 
21/bid., p. 462. 
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readily to this plan; for the annals mark changes in the tides of activity, and most 
current theories explain crises by what happens in prosperity and revivals by what 
happens in depressions. ([1927] p. 472) 
Time series would be segmented 'for use in a discussion which treats first all 
periods of prosperity as a unit, then all periods of recession, and so on'. These units were 
taken from Business Annals, and purported to mark off, for each country, the dates 'not 
only of successive cycles, but also the successive phases of each cycle'. The data would 
be therefore analysed by comparison with a 'standard pattern derived from the annals' 
of successive phases rather than by identifying specific phases in each individual time 
series. The expectation was that specific and 'reference' phases would 'correspond fairly 
well', but that also there would be cases of 'divergence in timing - cases which our plan 
will throw into high relief, and from which we will learn much of interest'. 
3.3.3. Empirical Investigations 1929-1939: 'Measurement without Theory' 
'Factual testing' of the business cycle concept by the NBER continued and 
expanded. In 'Testing Business Cycles' published in 1929, and attributed to Mitchell, the 
technique of finding 'reference dates' by comparing time-series data with the annals was 
further developed.29 Although foreshadowed in BCPS, the term 'reference cycle' appeared 
explicitly for the first time in this article as a set of dates which 'show the month and year 
when economic revivals and recessions occurred', and which 'mark, as nearly as may be, 
the beginning and ending of successive cycles in business at large'.3o This was an 
important departure, for it marked a formal break with the cautious process of 
simultaneous theoretical and empirical enquiries, and seems to imply the failure of that 
research strategy. Previously, Mitchell had avoided such generalizations because of the 
insufficiency of the data. 'Finding out more about the facts' must precede the definition 
29NBER News-Bulletin No. 31, March 1, 1929, pp. 1-8. 
~1929al p. 2. 
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of a 'general concept'; and this had consisted in the objective study of individual 
processes and their interactions.3 ! The revised techniques were claimed as an attempt 
objectively to compare individual processes against some general reference in order to 
arrive at 'central tendencies' in, and measures of variability of, behaviour over time. 
Individual series were broken into 'reference cycle segments': that is, the series was 
divided into chunks conforming to the reference dates, rather than to the dates of its own 
maxima and minima. Each reference cycle was itself decomposed into eight segments, 
three of expansion, three of contraction, and two periods of three months each centred 
on the reference maximum ('recession') and minimum ('revival'). For specific series, the 
average for each reference cycle segment was taken in index form and plotted as a curve 
(see Figure 3.3.4 for an example). 
The analysis was intended as a systematization of 
comparisons between the cyclical fluctuations of the same series in different 
cycles and of different series in the same cycle. It also elinlinatcs the greater part 
of the secular trends. ([1929a] p. 2) 
Specific cycles, i.e., the trough-peak-trough sequence in each series, were also plotted 
without reference to the general dates. Mitchell conceded that these turning points 
... are no more likely to coincide precisely with the reference cycles in tinling than 
the price fluctuations of a single commodity are likely to agree precisely in timing 
with the changes in an index number. A few series show no cycles at all; others 
show cycles which diverge widely from the standard pattern. These 
'non-confornling' cases are especially interesting theoretically. But most series 
confornl more or less closely ... 
When applied to a large number of tinle series, the scheme provides a 
searching test of the notion that business cycles are a genuine species of 
economic phenomena. If these cycles were the figment of a stereotyping 
imagination, little similarity could be expected either in the behaviour of anyone 
J'This approach has been characterized by Morgan (1990) as 'Mitchell's empirical (but non-operational) ideas' (p.66). 
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series in different reference cycles, or in the behaviour of different series in any 
one reference cycle. ([1929a] pp. 2-'3) 
In the same year Mitchell published an article in Recent Economic Changes, the 
report of the Conference on Unemployment set up by President Harding in 1921. The 
emphasis of this document was on 'structural' changes rather than on 'cycles': i.e., 
population growth, technological innovations and the comparative postwar ascendency of 
the United States over the European economies. Improvements in industrial and 
agricultural productivity during the 1920s were seen as bringing hardships in the form of 
the failure of uncompetitive businesses, the redundancy of certain trades and the decline 
both of older industries and of geographical regions. Price declines, especially during the 
severe fall in output from 1919 to 1921, were thought to be a destabilizing factor because 
of the direct effect on profits. Mitchell believed that the argument, then current, that 
business cycles had been 'ironed out' was premature and saw current conditions as part 
of an evolving state, more or less severe, of economic distress. 
In 1935, NBER Research Bulletin No. 57 contained 'The National Bureau's 
Measures of Cyclical Behavior', by Mitchell and Arthur Burns, an expansion of the 1929 
article. The emphasis was beginning to shift from the monetary to the real sector. The 
specimen series was now industrial: monthly coke production in the United States, 
1914-1933. The analysis was wider. Business cycles were seen as 'interrelated fluctuations 
in many economic processes' but which 'differ from one another in timing, amplitude and 
relationship to the expansions and contractions of general business'. Knowledge of these 
differences had been 'piecemeal and vague for the most part', and thus 
economists have had to construct their theories of business cycles without 
adequate knowledge of the phenomena they were trying to explain, and without 
adequate means of testing the relations between their hypotheses and what 
actually happens. ([1935] p. 1) 
Filtering techniques were still unsatisfactory. 'Reference' dating was as in the 1929 paper, 
but extended to the UK, France and pre-1933 Germany. Series were analyzed both for 
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reference and their specific cycles to determine if there were systematic timing relations 
between the former and latter. The object was to 'lay a satisfactory basis for a theory of 
business cycles'. The technique of indexing individual series' average behaviour, first 
discussed in 1929 (the so-called 'cycle relatives'), 'eliminates from the original data what 
we call the "inter-cycle" portion of the trend,.n The analysis was extended by the use of 
index numbers to such activities as US exports, factory payrolls, bank clearings, US and 
UK wholesale prices AT&T index of industrial activity and indices of motor vehicle 
production and capital goods in th~ United States. The AT&T index was the only series 
adjusted for 'trend'. An examination of the pattern charts shows a wide variation in 
profiles both across series and across cycles. 
An analysis of the recent 'great depression' by Burns and Mitchell appeared in 
NBER Research Bulletin No. 61, November 9, 1936, under the title 'Production during the 
American Business Cycle of 1927-1933'. The authors found that the depression of the 
1930s was not propagated by the stock market crash. Although there was 'a definite 
concentration of peaks [in time series] around June 1929', the 'building boom reached 
its highest point in February 1928 ... wholcsale prices in September (1928] ... and production 
of consumer goods in November (1928],. In all, 40 series were analyzed, with the greater 
number peaking within five months of June 1929. The trough of 1933 was more difficult 
to date: 17 series reached bottom in March, and seven more within a two month interval 
either side; but they found a 'secondary concentration' around the summer of 1932, thus 
establishing a 'double bottom', thought to be a common occurrence. (This identification 
problem for the 'cycles' of the 1930s was never satisfactorily solved.) The 40 series 
included a number of 'trend-adjusted' indices of business conditions (e.g., the AT&T, 
Persons, Ayres and Axe-Houghton); indices of production (Babson's, the FRB and 
Standard); indices of industrial groups; and single series indicators such as pig iron 
production, freight car loadings, wholesale prices and banking and money market 
J2(1935) p. 1. 
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statistics. The pattern charts again showed diverse behaviour. In their discussion of the 
expansion and contraction 'phases' the authors expanded the number of series to 73, 
which gave an even more diffused picture of the 1928-9 peak. 
[Total] construction contracts declined after February 1928 ... Orders for 
passenger-train cars and apple shipments followed within six months. Later that 
year contracts for industrial buildings and the production of oak flooring, inner 
tubes and solid tires turned downward. Portland cement began to decline in 
January 1929, and five series in February, including passenger automobiles. 
Thereafter the recession spread rapidly ... ([1936] p. 18) 
A few of the food and construction series turned round in the summer of 1930 as the 
government attempted to reverse the tide of unemployment. 
'Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals' by Burns and Mitchell, published in 
May 1938 in Research Bulletin No. 69, was a discussion of the problems of applying 
leading indicators as a potential forecasting tool. The authors were trying to predict an 
upturn in the economy (by which they meant the reference dates) based on the analysis 
of '487 statistical series in monthly or quarterly form'. 
But one of the clearest teachings of experience is that every business cycle has 
features that are peculiar to it. Accordingly, no one who knows the past expects 
that what happened during any earlier business revival will repeat itself during 
the next revival. Even average experience over several revivals establishes no 
more than a presumption concerning the general character of the developments 
that may be anticipated when the next business tide begins to rise. «(1938] p. 1) 
The proposed list of indicator variables was not seen as a '''forecasting machine", but 
rather [as] a registering device .. .' to assist in the interpretation of the drift of historical 
fluctuations. After removing seasonal variations, turning points in each series were found. 
There were series that lead, coincide with, and lag the reference dates 
with some regularity. As this statement inlplies, a business-cycle revival is not an 
event that happens in a single month, but a complicated series of changes that 
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occur cumulatively in various economic processes during a period that may last 
a year or more. ([1938] p. 2) 
Thus by a process largely of judgment, the most 'convenient' point to use for a 
revival was determined as the month 'around which cluster the cyclical upturns in 
different types of production, construction ... commodity prices, merchandising, 
employment. .. security prices ... interest rates ... and other economic variables of which we 
have statistical records'. Unfortunately, from the reference dates it appeared that the 
durations ofbusilless cycles ... differ so much and so irregularly that they give little 
help in judging when the next cyclical tum may occur. And the durations of 
cyclical contractions appear to be even more variable than those of cyclical 
expansions. ([1938] p. 3) 
The specification of an ideal leading indicator was given: it would cover at least 
50 years; it would lead the turning point regularly by about six months; it would have no 
erratic movements; its cyclical movement would be pronounced; and finally, it would 
conform so well to the general movement that its future behaviour is predictable. Not 
surprisingly the authors found no such series, and so it was 'unsafe to base 
judgements ... upon the behavior of anyone series, or of a few series'. They gave a list of 
some 75 series which were the least untrustworthy. Difficulties in forecasting upturns were 
given as (1) monthly records not being up to date; (2) changes in seasonals from year to 
year; (3) the erratic nature of time series making it difficult to recognize an upturn; and 
(4) the general unpredictability of economic behaviour. 
3.3.4. The 'Definitive' Volume of 1946 
Measuring Business Cycles was intended as an interim volume, a summary of the 
work of the NBER up to the entry of the United States into the World War II. The 
'definition' by now had been amplified. 
Business cycles are a type of organization found in the aggregate economic 
activity of nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle 
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consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic 
activities, followed by sinlilarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals 
which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes 
is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than one 
year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of sinlilar 
character with amplitudes approaching their own. ([1946] p. 3) 
The 'definition' was immediately qualified by restatement as an hypothesis: 
Considerable evidence can now be cited to support [the above definition's] every 
clause. But an intensive study of the best available records is necessary if we are 
to ascertain conclusively whether many economic activities really fluctuate in 
unison as the definition states, and how different activities behave with respect 
to the alleged cycles. ([1946] p. 5) 
Existing theories were again rejected, though this time on empirical grounds: 
To say that business cycles are departures from and retunts toward a nontlal 
state of trade or a position of equilibriulll, or that they are movements resulting 
from discrepancies between market and natural rates of interest, will not help, 
because we cannot observe nornlal states of trade, equilibrium positions, or 
natural interest rates. [1946] p. 5) 
So many problems seemed to be raised by the 'definition' that the authors were 
constrained to give a phrase-by-phrase critique. The same difficulties noted in 1927, 
1935, 1936 and 1938 presented themselves. For example, what is meant by 'economic 
activities'? If 'recurrent but not periodic', can business cycles be distinguished from 
seasonal fluctuations, secular movements and noise? Are there 'several sets of general 
cycles running concurrently, each set perhaps periodic but combining with cycles of other 
periods to produce the variability our definition admits'?33 To what extent should 
empirical work rely upon aggregate measures, and to what extent upon the component 
parts? Are business cycles really continuous? How general are these movements? Are 
turning points in time-series data clustered, or are there so many leads and lags that 
"See Schumpeter [1939) for a discussion of this hypothesis. 
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• ... the divergences in timing of these [specific] cycles produce an unchanging total'? The 
timing issue posed such potential difficulties that the authors were forced to admit that 
if .... there were no bunching of cyclical turns, there would be no business cycles answering 
to our definition'. Even this catalogue of questions was not seen as exhaustive: anyone 
attempting to explain business cycles must examine at some stage the historical record 
in order to 'know what he is explaining'. Defects in previous theories were largely the 
result of 'a sadly incomplete, sometimes badly twisted, knowledge of the facts'. 
Nevertheless, the process of enquiry could not be separated into 'inductive' and 
'deductive' stages, because no research had ever been able to 'devise a hypothesis 
concerning business cycles entirely apart from the facts to be explained'. 
lIence, an investigator who seeks earnestly to discover the cause or causes of 
business cycles should not restrict hinlself to testing any single hypothesis. If he 
concludes that the facts of experience are consistent with one hypothesis, he 
should make sure that they are not equally consistent with other hypotheses. 
([1946] p. 9) 
The observational problems were acknowledged. On pp. 12-14 are found the 
plaintive statements 
business cycles ... can be seen through a cloud of witnesses only by the eye of the 
mind ... 
[When] we speak of 'observing' business cycles we use figurative language ... What 
we literally observe is not a congeries of economic activities rising and falling in 
unison, but changes in the readings taken from many recording instruments of 
varying reliability. 
To deal with these difficulties, the approach (following the 1930s research bulletins) was 
to identify the specific cycles in more than 800 seasonally adjusted time-series and then, 
in order to avoid an unwieldy number of bivariate comparisons, to relate them to a 
'common unit' of measurement, the 'reference dates'. These had now become the 
backbone of the analysis. They 
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purport to mark off the troughs and peaks of successive business cycles, and to 
measure the leads and lags of specific-cycle troughs and peaks from these 
benchmarks. This step is the crux of the investigation; it involves passing from the 
specific cycles of individual tinle series, which readers not embarrassed by 
experience are likely to think of as objective 'facts', to business cycles ... «(1946] 
p. 12) 
Two assumptions were made about the nature of business cycles: 
First, we shall assume that [they] run a continuous round ... Second, we shall 
assume that it is sufficient to mark off the dates when expansions and 
contractions in general business activity culminate [implying] that business activity 
as a whole does not linger [at troughs or peaks] but commences rather promptly 
to decline [or] to rise. ([1946] p. 71) 
These dates were justified as a 'common denominator' against which to compare 'cyclical' 
movements in specific time series, but their derivation raised yet more difficult questions. 
How could aggregate activity be measured? How could noise be filtered out, both in 
aggregated and dis aggregated measures, and, indeed, should it be? In any case the 
authors were quick to point out that the reference dates themselves were only 'a tool of 
analysis'. Otherwise 
[an] investigator whose main concern was to establish a chronology of business 
cycles might wish to spend years in studying specific cycles before venturing to 
date the peaks and troughs of business cycles. But our interest in a reference 
scale is largely incidental to theoretical ends. Early in the investigation it seemed 
wise to determine whether our working definition of business cycles was a 
promising guide to further inquiry [and if so] to organize the work in such 
fashion that we could learn quickly ... how the cyclical fluctuations of leading 
economic activities are related to one another. ([1946] p. 72) 
Thus, although apparently contradicting the multivariate nature of the 
business-cycle hypothesis, the reference cycle was actually quite consistent with it. The 
objective of finding theoretical explanations, rather than of predicting future episodes, 
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required that central tendencies be extracted from the time-series data. To meet the 
objective, the reference dates should idealIy have been a set of turning points in an 
aggregate measure ' ... given a definite meaning and made conceptually measurable by 
identifying it with gross national product. . .'34 The possibility of calculating central 
tendencies in 'each cluster of turning points in individual economic activities' was 
discussed as a proxy for aggregate activity. Even if an aggregate existed, could it be given 
operational significance for the purpose of business cycle analysis? Could it then be 
checked against cycles in specific series, and in that case, what series would be 
appropriate? Furthermore, it 
will also be necessary to detemline whether cycles in aggregate activity are 
sufficiently diffused through the economy to rate as business cycles. What series 
or processes should be examined to detemline this issue? .. Should not a 
fluctuation that satisfies the criterion of diffusion meet also certain criteria of 
duration and amplitude, phase by phase as well as for the entire fluctuation, 
before it is admitted to the family of business cycles? Finally, how should we 
distinguish between cyclical and erratic in aggregate activity ... ? ([1946] pp.71-2) 
At the time, however, only annual series were available3s• 'Monthly index numbers 
of the physical volume of production [failed] to meet our needs', since they were 
compiled from indices whose constituents changed over time, and which could thus shift 
the dates of turning points. Indices with unchanging constituents which were of sufficient 
length, such as prices, financial data and 'business indexes' were considered to be 
'inadequate gauges of business cycles' because their coverage was not sufficiently diffused. 
By the now standard NBER technique of comparing annals with time-series data, a set 
of monthly dates had been found. This was viewed with suspicion owing to the uneven 
range and quality of the statistical records, and to the large range of behavioural variation 
34 As defined by Kuznets in National Income and Capital Fonnation, 1919-1935, NBER (1937). 
3S A quarterly US GNP series was not published until 1947. 
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in the data. Correspondences were then sought between reference turns and 'specific-
cycle' turns in each time series. In many cases this correspondence 
is imperfect; sometimes it is negligible. Thus if two specific cycles occupy 
approximately the same period as a business cycle, the trough between the two 
specific cycles and at least one peak will not correspond to any reference turn. 
([1946] p. 117) 
For such occurrences, the matching operation became difficult, requiring 'objectivity' and 
'self-restraint'. The rule was that if two turns in different months be designated as 
'corresponding', there must be no extra turns, either reference or specific, in the interval 
between the two. The object was to 'help to weed out "extra" cycles, that is, specific-cycle 
movements unrelated to business cycles'. If specific turns appeared either side of a 
reference turn, each meeting the above criteria, the first would be treated as 
corresponding only if it was within three months of the reference point. Otherwise, the 
specific turn would be treated as non-corresponding. The difficulty in applying the 
technique was that ' ... the rules may reduce unduly the number of timing comparisons in 
series that conform well to business cycles' thus biasing the calculations of average 
behaviour. The rules were therefore relaxed for 'well-conforming' series so that any 
specific turn that deviates less than a full phase from the reference turn was taken to be 
'corresponding'. Furthermore, any sufficiently 'mild' specific turn in the neighbourhood 
of a reference date was ignored, though no criterion for mildness was given. In practice, 
non-corresponding turns (as for example in the case of structural steel orders during 
1923-6) were discarded if there were any other possible turns which improved the 
correspondence even though the rules were violated. These criteria applied only in the case 
of series which were judged closely to conform to the reference dates. There was no 
quantitative test for closeness, although measures of conformity and 'other evidence' were 
taken into account.36 
~19461 pp. 116-128. 
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These highly flexible rules seem to have been honoured more in the breach than 
in the observance. The results were given for specific-cycle turning points, series by 
series, together with leads and lags.37 The average deviations of turning points from 
reference dates ranged from four to about six months; but the decisive feature of these 
tables was the apparent unpredictability of 'leads', 'lags' and 'correspondences' with 
reference turns, even after substantial filtering out of inconvenient specific turns. The 
authors had strong reservations about the accuracy of these leads and lags, because 'some 
business cycle turns are more difficult to date than others'. An alternative to finding 
specific cycles, following the 1929 paper, was to take the value of each time series at the 
reference date as the peak or trough for that specific cycle. These were denoted, 
confusingly enough, as 'reference cycle patterns' and were seen as a way of dealing with 
the variability of individual time series. The result was, nevertheless, that however timing 
was measured, the lead and lag relations were unique for each reference episode in the 
sample. 
Considerable variation was encountered in the specific cycles in 828 monthly and 
quarterly American series. All but three percent of these were found to have sequences 
of peaks and troughs. From a very small sample of these series - employment data from 
ten US manufacturing industries - a 'tendency toward a common rhythm' was detected. 
However, six of the ten had either 'extra' or 'missing' cycles; and furthermore, where 
corresponding turns were found in all ten series, they were dispersed, suggesting that 
'turning zone' was a more appropriate term than 'turning point' for business cycles. For 
example 
every series turned up in 1932-33, but the trough spans 10 months. The 'turning 
zone' is still longer at the upturn in 1921. On account of the divergencies in the 
timing of cyclical turns, all industries experience specific-cycle expansion or all 
37E.g., Table St, p. 26. 
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experience specific-cycle contraction in only 69 of the 239 months covered, less 
than a third of the full period. 
Let the reader imagine a thousand tinle series arranged on [this] plan, 
and he will begin to face in their full complexity the tinling relations among the 
cyclical movements of actual life. ([1946] p. 70) 
(Burns and Mitchell never found a satisfactory method of fixing reference dates, and this, 
in the spirit of objectivity, they acknowledged.) 
The pattern of each of these hundreds of time series was calculated, for both 
'specific cycles' and the reference peaks and troughs. An example of the basic analysis 
was given in Chart 2 on p. 35, reproduced here as Figure 3.3.5. Some additional detail 
on deviations from average values of the pattern at stages of the cycle was given; but 
since the basic approach was that of the 1929 paper, it can almost certainly be attributed 
to Mitchell (although he credits the technique to Burns). The NBER reference cycle was 
checked against Frickey's 'standard pattern of short-term fluctuations' and found to have 
the same number of cycles. Frickey's series was an index of bank clearings, railroad 
earnings, imports, exports, immigration, commodity prices, wholesale prices, industrial 
and railroad stock prices, bond prices and commercial paper rates, the construction of 
which involved both 'detrending' and smoothing. 
As noted above, the MBC study of specific cycles was largely a search for 
statistical distributions to support a theoretical structure; so, for example, the patterns for 
bituminous coal production were shown for eight cycles beginning in 1907 and for the 
average of these cycles. Apart from the considerable inter-cycle variation, statistical 
analysis of this sort ignored the problem of 'historical succession', that is, the possibility 
of 'structural' change over time. When average patterns were shown for different series, 
as in Chart 16, p. 156, the 'consilience' in ("'Yclical timing and character sought by the 
authors seemed ever more elusive (see Figure 3.3.6). Moreover, when reference cycle 
patterns were analyzed, as in Chart 19, p. 165, the variations were even more striking 
(Figure 3.3.7). Most series in the sample had 15 cycles or less, with great variations in 
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both duration and amplitude. An example of such variations was given in Chart 53, pp. 
373-4, for seven American series: railroad bond yields, bank clearings, shares traded, call 
money rates, pig iron production, railroad stock prices and freight car orders. The 
number of specific cycles in these series varied from 15 to 23; the duration of cycles from 
38 to 50 months; and the amplitude by as much as 18 times.38 
The idea was to 'expose the typical characteristics' of cyclical behaviour In 
different activities and of 'business as a whole' in order to 'establish a base from which 
the wide variations ... observable in actual life may be ... explored'. Average deviations from 
some norm of cyclical behaviour had 'positive value', for they helped to differentiate 
processes which 'can be counted upon with assurance to behave in a standard fashion' 
from those which 'vary in an unpredictable fashion from one cycle to the next'. 
Antiphonally, the use of averages ~as questioned. 
Yet we must face the difficulty that results are apt to become less trustworthy as 
the range of variation becomes larger and the number of observations fewer. This 
difficulty is especially acute in handling temporal sequences subject to cumulative 
changes. ([1946] p. 371) 
An average covering a dozen cycles in a series takes no account of the historical 
sequence in which they occurred ... If secular, discontinuous, or cyclical changes 
of formidable scope occur ... the repetition that justifies the use of averages 
becomes a repetition in name only ... [llieir] historical value may be slight and 
their value as bases of future expectations slighter still. ([1946] pp. 381-2) 
Secular and discontinuous changes could not be taken for granted: for example, Marx 
held that commercial crises became progressively more severe, while Veblen argued that 
economies would subside into a state of'mild depression'. Others hoped that the business 
cycle had been 'ironed out'. A further complicating factor was the possibility of 'long 
cycles' as 'identified' by Kondratieff, Kitchin and Kuznets. Indeed, Burns found '''trend 
38From Table 140, p. 375. 
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cycles" of about 15 to 20 years in production and other business activities'. Thus it might 
be that 
the position that an individual business cycle occupies in a 'long cycle' 
determines ... whether its expansion develops into a 'boom', whether its recession 
becomes a 'crisis', and whether its contraction turns into a drastic 'depression'. 
([1946] p. 382) 
Tests for structural change, owing to small sample sizes and other uncertainties, 
were judged as inconclusive. Chapter 10 dealt with the problem of 'secular changes in 
cyclical behaviour'. Linear time trends were fitted by regression methods to the seven 
American series alluded to above. F-tests with a null hypothesis of no secular change in 
amplitudes or durations of specific cycles were significant only for amplitudes in call 
money rates. Results for the reference-cycle patterns were less clear. The authors' 
impression was that secular changes in cyclical behaviour had not taken place over the 
sample period; but that there was a wide variation among series. Thus, although there 
might be long-run changes in behaviour, these were not strong enough to negate the 
validity of averaging. 
The 'long cycle' hypothesis was examined in Chapter 11. Burns and Mitchell 
found that the building industry had been 'characterized by long cycles of remarkably 
regular duration' of 15 to 20 years. They were 'clear cut in outline, attain enormous 
amplitudes, and are paralleled by long cycles in other real estate processes'. Because they 
seemed to have occurred in the above seven series, the authors speculated that long 
building cycles might induce business cycles, although they then immediately rejected this 
argument. They also found long swings in prices for the United States, Britain, Germany 
and France. However, Schumpeter's assertion that 120-month 'Juglar' cycles, for which 
he claimed there was historical evidence, could each be subdivided into three 40-month 
cycles was unsupported: 
only about 28 per cent of [American] cycles since 1854 fall between 37 and 43 
months. No arrangement of our monthly measures ill groups of three consecutive 
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cycles will produce an approximation of 'Juglar cycles' of from nine to ten years. 
([1946] p. 442) 
In general, different investigators had reached 'widely divergent results' apparently from 
the same data, and hence 'it seems reasonable to infer that [longer] cycles are probably 
far from being a clear or pronounced feature of economic development'. The decisive 
inference was of no clear evidence that short cycles evolve or change systematically with 
time, but rather that such changes are pronounced but unpredictable. 
The final chapter of MBC dealt with questions of stable and irregular behaviour, 
following from the conclusion that the latter type of change was 'far larger in scope than 
secular or cyclical changes' (in specific cycles). 
This tentative finding will not be questioned by students who believe that it is 
vain to strive after a general theory of crises, or depressions, or business cycles. 
Their argument is that each of these episodes must be explained by the peculiar 
combination of conditions prevailing at the time, and that these combinations 
differ endlessly from one another. [Such students 1 may see little value in 
statistical averages ... If the episodic features ... are the thing of real importance, 
averages that conceal the episodic movements are futile if not mischievous ... as 
futile and mischievous as general theories of business cycles. ([1946] p. 466) 
The chapter is a discussion of these criticisms. Although each 'business cycle IS an 
individual...differing in countless ways from every other', and 'business activity at any time 
is influenced by countless "random" factors', the authors argued that without a 'norm', 
the extent of such particularities could not be assessed. Without, therefore, the use of 
averages, notions of what is 'usual' or 'unusual' about each cycle 'cannot be made more 
definite'. A chart showing 'average' patterns and patterns for individual cycles the in the 
seven series was given as an example of the value of such analysis. The chief merit of 
averages was that they 'indicate roughly what cyclical behaviour is characteristic of 
different activities'. However, they may also mislead the observer into finding regularities 
where there are none, and vice versa. Even more important was to 'recognize that 
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averages, if used judiciously, enable us to describe what cyclical behavior has been 
characteristic "in the long run'" (Le., 'typically'). 
Averages were calculated for amplitudes and durations of cycles in the seven 
series. The general conclusions were that in 
the first place our tests, as far as they go, bear out the concept of business cycles 
as units of roughly concurrent fluctuations in many activities. In the second place, 
they demonstrate that although cyclical measures of individual series usually vary 
greatly from one cycle to the next, there is a pronounced tendency towards 
repetition in the relations among the movements of different activities in 
successive business cycles ... These facts have a vital bearing on the value of 
averages as a 1001 o/theoretical analysis [emphasis mine]. ([1946] pp.490-1) 
Exogenous disturbances and secular influences were also discussed: 
... we may find significant differences between cycles that come in tinles of war 
and those that come in tinles of peace, between cycles occurring in times of 
agricultural prosperity and in tinles of agricultural depression ... between short and 
long business cycles, mild and violent cycles, and so on. ([1946] p. 506) 
The permutations were numerous and required the study of distributions (,averages and 
average deviations') of the relevant variables. The tests on seven time series were, 
however, inconclusive. A greater number was required, both aggregated and 
disaggregated. The authors argued that business cycles had been 'sufficiently stable' in 
the 'long run' to justify a 'primary interest' in average or typical behaviour. This in turn 
was seen merely as a 'first approximation' to an ultimate explanation, in a definitive 
theoretical volume, of the 'business cycles of actual life'. Such an explanation would 
encompass such divers structural factors as ' ... the increasing scale of business enterprise, 
the spread of absentee ownership, the building up of colonial empires, the disappearance 
of our frontier ... the declining rate of population growth, the development of instalment 
selling, the increased role of government in economic affairs, and many others .. .' The 
cycle of development and decline of specific industries, such as the American railroads, 
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' ... penetrate[ s] the world of business .. .' in ways which affect cyclical behaviour, although 
the individual case may be masked by the aggregates. The study of this effect, presumably 
a combination of long swings and structural change, 'is one of the most important 
problems to be tackled in the theoretical volume of this series'. 
These ideas are confusing given Mitchell's rejection of 'normal' behaviour and 
indeed his views of business cycles as distinct historical episodes. However, reliance upon 
the use of empirical averages was seen as an alternative to objectionable a priori 
neo-classical assumptions: instead of relying upon a fictitious normality and the 
'dreamland of equilibrium', the study of average behaviour would permit a theory of 
business cycles to be drawn, as it were, directly from life. This would be valid only if 
business cycles have many 'repetitive features other than the cyclical movement in "total 
output" or "total employment" .. .' The discussion of theoretical objectives did not state 
whether or not a general theory of business cycles is possible when only the aggregates 
exhibit the required behaviour; but it did emphasize the heavy reliance of any such 
construction on 'cyclical averages'. The projected volume would 'seek to explain how 
business cycles come about and why they differ from one another', using at every stage 
'the array of averages'. The authors seemed to be arguing the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
that business cycles originate in structural changes, but this point is not entirely clear. 
3.3.5. The Valedictory Volume and Bums's Annotations 
Mitchell died in 1948. An incomplete final volume was published posthumously 
as Mat Happens during Business Cycles, a Progress Report, in 1951, in which Burns 
summarized the 'broad conclusions' of Mitchell's life-work. These were (1) that although 
there is much diversity of dis aggregated behaviour, 'peaks tend to come in bunches and 
likewise the troughs ... The business cycle of experience is an alternating succession of 
these sustained majorities .. .' (2) although there is 'turmoil' within the cycle, it has a 
'systematic core'; and (3) there is thus a 'typical' sequence during cycles. The account 
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gave further detail of the timing sequence of the several variables; yet 'this recital 
delineates characteristic movements during business cycles, not invariant sequences'. 
Divergences, however, 'are not so numerous as to destroy the validity of a generalized 
sketch'. In any case, there was some asymmetry between expansions and contractions. 
The arrays of individual turning points at business-cycle troughs 'are more 
dispersed and skewed toward leads' than are the arrays at peaks. Expansions of 
aggregate activity are longer than contractions. They are also more vigorous ... 
([1951] pp. xviii-xix) 
At the end Mitchell was acutely aware of the contradictions in his empirical 
evidence. He had hoped that the use of averages as pointers to the exceptions, the 
'deviations', would 'lead to the discovery of unsuspected regularities among what had 
seemed annoying exceptions to orderly relations'. These could then be incorporated into 
working hypotheses, leading to further testing and further generalizations. His conclusion 
was that the statistical evidence available 'considerably understate[ s ] the extent to which 
business cycles dominate the American economy'. 
89 percent of our series should be thought of as typically swayed by the cyclical 
tides throughout reference cycles ... [But objection] may well be raised to this 
blunt statement. It suggests argument in a circle. First we define business cycles 
as a congeries of roughly synchronous expansions ill many activities followed by 
similarly general contractions; then we attribute the cyclical movements in a large 
majority of individual series to the cyclical tides, which are merely a summation 
of movements in individual series. ([ 1951] p. 77) 
The interdependence of aggregate and individual measures of 'cyclical tides' was justified 
by an appeal to the interrelationships within the economy. so that 'every part is 
influenced by changes in every other part'. 
Burns updated the work in the essay 'New Facts on Business Cycles' in Business 
Cycle Indicators [1961] Volume I. The section 'The Need for Scientific Work' put 
business-cycle research squarely into the Cold War firing-line: 
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Despite the relatively good business conditions of recent years, the business cycle 
continues to haunt the thinking of the American people. The reason is not only 
a wish to obliterate human miseries and material wastes [but] also political 
necessity. The old Marxist dogma that capitalism is doomed has become a 
weapon of propaganda, used adroitly and energetically to confuse the uninfomled 
and to stir discontent the world over. Our government and other democracies 
have met the challenge by building a variety of defences against depression. I low 
well the defences have been built, no one yet knows ... For the present, obituaries 
of the business cycle are romantic expressions of human inlpatience, not records 
of solid achievement. TIley serve neither the nation nor economics, and may 
prove seriously harnlful if they lead to any relaxation of the scientific work on 
business fluctuations now going fOJWard ... ([ 1961] p. 13) 
By 'scientific' Burns apparently meant quantitative, statistical. His analysis, based 
primarily on US prewar data, of specific cycles in 'over 600' indicators (reproduced as 
Figure 3.3.8), was remarkable to the extent that it showed how dispersed rather than 
concentrated were the turning points. The spikes in either peaks or troughs represented 
at most about 17 per cent of the series. Burns found that the lower line on this chart was 
slightly more reassuring. 
Rising series [are] only a thin majority at the beginning of a business cycle 
expansion. Their number swells as aggregate activity increases, though expansion 
reaches its widest scope not when aggregate activity is at a peak, but perhaps six 
months or a year earlier. In the neighborhood of a peak, cross currents are the 
outstanding feature of the business situation. Once the economy is on the 
downgrade, the number of expanding activities becomes smaller and smaller, 
though the scope of expansion does not shrink indefinitely. Perhaps six months 
or a year before the aggregate activity reaches a trough, the proportion of 
contracting activities is already at a maximum; thereafter the majority of 
contracting activity dwindles, while the minority of expanding activities becomes 
ever stronger and before long becomes the ruling majority. 
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Thus a continual transfomlation of the economic system occurs beneath 
the surface phenomena of aggregate expansion and contraction. ([1961] pp. 
10-11) 
This use of specific turning points gave a rather different picture of business 
cycles: one of swelling and receding momenta, measured by cumulatively increasing and 
decreasing changes of direction in dis aggregated activities. Indeed, Burns saw this as 
evidence of two cycles: the 'seen' cycles of changes in direction in the 'aggregates or 
averages' (these terms appear to be interchangeable) of activities; and the second 
'''unseen'' cycle in the relative distribution of expansions and contractions of specific 
activities'. However, even the latter distribution showed a maximum clustering of only 
15-20 percent of turning points in anyone month. Despite these attempts at general 
descriptions of business cycles, Burns continued to stress the diversity of behaviour. In 
the section on forecasting, he wrote: 
I take it as a matter of course that it is vital, both theoretically and practically, 
to recognize the changes in economic organization and the episodic and random 
factors that make each business cycle a unique configuration of events. ([ 1961] 
pp. 10-11) 
He then showed a leading indicator based on the seven series which appeared to 
anticipate all the reference dates in the period 1919-1939, and a coincident indicator for 
the same period - a seeming contradiction of the position of each episode as unique. 
This is another example of the circularity implicit in confusing reference dates with 
business cycles. How indicative it was of contemporary thinking is not clear. If indeed 
representative, it partly explains how the confusion of aggregate with 'typical' behaviour 
in econometric research has developed. 
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3.4. CRITIQUES OF STATISTICAL BUSINESS-CYCLE RESEARCH 
The unease evident in Mitchell's work is reflected by all writers of the period. As 
early as 1923, Irving Fisher referred to the 'so-called business cycle' in a paper in which 
he argued that for the period 1916-1922, such fluctuations could be fully 'explained' by 
changes in (distributed lags ot) a wholesale price index. Explanation in this case meant 
correlation or regression, based on the prior theoretical view 'long recognized [that] a 
rising price level temporarily stimulates trade and that a falling price level depresses 
trade'.39 Kendall's 1946 study of oscillatory AR(2) models, although specifically criticising 
Beveridge's index of British industrial production, 1785-1938, applies to all contemporary 
research.40 Kendall demonstrated that Beveridge apparently ignored 'minor' turning 
points in his data in order to find a cycle of eight-years' duration, which, had these been 
included, would have produced a duration of only four years. 
3.4.1. The Theory vs. Empiricism Debate 
The best-remembered critique of Mitchell and the NBER was Koopmans's 1947 
review ofMBC, entitled 'Measurement without Theory'. This was part of a wider debate 
between the NBER and the Cowles Commission, the course of which can be traced in 
the correspondence between Koopmans and Rutledge Vining in the Review of Economic 
Studies from August 1947 to May 1949.41 Koopmans's title gave the impression that 
Mitchell and the NBER rejected theory, a clear misunderstanding of the significance of 
the work and its results. Koopmans held that the stages of the development of 'economic 
science' were analogous to what he called the 'Kepler' and 'Newton' stages in the theory 
of celestial mechanics. The former was supposedly the stage of data-accumulation and 
)!I'Our Unstable Dollar and the So-Called Business Cycle' ,Journal of tlte American Statistical Association, 17, pp. 179-202. 
Further discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
«>Contributions to tlte Study of Oscillatory TIme-Series. discussed rully in Chapter 4 below. The index in question appeared 
in Full Employment in a Free Society (1944). 
C1Reprinted in Gordon and Klein (eds.) Readings in Business Cycles (1966]. 
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measurement, and the latter the deduction of general empirical 'laws of nature' from 
these observations. MBC was supposed to be a contribution to the Kepler stage. 
Koopmans thought this inadequate: a 'shorter road' to the explanation of such 
phenomena would use 'the concepts and hypotheses of economic theory [by which he 
meant general equilibrium and other micro-foundations] as part of the process of 
observation and measurement'. His three specific objections to MBC were: (1) that for 
the analysis of 'such a many-sided phenomenon, theoretical preconceptions about its 
nature cannot be dispensed with' and that the argument is weakened by so doing; (2) that 
'the prediction, within the narrowest attainable limits of error, of the [policy] effects of 
stated hypothetical measures' is the most important objective of the Burns and Mitchell 
analysis, and that without theory, the relevant conclusions about policy 'cannot be drawn'; 
and (3) that hypothesis testing, in the technical sense, cannot be carried out without 
distributional assumptions, which are missing from MBC. 
Vining's objection to the Koopmans position was that the core of its criticism 
relied on the Burns and Mitchell choice of a macroeconomic unit of analysis - the 
'business cycle' - as fundamental. The Cowles Commission favoured a microeconomic 
unit - the preference-ordering, optimizing and representative agent within a competitive 
equilibrium model. Although the NBER approach had limitations, Vining thought that 
of Koopmans to be even less promising, and offered a three-point defence of Burns and 
Mitchell. First, economics, as a 'science of variation' had perhaps not developed to the 
point where a general mathematical model had any chance of succcss. Second, Vining 
interpreted Koopmans's view as an argument for carrying out the two stages of enquiry 
together, and criticised it for being equivalent merely to a form 'in the main available 
from works no later than those of Walras', Third, 
modern theories of statistical estimation and of tests of hypotheses with their 
emphasis upon distributional hypotheses, upon the extraction of maximum 
infornlation, upon the power of a test, and the like, are almost beside the point 
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in attempts to derive hypotheses, the exploratory stage that characterizes a great 
part of the work in all developing fields of knowledge. ([1966] p. 207) 
Koopmans, in 'A Reply', argued that 
if a theory fomlulates precisely ... the determination of the choices and actions of 
each individual in a group ... in response to the choices and actions of other 
individuals ... then the set of these individual behavior characteristics is logically 
equivalent to the behavior characteristics of the group [emphasis in original]. 
([1966] p. 219) 
This does not imply, however, that aggregating from collections of individuals is easy or 
obvious. The problem lies in the lack of micro-foundations, and Koopmans refers to 
Arrow's view that aggregate equations are not even necessary for macroeconomic 
analysis. His specific criticism of MBC is that its statistical measures are 'inefficient tools' 
because the application of theory can narrow down the choice of alternative hypotheses 
a priori. 42 Vining's 'Rejoinder' criticised Koopmans's argument that 'all 
actions ... associated with human beings are subject ultimately to individual determination', 
Koopmans's view of aggregation was seen as 'excessively formal', The distinction was, for 
example, analogous to that between aggregates of electrons hitting a diffraction grating 
and the behaviour of an aggregate biological population: in the former case, behaviour 
could be analysed by relative frequencies, whereas in the latter case the population itself 
was the indivisible unit. Moreover, according to Vining, Koopmans misrepresented MBC 
as an attempt at conclusive results rather than a tentative exploration of economic 
variation, which is how its authors saw it. In such primary research, specific distributional 
hypotheses are counter-productive. (There is evidence that Koopmans later softened his 
opposition to NBER methods. In Three Essays on the Slate of Economic Science [1957] 
he argued that in some cases the selection of measures such as turning points on 'intuitive 
ClHe did not apparently realize that this is exactly what Mitchell did. 
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grounds' can give 'reasonably efficient summaries of...the relevant information in the 
Koopmans's specific criticisms of Burns and Mitchell have been largely forgotten. 
What is remembered is 'Measurement without Theory': i.e., MBC is seen as the definitive 
purely statistical work because its methods of data-collection and evaluation appear to 
readers unfamiliar with the issues to be conclusive. It is considered to be the last word 
on the subject, and all subsequent business-cycle analysis has taken its 'results' as a 
justification both for the formulation of theories and for empirical modelling and 
forecasting. This interpretation was reinforced by Marschak (1951], who in response to 
Burns's introduction to What Happens during Business Cycles, attempted to rewrite the 
'definition'. Although this might h.ave clarified the position, it had the opposite effect. 
Marschak argued that empirical economics was at 'its very beginnings', and it was thus 
necessary to 'translate' the definition into 'terms ... that might yield themselves 
to ... empirical tests'.44 The MBC definition, which was a mere 'hypothesis that such cycles 
exist', should thus be modified as follows: 
In a society consisting mainly of business enterprises, and apart from seasonal 
and small random influences, certain economic variables are periodic functions 
of tinle; the period length is the same for all these variables; for each variable, 
each period contains exactly one peak and one trough. (It follows that for any 
two variables the distance in tinle [the 'lag') between the corresponding peaks is 
constant. ([1951] p. 15) 
This rendering implied that 'apart from random influences', each 'observable economic 
variable' is a lagged function of a zero-mean 'stochastic process' which is known as 
'general business activity'; and Marschak argued that such an hypothesis was 'implicitly 
accepted' by Mitchell as a 'drawing .. .from a random universe', 
41[l9S7J p. 216. 
44Universities-National Bureau Conference on Business Cycles, pp. 14-24. Jacob Marschak succeeded Frisch as Research 
Director of the Cowles Commission, which by this time had moved to the University of Chicago. 
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Marschak was making a serious point. The real difference between the NBER and 
the 'Chicago Interpretation' was the importance of micro-foundations, not the acceptance 
or rejection of the role of government in economic management and in promoting 
welfare. Institutional attitudes towards stabilization policy needed to be looked at, not 
because of 'free market' considerations, but because 
a wave pattern that can describe American business cycles at a time when public 
expenditures equal a tenth of national income is unlikely to have much predictive 
value when public expenditures equal a fifth or a fourth of national income ... 
([1951] p. 24) 
The difference between interpretations was perhaps a 'difference between generations'. 
Mitchell's approach was in the 'grand manner' of nineteenth-century thought, where 
'economic laws' were seen to be 'inexorable, with little place .. .for deliberate changes'. By 
the early 1950s, however, the belief was that far from being inexorable, these laws 
'depend on habits, institutions and policies' (an echo of the Institutionalist position?); and 
the economist's task is to predict the effect of 'exogenous' stimuli on the 'parameters' of 
the system.4S 'Deliberate changes' meant government intervention as in wartime to 
optimize both resource allocations and welfare - the 'social possibilities'. The force of 
'inexorable laws' would thus be modulated by some of the prescriptions of command 
economics, and in this view the positions of the parties were not that far apart. 
So far so good; yet for obscure reasons, Marschak's words have been taken as a 
'correct' interpretation of the Burns and Mitchell results by later generations. Burns tried 
his best to deflect Marschak's judgments. Stung by the Chicago Interpretation, he replied 
in the same volume that this 'sterile exercise in translation' misrepresented Mitchell's 
position. Mitchell 'saw the essence of the business cycle in a systematic divergence 
[emphasis in original]' of the various sectors of the economy, and not in its relation to 
450perationally this meant the estimation of 'systems-of-equations' structural parameters, as advocated by the Cowles 
Commission. This type of econometric analysis was implicit in Koopmans's remarks, and is discussed in the context of 
'calibrating' RBC models in Section 3.5.3 below. 
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an unobserved index of 'general business conditions'.46 There was 'never any such design 
or ... statistical construction' at the NBER; and the reference scale was not a proxy for 'an 
index of general business'. 
Mitchell's findings would not be significantly altered if his reference scale, which 
is derived from numerous economic series, were replaced by a scale ... derived 
from a single comprehensive series such as national income ... ([1951] p. 28) 
Nevertheless, the Chicago Interpretation over the years seems to have become the 
preferred one in applied work, perhaps because it has the merit of simplicity. Lucas took 
it as a point of departure for his own version of business cycles, declaring in a 1977 paper 
that 'business cycles are all alike', and again in Studies in Trade Cycle Theory [1981]: 
Mitchell sought an empirical definition of business cycles through the systematic 
exclusion of those movements in economic tinlC series that appeared likely to be 
explicable by then existing theory: the general level and pattern of growth in 
economic activity, and movements in individual series that seemed to arise from 
supply and demand conditions specific to individual markets ... 
[It] is easy to forget the remarkable character of the regularities that Mitchell 
succeeded in discovering and documenting ... The central finding, of course, was 
the similarity of all peacetinle cycles with one another, once variation in duration 
was controlled for, in the sense that each cycle exhibits about the same pattern 
of co-movements among variables as do the others. ([1981] p. 274)47 
3.4.2. Defences of Mitchell's Theoretu:al Views 
Mitchell's objective of formulating an empirically-based theory was perhaps 
overlooked by Koopmans and Vining, but not by Mitchell's NBER research associates, 
Burns and Milton Friedman. In an essay in the memorial volume in 1952, Friedman 
attempted to construct a general theory from Mitchell's work in the 'modern language 
i1951) p. 26. 
41See Section 3.53 below. 
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of propensities, multipliers and accelerators', He interpreted Mitchell's overall position 
as an attempt to improve the quantity theory by, in effect, inc\uding time subscripts in the 
formulation, 
So in the analysis of problems of position, the quantity theory can be used 
without paying special attention to the dating of the variables on which it centers 
attention, On the other hand, in the analysis of process rather than position, the 
dating of the variables is likely to be critically important; it is precisely the lags 
reflected in differences in dating that must be the central elements of a dynamic 
theory, ([1952] p. 252) 
Friedman argued that of the three interpretations of cyc\es then current - (1) 
reactions to exogenous shocks, (2) fundamental instability giving rise to fluctuations which 
are limited by some reflecting barrier, and (3) a self-generating process of fluctuations 
through some adaptive mechanism which encompasses (1) and (2) - Mitchell accepted 
the third view in Business Cycles and 'never found any reason to change this conc\usion',48 
However, although Mitchell was 'deeply interested' in 'money' in both the broad and 
narrow, technical, senses, he believed that prices and quantities were the 'active' factors 
in business-cycle movements, rather than money supply.49 This apparent contradiction 
between 'the dominance of the quantity of money in the long-period movement [and] 
its .. ,passiveness in short-period movements' was resolved by interpolating lag structures 
into the formulation, and this was considered by Friedman to be 'a theoretical 
contribution of the first importance to the quantity theory',SO Mitchell, as a theorist, was 
thus 
almost exclusively concerned with a part of economic theory that was largely 
outside the main stream ... and that even today is least developed and least 
satisfactory - the dynamic adjustment of the economic system as a whole, 
41(1952) p. 253. 
(9/bjd., p. 251. 
"'Ibid., pp. 251-2. 
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Because we know so little about this part of economic theory, we tend to neglect 
it. .. This circumstance, I think, partly accounts for the widespread illusion that 
Mitchell was antitheoretical... [For] Mitchell's work was consistently and almost 
exclusively devoted to the development of a theory of economic change. [Lags 1 
in response are the central elements in theories of this type. Further ... the lags in 
response must be pervasive, they must operate on a broad range of activities, 
these activities must be linked to one another and to the remainder of the 
system, and the whole must display consistent, though not identical, responses in 
successive cycles. ([1952] pp. 237-282) 
Schumpeter, in the same volume, concurred with Friedman but went even further, 
suggesting that MBC was 'an exercise in the dynamic theory of equiJibrium,.sl Burns, in 
the introductory essay, concurred with these views. 
3.5. I.ATTER DAY BUSINESS CYCLE RESEARCH 
Burns's 1961 paper was the last to rely on prewar data. During the 1950s and 
1960s the use of aggregates became standard with the development of national income 
accounting procedures. This was a period of rapid economic growth in all sectors, to the 
extent that 'cyclical' contractions in GNP and industrial production were rare and shallow. 
As a consequence the concept of business cycles was modified to that of 'growth cycles'. 
Moore and Zarnowitz [1986] define these as 'a fluctuation around the long-run growth 
trend of a nation's economy, that is, a trend-adjusted business cycle'. Lucas [1977] 
proposed a similar 'definition,.s2 
~'lbjd., pp. 259-60. 
~2This model requires the 'trend' to be 'removed' from the data. In the 19605 a moving average technique known as 'phase 
averaging' was widely applied to this end. It was used at the NBER by Mintz, by Moore and Zamowitz al Columbia University, 
and by Friedman and Schwartz in studies of the long-nm. It is currently employed by the UK Central Stalistical Office to 
'identify' the UK 'business cycle' from nonstationa ry time-series data. 
100 
3.5.1. An Algorithmic Approach to the IdentifICation of Turning Points 
Although specific-cycle dating has always relied upon subjective assessments, 
attempts have been made from time to time to find algorithms for its determination. The 
most ambitious of these was an NBER project in the 1960s, directed by Gerhard Bry and 
Charlotte Boschan, which tested computer-based procedures for finding turning points 
in monthly data, identification of which was seen as an 'essential element' in finding 
'cyclical turns in general business conditions'. The programmed approach, as discussed 
in Bry and Boschan's Cyclical Analysis of Time Series [1971 ] (CATS), differed somewhat 
from previous methods, which in the authors' opinion 'rely heavily on impressionistic 
judgments'. The authors took a strong a priori view of what actually constituted a specific 
cycle. Following NBER practice, duration for the most part was set in a range of two to 
seven years, with a minimum of 15 months. Problems had always arisen with anomalous 
behaviour in time-series data producing what maybe loosely categorized as 'false signals'. 
Examples of seven of these types are discussed, the most obvious being the occurrence 
of non-alternating sequences of peaks or troughs (see Figure 3.5.1). 
The CATS solution was to apply a number of filtering operations to the data to 
eliminate both noise and outliers. Peaks and troughs were placed 'at the highest and 
lowest points of cyclical fluctuations', and were forced to alternate, so that a peak always 
followed a trough, and vice versa. Where 'multiple' peaks or troughs appeared (with 
equal values) the latest was chosen. If 'plateaux' or 'valleys' occurred, that is, 'step' 
patterns, the search for turning points might be inappropriate. Since every such addition 
to the rules produced more problems, the approach was considered as highly provisional. 
The forced alternation of peaks and troughs could produce arbitrary results, as for 
example for the bituminous coal series (Chart 3, reproduced here as Figure 3.5.2). The 
two 'turning points' found by the program in this series for 1934 (indicated by arrows) 
do not look like true specific-cycle turns as defined by the NBER; and very likely there 
were other instances of such anomalies. 
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3.5.2. The Postwar 'Stabilization' Literature 
Some attempts have been made to re-examine Mitchell's reference chronology, 
both for its general accuracy and for what it implies about postwar stabilization policy. 
Watson [1992] finds evidence that 'apparent stabilization is largely spurious, and is caused 
by differences in the way that prewar and postwar business cycle reference dates were 
chosen by the NBER', owing mainly to the available prewar data having greater volatility 
than the 'aggregate economy'. Romer [1992] offers a criticism that is perhaps more 
serious. She argues that, far from using all the series then available, the pre-1927 
chronology is based almost entirely on two indices of 'general business conditions'; the 
Snyder and the AT&T, both of which were adjusted for some estimate of 'trend'. The 
latest of the absolute troughs in series is generally the reference trough, with the 
reference peak taken as the absolute peak of the two. She maintains that although the 
correspondences are not exact, they are close enough to permit such an inference to be 
drawn. 
111at the early NBER reference dates appear to have been set largely on the 
basis of just a few detrended series may seem to contradict the numerous 
references in Measurillg Busilless Cycles to the hundreds of series analyzed by the 
NBER. The resolution of this seeming contradiction is that the reference dates 
were an input to the analysis of many other series, not the final result of this 
analysis. ([1992] p. 10) 
Watson [1994] continues the theme of spurious stability. He finds that prewar 
(i.e., pre-1929) and postwar cycle durations are not significantly different, although the 
'volatility' is greater in the former period. He questions whether it is possible to 
determine from the historical record exactly how Mitchell arrived at the reference dates, 
and whether the Snyder and AT&T indices were given as much weight as Romer believes. 
Watson finds the Burns and Mitchell definition of expansions and contractions 'too 
vague' to be of assistance in dating specific cycles, and favours instead the Bry-Boschan 
algorithm. However, when applied to the monthly pig iron production series in MBe, the 
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latter technique finds turning points that are little different from those of the former. s3 
Watson also argues that certain sectors used by Burns and Mitchell for reference dating 
were 'systematically more volatile than the aggregate economy', which biases the 
chronology. Neither Romer nor Watson, however, question the idea of a cycle in general 
business conditions. 
3.5.3. 'Real Business Cycles': the New Classical Interpretation 
A substantial theoretical literature, known as 'real business cycles' (RBC), has 
developed since the 1970s. Its origins lie in the 1930s' transmission mechanisms for 
random shocks proposed by Slutsky and Frisch, as developed in postwar neoclassical 
growth theory by Solow [1956, 1957], who postulated exogenous productivity shocks as 
an impulse mechanism for short-run fluctuations.s4 Output growth from production in this 
model is given by gy = a gl + (I-a) gk + z, where g is a growth rate, the subscripts y, I and 
k denoting total output, labour and capital respectively, while z represents the growth 
unaccounted for by labour or capital - the 'Solow residual'. This equation implies, by 
rearrangement, that per capita output growth depends on a linear combination of growth 
in the capital-output ratio and in the residual, the latter, according to RBC theory, being 
the source of 'business-cycle' fluctuations. 
The opposing, neo-Keynesian, view is that demand and monetary shocks are more 
important, and this debate has itself generated an extensive empirical literature. In one 
of the earlier of these assessments of productivity shocks, Shapiro [1987] estimated the 
Solow residuals for a number of US industries in order to determine whether they 
represent an exclusive shift in the production function or whether there is a demand 
component as well. Comovements ('procyc1ical fluctuation') were measured in some detail 
'l(1994] pp. 25-27. 
S4Blanchard and Fischer (1989) have argued that Lucas's approach, 'originally ... known as ... ·rational expectations" was modified 
to an 'equilibrium business cycles approach' when it was realized that such behaviour 'came more from the assumption that 
markets cleared continuously' than from expectat ions ([ 1989) p. 311, note 9). 
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by computing cross correlation coefficients between sectoral Solow residuals and residuals 
for aggregate GNP, prices and wages. Shapiro's data set contained 14 US aggregates and 
25 oftheir constituent variables, sampled at annual frequencies for the period 1950-1985. 
Correlations with prices residuals were all negative, implying that price shocks are 
contra-cyclical. On the other hand, correlations between industrial output and aggregate 
GNP residuals were mixed. Examples of these the coefficients are: total manufacturing, 
0.77; total transportation, 0.68; wholesale trade, 0.36, finance, 0.27; construction, 0.06; and 
agriculture, -0.31. Table 3.5.1 shows the proportion of both aggregates and sectoral 
constituents with at least reasonably strong positive correlations - that is, with 
coefficients greater than, say, +0.5. 
Table 3.5.1. Correlations between Solow Residuals and GNP Changes for us Anmlal 
Output and Real Wage Variables, 1950-1985 
Variables Percentage of output Percentage of real wage 
variables per sector with variables per sector with 
coefficients >+0.5 coefficients > +0.5 
All output aggregates 29 43 
Manufacturing disaggregates: 
Nondurables 10 70 
Durables 36 36 
Transportation disaggregates 60 100 
(Source: Shapiro (1987). Table 1. p. 121) 
Wage residuals are correlated more strongly than those for output. Shapiro finds evidence 
that American economic fluctuations are generated principally by productivity shocks, 
although there are exceptions in some industries. Also, because the data are annual, there 
may be relevant effects that do not appear at that frequency.ss Other, more recent, studies 
of Solow residuals, such as Caporale [1993] and Costello [1993], indicate that for other 
national economies, both types of shocks playa role in short-run fluctuations, and that 
output growth is more highly correlated across national economies than productivity 
growth. King et al. [1991] model permanent productivity shocks as innovations to a 
~~[ 1987) Table 2. p. 123. 
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common stochastic trend in output, investment and consumption. They 'conclude that the 
U.S. data are not consistent with the view that a single real permanent shock is the 
dominant source of business-cycle fluctuations', because it does not explain the majority 
of the volatility in either output or investment.56 Such shocks do Furthermore, permanent 
changes in real interest rates are better than productivity shocks at explaining short-run 
fluctuations in output. 
The original inspiration for RBC models came from Lucas, as in his interpretation 
of MBC results in the 1981 book quoted above, but most strongly expressed in the 1977 
paper. 
Though there is absolutely no theoretical reason to anticipate it, one is led by the 
facts to conclude that, with respect to the qualitative behaviour of comovements 
among series, business cycles are a/l alike. To theoretically inclined economists, 
this conclusion ... suggests the possibility of a unified explanation of business 
cycles, grounded in the general laws governing market economics, rather than in 
political or institutional characteristics specific to particular countries or periods 
[emphasis in original]. ([ 1977] p. 10) 
These views mean introducing microeconomic 'foundations' into the analysis, i.e., 
preference-ordering agents and explicit production technologies, with 'solutions' involving 
recursive, Pareto-optimal general equilibria. Lucas defined the business cycle as 
deviations of aggregate real output from 'trend', with certain 'empirical regularities' in 
the 'comovements' of deviations from trend with other aggregates: investment and 
durable production tend to have fluctuations of greater amplitude that GNP, whereas 
consumption and capital stock are much \css variable. 
Kydland and Prescott [1990] have argued that Lucas's understanding of business 
cycles 'differs importantly from that of Mitchell', especially in the latter's emphasis on 
'sequences of expansions and contractions ... emphasizing turning points' and the four 
S6(1991) p.838. 
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phases of depression, revival, prosperity and recession.s7 They quote the 1922 Clements 
definition of 'cycle' from BCPS, p. 377 as accurately representing Mitchell's position, and 
appear to be arguing that Mitchell's hypothesis was one of 'deterministic cyclical laws of 
motion' which fail to account for business cycles from a theoretically sound basis 
because cyclical laws of motion do not arise as equilibrium behaviour for 
economies with empirically reasonable preferences and technologies ... ([1990] p. 
5) 
(Their own definition is 'consistent with' Clements's, but substitutes 'deviations' for 
'departures'. 58) Kydland and Prescott propose an alternative 'identification' of the' cyclical 
component' using what has become known as the 'Hodrick-Prescott filter' (see below). 
There is again a significant degree of sectoral disaggregation in this study, with ten input 
and 20 product and income variables.59 Their results are presented as 'business cycle 
facts', i.e., the 'cyclical behaviour of aggregates'; i.e., the degree of cross correlation of 
the cyclical component (,deviations from trend') with real GNP, the phase shifts relative 
to the 'overall business cyclc', and the amplitudes of input and output variables. Hence 
'comovement' here means cross correlations with aggregate output rather than with each 
other. The H-P approach has bcen criticized as statistically unsound (see, for example, 
the discussion of Stadler [1994] and Pagan [1994], following, and of Harvey and Jaeger 
[1993] in Chapter 4 below.) 
RBC models have been more recently seen as a method of carrying out 
quantitative experiments -effectively simulations -whose objective is to answer specific 
comparative questions, rather than to reproduce the salient features of time-series data. 
Methodological issues are discussed most recently in Kydland and Prescott [1995]. 
Building on the 'neoclassical growth framework', these authors argue for simulations, or 
Sl(1990) p.4. 
)ISee footnote 26 above. 
Yo/[1990J Tables I and 2, pp. 10, It. 
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'computational experiments' as 'econometric tool[s] used [in] deriving the quantitative 
implications' of such theories/)() RBC analysis addresses such questions as the 
consequences of changing welfare policy, the relative importance of a given factor in 
propagating particular behaviour, and the effect of introducing a new factor on the 
'deviation from standard theory'.61 However, because all models are abstractions, they 
can be judged only relative to some given question. To criticize or reject a model 
because it is an abstraction is foolish: all models are necessarily abstractions and 
therefore false. ([1995] p. 6) 
Furthermore, 
searching within some parametric class of economics for the one which best fits 
a set of aggregate time series makes little sense ... A model economy is obviously 
an abstraction and, by definition, false. With enough data, statistical 
hypothesis-testing almost surely will reject any model along some dinlension ... 
Using probabilistic theories ... to compare a given scientific theory with all 
others that might fit the same data is a futile effort ... All historically significant 
theories have agreed with the facts, but only to a degree. No precise answer can 
be found to the question how well an individual theory fits the facts. ([ 1995] p. 
6t2 
The authors argue that although RBC theory has evolved from the original Lucas 
[1977] definition, it currently departs from the original formulation in important respects. 
In the 1970s, when it was believed that 'one set of factors was ... behind the cyclical 
component and that an entirely different set of factors accounted for the movement of 
the growth component', the preferred method for isolating 'cycle' from 'trend' was to 'fit 
a smooth curve through the time series'. The H-P filter was intended to isolate the 
cyclical component and, by the 'calibration' of a parameter, to make 'the fitted curve 
(011995) Abstract and p. 4. 
61/bid., p. 3. 
~e authors are here agreeing with Kuhn (1962) that 'Cew philosophers oC science still seek absolute criteria ror the 
verification of scientific theories'. 
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mimic ... one that business cycle analysts would draw'.63 Those features of the data 
designated 'business cycle fluctuations' are 'nothing more than well-defined statistics' and 
'given the way the theory has developed, these statistics measure nothing'.M The 1970s 
view has changed. Nowadays 
business cycle theory treats growth and cycles as being integrated, not as a sum 
of two components driven by different factors. ([1995J p. 9) 
The H-P filter merely 'summarizes in a reasonable way what happens at business cycle 
frequencies ... as a means of presenting the findings and of judging the reliability of the 
answer' in the abstract context of the RBC model; hence, to complain about the 
generation of 'spurious cycles makes no sense'.6S In contrast to the 'systems-of-equations' 
approach of the Cowles Commission, the preferred model is not necessarily the one 'that 
better fits the data'; and furthermore, because 'any model of a national economy is an 
abstraction and therefore false ... statistical hypothesis-testing is not a useful tool for 
testing theory'.66 
The problems of calibration are considered explicitly in Pagan (1994]. Given the 
'model' Yr = g (zr ; () ) + ur = Y; + ur' where z is exogenous, U an error term and Y· the 
'estimate' of g(zr; (}), the RBC approach is to derive the functional form of g from 
theory and to remain relatively indifferent to the precise nature of the error term.67 This 
approach assumes that 'the calibrated model is the DGP [data generation process] and 
then proceed[ s] to do inference under the condition that y, = y; '; but 
63(1995) p. 9. The term 'calibration' has somewhat divergent meanings, depending on context, but essentially means 
imposing a parameter value on a priori criteria. 
"Ibid., p. 10. 
65-ynis is a reference to Harvey and Jaeger (1993). See Chapter 4 below. 
'1995) p. 18. 
67(1994) pp. 2-4. 
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lurking in the background is the concern that it does not seem plausible that 
Yt= Yt·. Indeed one feels that this theme is always present in calibration 
exercises ... ([1994] p. 19) 
In other words, all calibrated model economies are 'false' in the specific sense that, unlike 
the systems-of-equations approach68, they do not investigate the 'unknown' properties 
of the error term u,. In particular, no attempt is made to investigate its magnitude or 
correlation with Yr'; yet both these values are of great importance in assessing whether 
the 'restrictions implied by the model are rejected by the data'.69 
This seeming implausibility is also criticized in Canova, Finn and Pagan [1991]. 
These authors argue that much of the underlying theory, e.g., Cobb-Douglas production 
and CRAA utility functions, are 'ad-hoc assumptions [and hence] can scarcely be 
defended on the ground that they are "theory"'. 70 No rigorous statistical criteria exist for 
evaluating whether model behaviour is acceptably 'close' to actual behaviour. Moreover, 
in 
what purport to be business cycle models, which classically are interpreted as 
giving rise to a peak in the spectrum for output, evaluation is performed with 
respect to variances, which represent the area under the spectrum [emphasis in 
original]. It is not surprising therefore that these models generally don't have a 
cycle at all, exhibiting real rather than complex eigenvalues [e.g. King, Plosser 
and Rebelo [1988], the Kydland-Prescott 'tinle-to-build' models] ... At the 
moment RBC models only possess cycles if some rigidity such as wage contracts 
are [sic] built into them ... ([1991] p. 14) 
Kydland and Prescott [1991] criticized the systems-of-equations approach partly 
because of a record of predictive failure, but mostly because of 'advances in neoclassical 
theory that permitted the application of the [competitive equilibrium] paradigm in 
68That is, the estimation of the structural parameters of a simultaneous-equations model. 
IR Ibid., p. 20. 
"11991] p. 13. 
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dynamic stochastic settings'.71 They argued for a 'recursive' stochastic general equilibrium 
approach in which the effects of shocks on the 'willingness of agents to substitute 
commodities' could be assessed. The 'precise question [was] how much variation in 
aggregate economic activity would have remained if technology shocks were the only 
source of variation'. Such comparatives are characteristic of RBC research: within an 
abstract, neoclassical framework with a restricted class of technologies and preferences, 
what is the relative contribution of each behavioural category to overall fluctuations. RBC 
models do not, according to Kydland and Prescott, attempt to match the behaviour of 
national income accounts data (up to an error term with known properties). 
Model-economy selection depends on the question being asked [rather than] on 
the answer provided ... Unlike the systems-of-equations approach, no attempt is 
made to detemline the true model. All model economies are abstractions and by 
definition false. ([1991] p. 170) 
They do not, therefore, directly address empirical issues such as the identification of 
business-cycle components from time-series data; nor is their success measured by an 
ability to capture 'real-world' behaviour. They are essentially asking ceteris paribus 
questions about the composition of short-run macroeconomic fluctuations within a 
recursively-determined general equilibrium framework. 
Earlier RBC applications are discussed in Blanchard and Fischer [1989], Chapter 
7. At this time interest centred on the explanation of fluctuations as the propagation of 
productivity shocks through an economy without market imperfections. The authors 
demonstrated how such behaviour could be generated in the Ramsey and Diamond 
models via the stochastic evolution of capital stock and output growth following an AR(l) 
process, with and without unit roots to allow for permanent and transitory effects. A 
multi-sector version of these dynamics is discussed in Long and Plosser [1983], who 
obtain serially and cross correlated shocks from serially independent impulses. However, 
71(1991 J p. 167. 
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the order of these serial and cross correlations are only 0.3 and 0.2 respectively. King and 
Plosser [1988] applied the Bry-Boschan algorithm to data from the Adelmans [1959] 
simulation of the US economy (see Chapter 4 below) to determine whether an RBC 
model could reproduce the durations of 'business-cycle' expansions and contractions. 
Kim and Pagan [1993] have demonstrated that such models, in order to capture 
the 'stylized facts' of durations, must be driven by processes 'close to 1(1 ) ... with drift', i.e., 
stochastic trends.72 These authors criticize RBC models in general because they assume 
a 'deterministic steady state growth path' which can 'be easily removed from the data' -
the strategy behind H-P filtering. It 'involves a serious inconsistency', because if the 
'forcing processes are not integrated, then they cannot produce a stochastic trend, yet 
there is one in the data'. If the filtered data still possess a stochastic trend, and 'hence 
the variance of the detrended data does not exist', comparisons between moments ofH-P 
filtered data and those of RBC models will be invalidated. Such inconsistencies are 
sufficient grounds 'for doubting the validity of the calibrations' on many RBC models; 
but there is a further objection to filtering. 
If the stochastic trend has no impact on the features of interest such an action 
[H-P filtering] seems acceptable. However, for the purpose of assessing the 
nature and causes of business cycles there is ample evidence that the stochastic 
trend is a major contributor to these, in the sense that the 'pemlanent' impulses 
explain a large percentage of the variation in output at the business cycle 
horizon ... ([1993] p. 14) 
The most recent RBC applications are contained in the collection of essays 
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research [1995], edited by Cooley and Prescott. According to 
these authors 
modern business cycle theory starts with the view that growth and fluctuations are 
not distinct phenomena to be studied with separate data and different analytical 
tools [emphasis in original]. ([1995] p. 4) 
72[1993) p. 16. 
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This view is attributed originally to Hicks, Goodwin and others in the 1950s, but in the 
neoclassical context requires modifications of the growth model to produce the desired 
short-run effects. There is no single or 'correct way ... to produce business-cycle type 
fluctuations', and the book is an exploration of various models by a number of authors.73 
The Cooley and Prescott paper in Frontiers proposes a 'stochastic growth economy 
with labor-leisure choice'. A 'law of motion', specified as AR(l), is introduced for both 
a random productivity shock and for aggregate capital stock. Model parameters are 
calibrated so that behaviour 'mimics the actual economy on the dimensions associated 
with long term growth'.'· The types of restrictions imposed on these parameters 
'depend ... on the kind of questions being asked of these artificial economies'. The model 
is 'very abstract', containing 'no government sector, no household production sector, no 
foreign sector and no explicit treatment of inventories'. Calibration is difficult because 
of definitional inconsistencies in the national income and product accounts. The assumed 
'business cycle facts' are the 
regular ... way the variables move together. It is these comovements of variables 
that Bums and Mitchell worked so hard to document and that Robert Lucas 
emphasized as the defining features of the business cycle. These are the features 
of fluctuations that we would like an artificial economy - a business cycle model 
- to replicate. ([1995] p. 26) 
A real US GNP series is decomposed via the H-P filter following the Lucas 
trend-stationary approach, with MBC duration criteria. 
We nomlally think of the business cycle as fluctuations about the growth path 
that occur with a frequency of three to five years. That is what Bums and 
Mitchell [1946] characterized as the usual business cycle frequency. ([1995] p. 28) 
The authors find that although their model 'does display a business cycle', its behaviour 
differs in several respects from actual US experience. None of the models discussed in 
73[1995) p. 12. 
14Ibid., pp. 12, 14. 
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Frontiers is intended to be 'comprehensive' because of continuing developments in the 
field. The assumption of a Burns-and-MitcheIVmodified-Lucas cycle in the 'real-world' 
economy is· accepted and 'mimicked' within the general equilibrium framework of 
optimizing agents under a number of theoretical specifications. These include 
non-Pare to-optimal equilibria, heterogeneous agents, monetary shocks, and 
non-Walrasian and imperfectly-competitive economies. The Canova et al. comments 
apply: productivity shocks and the evolution of capital generally follow first order 
autoregressive processes in these models. 
Although RBC studies demonstrate that fluctuations mimicking 'business cycles' 
can arise in abstract models of competitive equilibrium (i.e., the 'empirical regularities' 
specified by Lucas in 1977 and later expanded), they leave most empirical issues 
unresolved. A general critique is given in Stadler [1994], who argues that the 'true 
purpose' of RBC models is to 
provide the important insight that the existence of fluctuations in output does not 
imply any failure of markets to clear. Even economies with complete and efficient 
markets will display business cycles if technical change is stochastic. Although 
government intervention may be welfare-inlproving if equilibrium is not 
Pareto-optinlal to begin with ... the existence of cycles per se is not sufficient to 
justify stabilization policies. ([ 1994] p. 1778) 
These models are in effect designed to demonstrate these propositions.7s Stadler argues 
that nevertheless (or perhaps consequently?) the RBC approach has 'difficulty in 
accommodating a number of empirical facts': it does not 'adequately account for the 
dynamics of output' or for agent heterogeneity; and although it 'can generate cycles, 
these ... are not like the cycles observed', The introduction of additional shocks to tastes 
and preferences, or to government spending or to the money supply, still fails adequately 
to explain such fluctuations as the pattern of household investment, or volatility in the 
"Th' d IS paper pre- ates Frontiers and perhaps does n~ give sufficient weight to the increasing catholicity of the latter's model 
speci fications. 
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terms of trade. Furthermore 'there is no microeconomic evidence for the large real 
shocks that drive these models'.76 The predictions of general pro-cyclicality in prices and 
productivity, and contra-cyclicality in real wages, are not confirmed by US experience. 
Stadler also maintains that none of the RBC formulations are able to provide a 
convincing explanation of the mechanism whereby serially-independent impulses are 
transformed into serially correlated output dynamics. Comparisons of correlation 
coefficients, as in Shapiro [1987], are open to several criticisms. Solow residuals reflect 
'shifts in the production function' only in the presence of perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale, and 'will capture changes in total factor productivity only if 
there are no measurement errors' in the input series. These errors will otherwise 
show up as variations in the estimated ... residual ... [Also] Solow residuals ... do not 
behave like an exogenous impulse, but are Granger-caused by money, interest 
rates and government spending ... [Moreover] between one quarter and one half 
of the variation ... is attributable to variations in aggregate demand [suggesting] 
that Solow residuals ... capture a variety of other factors at work in the 
economy ... and reflect both supply-side and demand-side impUlses. ([1994] pp. 
1775-6) 
Stadler further cautions against the use of correlation coefficients 'because these 
coefficients are not necessarily informative about the true cyclical comovements of 
variables'.77 He thus concludes that while 'there is no persuasive evidence against RBCs 
here, there is no clear evidence in their favor either'.78 
76(1994) p. 1772. 
77/bid., pp. 1778-9. 
71 Ibid., p. 177 S. 
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3.5.4. Current Reference-Dating Practice 
The idea of a general cycle persists and continues to be tracked by governments 
and international organizations. Their approach has largely consisted in attempts to find 
proxies for these hypothetical 'comovements' within the methodological framework of 
MBC. For example, in the UK the dating of domestic 'cycles' is based on a close 
paraphrase: 'recurrent' sequences of expansions and contractions in 'many economic 
activities and sectors', the comovements extended in this case to include growth rates.79 
The CSO implementation relies on the fixing of 'reference dates' as a proxy for 
generalized fluctuations, i.e., 'the set of turning points representing the cyclical 
movements of a hypothetical variable which may be thought of as "aggregate economic 
activity"', and which can be tracked by leading, coincident and lagging indicators.80 
Since 1980, the US reference chronology has been determined by the NBER 
Business Cycle Dating Committee, still using the Burns and Mitchell 1946 definition of 
expansions and contractions in 'aggregate' activity, but having abandoned the 
classification of cycles according to Mitchell's four 'phases'. Romer argues that in fact the 
procedures are as 'laid down in more or less final form in Measuring Business Cycles'.S! 
The Committee fixes turning points in aggregate activity between expansions and 
contractions (,recession') by assessing movements in several coincident indicators. This 
process is described in an article by the NBER Director of Public Information in the 
NBER Reporter, Spring 1989: 
Historically, as now, determining when there was a turning point (peak or 
trough) in the economy was a two-step process. First, has there been a turning 
point? Here the NBER's historical series are useful for comparing current 
economic activity with earlier business cycles in terms of: duration, depth of the 
79'Cyclical Indicators for the United Kingdom Economy' in Economic Trends, March 1975, pp. 95-98. 
rtJlbid., p. 95. 
"(1992) p. 4. 
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decline in aggregate activity, and diffusion among different economic activities 
and in different industries, sectors, and region [known as the '3-D' criteria]. 
To identify the peak, for example, total business sales, the industrial 
production index, real GNP, the unemployment rate, non-agricultural 
employment, man-hours of nonfarm employment, and personal income must all 
be considered. Composite indexes of these series, and the components of each 
series, are also useful. As Moore points out, one of the advantages of basing the 
decision on such as wide variety of evidence 'is that it reduces the possibility of 
error and the need for subsequent revision'.82 (pp. 2-3) 
An NBER press release of 25th April, 1991, gives a flavour of the committee's 
deliberations and shows how the emphasis has shifted from Mitchell's original intentions 
to the tracking of the reference cycle as an end in itself.83 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research reached the judgment today that the peak of U.S. economic activity 
occurred in July 1990. The current recession began in July 1990, in the 
committee's view. ([1991] p. 1) 
The tendency of turning points to be spread over a number of months is still evident. 
Each of the indicators peaked in a different month ... Nonfarm payroll 
employment reached a peak in June. Real personal income peaked in July. Real 
manufacturing and trade sales peaked in August. The index of industrial 
production peaked in September. 
The committee does not use a fixed fomlula to reach its conclusion 
about the date of a business cycle peak. It reaches a judgment based on a variety 
of monthly indicators. ([1991] pp. 1-2) 
A further discussion of the dating procedure, written by Robert E. Hall, the 
committee chairman, appeared in the Rep0l1er, Winter 199112. He argued that the 'basic 
problem of dating a business cycle' is that 'different cyclical indicators have different 
IZG.H.Moore, Business Cycles, Inflation and Forecasting, Second edition, NBER Studies in Business CYcles No. 24. 
n-rhe evidence that NBER reference dates track turning points in US aggregate output is given in Table 53.2 below. 
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turning points'. Hall expresses further misgivings about the '1990-1 recession' and about 
the procedure in general. 
All recessions are hard to forecast, and the most recent is no exception. But this 
recession is particularly remarkable for the breakdown of the one apparently 
reliable principle of recession forecasting that had held previously. Financial 
market stress rather systematically preceded almost all previous recessions. Many 
different indicators of stress have been shown to have some forecasting power, 
including the stock market, monetary aggregates, and interest rates. ([199112], p. 
2) 
In 1989, however, these leading indicators failed. As incorporated, for example, in the 
Stock and Watson 1989 probability model, 'based on historical statistical relationships', 
they yielded 'extraordinarily low probabilities of impending recession in early 1990, even 
when conventional forecasters were gloomy'.84 
Apparently the current recession is a very different aninlal from others 
summarized in the data Stock and Watson used. In particular, this recession 
began outside of the financially sensitive sector of the economy. ([1991/2] p. 3) 
In any case, reference dates have never been entirely free from controversy (as is evident 
in the stabilization literature). In an article appearing in the Summer 1991 Reporter, Hall 
lists the recessions beginning in 1967, 1973 and 1980 as examples of 'previous episodes 
[that] have challenged the Bureau's dating process'. Because the dating criteria are 
informal, there is always the danger of differences of opinion within the ranks of 
professional economists. 
The latest word from the NBER is that of Zarnowitz [1992]. This author accepts, 
with misgivings, the MBC reference chronology and empirical methodology, and uses it 
inter alia to discuss differences between pre- and post-war 'cycle' durations. He sees 
business cycles as fluctuations in aggregates - employment, output, income and 
expenditure - and also in 'co-movements and interactions of many variables'. The Burns 
"Ibid. The models of Stock and Watson are considered in Chapter 4, below. 
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and Mitchell 'definition' encompassed a 'broad range of durations' (one to twelve years) 
deliberately to 'admit...both short and long cycles ... vigorous and weak expansions, severe 
and mild contractions'.85 Business cycles are thus 'a class of varied, complex and evolving 
phenomena of both history and economic dynamics', intractable to single-cause models 
or theories; but are 'not the fluctuation of any single aggregate [emphasis in original)'.86 
Zarnowitz also distinguishes 'growth cycles', described in a manner similar to Lucas as 
'deviations from trend', from 'business cycles', which must be fluctuations in levels.81 
However, the 'trend' in this case is obtained as a separate component by the application 
of moving-average filters, a method which has been much criticized in the time-series 
literature for inducing distortions in the component estimates.88 
3.6. DISCUSSION 
'Business cycle' research in recent years, both theoretical and empirical, is largely 
based on the assumption that the phenomenon is 'proved', contrary to the 
inconclusiveness of the MBC findings. Burns and Mitchell stressed again and again that 
each historical episode is unique.89 Burns [1951, 1952] considered the results as merely 
establishing the hypothesis and not as conclusive. Those closest to the problem in the 
NBER have always been circumspect about the nature of short-run fluctuations. After 
Mitchell's death the impetus for further technical development was lost, and even now 
the reference-dating procedure (the '3-0' criteria) is as prescribed in MBC. It is not 
entirely clear why the authors' warnings about the reliability of their results have been so 
IS Ibid. p. 9. 
"[19921 p. 9. 
17lbid., Section 3.4. 
"This issue is discussed fully in Chapter 4 below. 
"E.g., in BCPS, Chapters II and III, in the 1938 paper and in the remark in MBC, p. 467, that 'each specific and business 
cycle is ... an individual differing in countless ways from every other'. 
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persistently ignored; but it is likely that unresolved problems in the work have themselves 
contributed to the judgments of later generations of economists. 
For example, it is not apparent why Mitchell, who understood the inductive 
method as well as anyone, should fall into the elementary error of mislabelling his 
hypothesis as a 'definition'. This point may seem somewhat pedantic, but an important 
methodological distinction does exist which, if not observed, can lead to confusion. The 
'definition' is used in mathematics as the basis for the construction of a formal argument 
leading to a general result about a class of objects. The 'hypothesis', on the other hand, 
is the starting point for an empirical enquiry leading to statements about the properties 
of observed phenomena. It is not clear whether either the 'proof of an hypothesis by 
deduction or the 'validation' of a theorem by observation are statements that have any 
meaning.90 
There are other significant methodological lapses. Having inadvertently 
misrepresented their own case by mislabelling the central hypothesis, Burns and Mitchell 
then failed rigorously to define the (mathematical) metric, the turning point, by which 
they meant to measure it. By arbitrarily fixing a reference cycle which strictly should have 
been found empirically from turning point data, they introduced both circularity and bias 
into the analysis. Their response was to attempt to adduce 'annals' and a subjective 
chronology of specific cycles as evidence. Since both these sources are of questionable 
reliability, the error may have been further compounded. It is only possible to speculate 
as to the causes of these failures of method. Beveridge, of course, made a similar mistake 
at about the same time (1944), suggesting that something in the intellectual climate might 
account for such lapses. Perhaps Mitchell's contemporaneous concern with the 
establishment of the national income accounting procedures, where definitions are 
appropriate, might have inadvertently confused his approach to business cycles. Perhaps 
he felt that time was short, tempting him to cut corners in the search for a definitive 
IIOProfessor Richard Feinman pointed out some years ago that 'all [scientificl theories are wrong' and should be treated 
as mere approximations to be discarded or modified as more information becomes available. 
119 
statement. None of these explanations is really persuasive: Mitchell was perhaps cleverer 
than his own arguments, shown by the antiphonal self-doubt running through all his 
writing. 
There is, however, another possible explanation, which owes as much to the 
misperceptions of the present day as to Mitchell's failures. It is important to remember 
that MBC was written during the War, and that its empirical results were based on a 
sample period ending in 1939, during the latter twenty years of which there was no 
overall growth. The authors had no aggregate series, hardly any output statistics and no 
experience of the persistent growth patterns which have become so potent a feature of 
the postwar economic landscape. Before World War II there was an effective theoretical 
consensus that the engine of macroeconomic fluctuations was price behaviour and its 
influence on business profits - ideas which in the postwar climate became discredited. 
As late as Burns [1961] these ideas still had some force. This may partly account for the 
generation gap pointed out by Marschak.91 Unfortunately, the historical context of 
Mitchell's results has not been given proper weight in recent business-cycle research. 
On the principle that economists tend to shoot at moving targets, the problems 
of growth were relegated to the background by most writers of the inter-war period 
because of stagnant conditions. The Balke and Gordon estimates show that all net real 
growth in US GNP from 1918 to the date of publication of MBC took place in the war 
period 1938-45; but this was certainly overshadowed by three episodes of quite severe 
falls (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 above). In fact, real output in the US economy fell by about 
22 percent from the first quarter of 1945 to the first quarter of 1947, roughly the 
magnitude and duration of the 'depression' of1919-1921.92 There is thus no way in which 
the postwar acceleration in growth rates could have been anticipated at the time, and the 
91The debate was not about which variables to include, on which a consensus existed, but rather, as Wicksell had put it, 
about 'chickens and eggs'. 
92So while MBC was in galley proof, it looked as though history might be about to repeat itself. See estimates in the 
Appendix to RJ. Gordon (ed.) (1986), pp. 789-99. The index numbers are 595.55 for 1945:1 and 466.05 for 1947:1. 
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probability of a structural 'boom' appeared less than that of a return to chronically 
'depressed' conditions. The latter were indeed were being confidently predicted in the 
second half of 1945. 
At the same time, versions of the command economy in the war years had 
succeeded in a spectacular fashion in mobilizing resources in the UK and the US (as 
indeed in the Axis powers and the Soviet Union). These 'social possibilities' were seen 
as a model for postwar reconstruction, for example by Beveridge and later by Keynesians 
such as Rostow. There is even an echo of such dirigisme in Marschak [1951]. Economists 
thus generally felt it imperative to continue the study of 'cycles' in an attempt to 
understand and perhaps help to forestall a new slump by the action of government. 
Moreover, quite soon after the end of the War 'anti-communist' incentives were thought 
to be required to prevent the masses of the West being beguiled by Marxist ideology, as 
so carefully expressed in Burns [1961]. The emphasis thus changed from the 
quantity-theoretic to the domino-theoretic. It was this confluence of command 
experience during the World Wars and the exigencies of the Cold War that gave the 
1950s and 1960s a distinctly centralist flavour, with demand management, 'fine-tuning' 
and high marginal rates of tax the favoured policies. 
The revisions of new classical theory were similarly motivated by observed 
instabilities: the post-Smithsonian shocks of the 1970s. By this time, however, growth was 
again dominant, leading Lucas to advocate trend-stationarity - processes distinct from 
Mitchell's four-phase cycle, as argued by Kydland and Prescott. However, because the 
RBC literature embraces the MBC concept of comovements as one of its foundations, 
it can be argued that its view of empirical behaviour is not that far removed from 
Mitchell's, even though its causal mechanisms are distinct. As Romer has argued, the 
NBER dating committee also follows the methods of Burns and Mitchell. The four-phase 
hypothesis was quickly discarded after Mitchell's death, so that in their pure form 
'Mitchell cycles' have only been of historical interest in the whole of the postwar period. 
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Nevertheless because the comovement hypothesis is supported in most conceptions, the 
most widely held view of business cycles is not all that far from the diffusion criterion 
proposed in MBC. The phenomena are thus still regarded as fluctuations in general 
conditions, although most authorities now believe them to be a species of behaviour 
related to growth. 
The RBC approach consists principally in simulating 'business-cycle' behaviour. 
This follows Lucas's understanding of Burns and Mitchell's empirical descriptions, as 
modified by Kydland, Prescott, Cooley and others. The interpretation is of stochastic 
general equilibria with Pareto-optimal allocations, implying the rejection of Phillips Curve 
trade-offs as a means of improving welfare. All such models are considered 'false' by 
their authors, though perhaps this is too harsh a value-judgment. What Kydland and 
Prescott actually mean is that the models are not designed to be representations of the 
nGPs of any empirical time series, and that correspondences with empirical data are 
incidental to the main purpose. They are more in the nature of tests of the models' 
plausibility than of empirical verification, because MBC 'conclusions' are assumed to be 
'correct' a priori. Commentators on these 'quantitative' theories such as Pagan argue 
strongly against drawing inferences about empirical phenomena from the outputs ofRBC 
models - a caution shared by the model-makers themselves. Stadler points out many of 
the problems still facing RBC models, and argues that the current lack of conformity to 
actual behaviour restricts their explanatory power. 
Mitchell's great prestige, aided by the Chicago Interpretation and by Lucas, meant 
that the MBC results are understood as definitive rather than as exemplary, whatever 
might have been the unconscious motivation of economists after the 1945. Taken with the 
confusions of method, the apparently conclusive nature of MBC results seems to have 
created the impression that the results were 'scientifically' reliable and universally 
applicable. It is clear however from Burns [1951] that Mitchell rejected the idea of 
'general business conditions' out of hand; and that even the existence of a GNP series 
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would not have changed this view. Given the postwar experience of growth, perceptions 
of 'business cycles' have moved closer to the 1927 interpretation: fluctuations 'in the pace 
of a more fundamental process' - the exception being Zarnowitz, who makes a clear 
distinction between the two types ofbehaviour.93 Recently expressed views of Cooley and 
Prescott concur with the unitary interpretation. The implications of structural change for 
the 'business-cycle' hypothesis have also been recognized. Zarnowitz argues that the idea 
of business cycles must be continually reexamined because conditions 'evolve' over time; 
and that the 'many interacting processes ... are certainly not the same at all times, and in 
all developed ... economies'. 94 
An important source of confusion for economists of later generations has been 
the role of the 'reference' dates. These were originally intended as an aid to theoretical 
analysis, but soon metamorphosed into a distinct phenomenon: a 'reference cycle' in 
aggregate output, as discussed by Burns in 1961. Even in that paper, however, the author 
commented that each episode was 'a unique configuration of events'. Unless it is 
remembered that the object of Mitchell's programme was to find an overarching theory 
the significance of the reference dates cannot be properly understood. They were only 
ever seen by Burns and Mitchell as a preliminary attempt to capture the average 
behaviour on which the theory would be based, and not as definitive 'business cycles'. 
Mitchell always insisted that business cycles are multivariate phenomena, and can be 
validated only by the clustering or 'bunching' of turning points and, according to Burns, 
recognized the difficulties that empirical 'divergences' presented for his hypothesis. 
Theorists acknowledge the importance of 'comovements' for business-cycle 
behaviour, and rely on the Burns and Mitchell definition. Disagreements, especially in 
recent papers, appears to be about the sources of fluctuations and their relation to growth 
rather than about their generality, the evidence of which is generally understood to have 
9'Tbe inferences of Chapter 12 of MBC that noise was more important than growth were based on atypical time-series 
evidence from the 19205 and 19305. 
9'(1992) p. 14. 
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been established in MBC. Although the RBC interpretation does not directly consider 
turning-point evidence, it can be argued that the business-cycle 'component' in these 
models shows a clear alternations of expansions and contractions at predetermined (i.e., 
H-P filtered) frequencies, which implies clearly identified peaks and troughs. The 
comovements assumed by the theory, together with filtered components, are highly 
suggestive of Mitchell's 'many activities' criterion as endorsed by the NBER and other 
tracking agencies. However, the emphasis on comovements in the theoretical literature 
places it perhaps closer to the spirit of Burns and Mitchell than current NBER dating 
procedures with their emphasis on the 'reference cycle'. 
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Figure 3.3. 7. MBC Chart 19: Divergences in Reference-Cycle Timing 
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Figure 3.5.2. Operation of the Bry-Boschan Algorithm. 
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CHAPlER4 
REPRESENTATIONS OF 'BUSINESS CYCLES': 
EVIDENCE FROM TIME-SERIES DECOMPOSITIONS 
4.1. INfRODUCI10N 
It has been customary to analyse an economic time series by extracting from it 
a ... trend ... and then scrutinizing the residual portion for short ternl oscillatory 
movements and random fluctuations. The assumption ... is that the long-term and 
short-temt movements are due to separate causal influences and therefore that 
the mathematical...analysis corresponds ... to a real distinction of type in the 
generative system. When it began to appear that better accounts of such 
movements were given by autoregressive schemes in which the disturbance 
element played an integral part, it was an easy step ... to enquire whether the 
so-called trend in a series was in fact separable from the short term movements, 
or whether it should be regarded as generated by a set of forces which gave rise 
to the short-temt movements. 
This passage appears in a paper given some years ago before the Royal Statistical Society 
by Sir Maurice Kendall, and expresses the author's scepticism about standard methods 
of empirical business-cycle analysis.1 The 'distinction of type in the generative system' was 
questioned at the time by a number of authors: for example, both Orcutt [1948] and 
Goodwin [1953] argued that macroeconomic time series did not have separate data 
generating processes (DGPs) for 'trend' and 'cycle'. Decompositions of this type had 
become popular before the First World War as it became evident that 'secular' 
tendencies were present and that they generally dominated other 'components'. Serious 
attempts to track cycles hence required that they be separately identified, normally by 
transforming the data to achieve stationarity. Partly through custom and partly because 
it is plausible, a four-component meta-model of economic behaviour - i.e., trend, cycle, 
1(1953] p. 11. 
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seasonal and irregular - has corne to be taken for granted in time-series analysis; yet as 
Kendall and others indicated, there is no obvious reason why there should be four 
components, or indeed more or less. For present purposes the issue is not whether this 
'classical' decomposition is 'correct', but rather how its wide application over 
three-quarters of a century has influenced empirical research, and what inferences can 
be made from it about business cycles. As will presently be demonstrated, the evidence 
is inconclusive, and inferences depend largely upon whether the hypothesis is believed a 
priori. Section 4.2 discusses the early modelling literature, and how this led to the 
interpretation of business cycles as the cumulative effects of random shocks. Section 4.3 
considers the use of large-scale models to represent business cycles as endogenous 
phenomena, and shows how this view later changed. Section 4.4 surveys models of 
asymmetry, a feature of short-run fluctuations in economies where growth predominates. 
Section 4.5 discusses the recent modelling literature and critiques of the classical 
decomposition. Section 4.6 presents the results of a Monte Carlo study of measures of 
asymmetry for nonstationary oscillatory AR(2) processes. 
4.2. EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF 'BUSINESS CYCLES' IN TI-IE 1920s 
In the 1920s social scientists still believed that 'solutions' to the problems of 
poverty, disease and social unrest could be found rationally. A prerequisite to this search 
for stability was the understanding of fluctuations in prosperity - the 'business cycle' -
which had proved so damaging to economic welfare in the previous hundred years. The 
great hope of economists was that science and mathematics could be pressed into service, 
and that the unfavourable conditions could thereby be predicted and stabilized. The 
question became more urgent when the decade began inauspiciously with a violent 
postwar 'depression' whose concurrent price instabilities to some extent masked the real 
effects. Contemporary observers, bemused by these complcxities, sought an intuitive and 
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convenient method of visualizing these fluctuations 'in the eye of the mind', and of 
forecasting them. 
4.2.1. Business Barometers: a 'Plausible' Representation 
In the 1920s, 'business barometers' were a popular method of synthesizing 
fluctuations in 'general business conditions' from time-series data by the construction of 
indices. Their best-known advocate was Professor Warren Persons of Harvard University, 
who according to Morgan was responsible for giving the technique both popularity and 
academic respectability.2 Persons, in a 1919 article, noted that the large volumes of 
statistical indices then becoming available in the financial press gave 'little or no 
information' about either the scope of the data or the methods of analysis. Because such 
results were not 'reproducible' and so violated a primary requirement of experimental 
science, he set out to make his analyses transparent by publishing both data and 
methodology. This turned out, however, to be a complicated process. A 'preliminary 
survey of the graphs' of widely differing data types ('bank clearings, iron production, 
commodity prices, and new building permits') - Morgan's 'strange collection' - led to 
the 'working hypothesis ... that each series is a composite consisting of four types of 
fluctuations' (as above). No empirical reasons were given for such a decomposition; 
Persons was simply following the consensus-view of the time, which thus rendered the 
'working hypothesis' little better than a priori opinion. 
Wide variations were found in all the components across all series, especially in 
the cyclical: 
each [series] appears to have cycles, but these cycles are neither synchronous nor 
of the same intensity ... General methods ... must always take into account the 
special characteristics of each series. ([1919] p. 8) 
2See Morgan (1990] Section 2.3. 
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Persons nevertheless compiled composite indices because, in a manner similar to 
Mitchell, he argued that the individual series 'convey a meaning only in case we are able 
to compare [them] with others of a similar nature, or with a standard .. .' In order to 
render the 'strange collection' comparable, he tried to isolate cyclical from secular and 
seasonal components. He experimented with moving averages and linear and polynomial 
time trends, but none were entirely satisfactory: moving averages did not achieve 
stationarity, and trend lines varied considerably in slope with the sample period. Persons 
had hoped that the observations for each series would fall into 'homogeneous' clusters 
of years with similar behaviour and without noticeable structural breaks. If such were the 
case the trend found for each duster would be justified as representing a smooth 
transition. If, on the other hand, conditions changed abruptly or unpredictably from time 
to time, the interpretation of trend lines would be tenuous - and in the event the latter 
seemed to be the case. As a result, Persons judged that each series should have two trend 
lines, one for the period 1879-1896 and a second for 1896-1913, and that these should 
be interpreted as 'normal' conditions. Each series was then expressed as deviations from 
the 'normal', and the barometers were constructed from weighted averages of these 
transformed series in deviations. 
Persons and his assistants grouped together those detrended series having 
approximately the same distances between peaks and troughs, even if they were not 
necessarily in phase. Using a light box (as described by Morgan, p. 61) 'correlations' 
among groups of variables were worked out by eye. From these groups, three curves 
composed of weighted averages of de trended series with similar timing patterns emerged, 
known as the Harvard A-, B-, and C-curves. In a further study published in 1925, 
Persons discussed an index of trading conditions constructed in a similar manner, which 
he interpreted as representing a coincident indicator of US 'general conditions' from 1903 
to 1925. This index appears stationary, although with the fluctuations increasing in 
amplitude between 1916 and 1921. The curve seems to behave plausibly: along the plot 
are noted various crises: the 'rich man's panic' of 1903, the panic of 1907, the San 
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Francisco earthquake, the War, etc., and the index showed plausible increases and 
decreases. Persons argued that the 'timing of advance and recession' was roughly the 
same as in the constituent variables - the 'strange collection' again - a contrast with his 
earlier assertion of idiosyncratic movements in each. The effect is presumably the result 
of the data-transformation process, although this is not clear from the discussion. 
However, a clue to the behaviour of Persons's model is given in the penultimate 
paragraph of the paper: 
For all ... sections covered ... the choice of series and weights is determined by the 
object in mind, that is, the construction of an Index responsive to variations in 
the general physical volume of trade. ([1925] p. 78) 
The importance of business barometers lies not so much in what they 
demonstrated about the nature of 'business cycles' as in how they conditioned those who 
took notice of them. That they were popular in the 1920s is not in dispute: Professor 
Irving Fisher mentions nearly 'fourscore forecasting agencies' engaged in tracking an 
'alternation of booms and depressions [emphasis in original]'.3 Morgan talks of an 
'explosion' of interest in statistical business-cycle research in all industrial countries, 
albeit with varying intensity; and despite some claimed differences of emphasis all 
research followed similar programmes. Wagemann, in Germany, for example, claimed not 
to employ the 'classical' decomposition (as above), but Morgan has shown how close to 
Persons's views this work really was. Slutsky at the Moscow Konjunctur Institute, and 
Yule in the UK, both favoured an experimental approach; but whatever the method, most 
researchers would have had 'in the eye of the mind' some form of 'coincident' indicator, 
stationary and with fluctuations of irregular period, summarizing 'general' business 
activity. 
Fisher was the chief dissenter from this line of research, arguing that business 
cycles were illusory: a nominal rather than a real phenomenon. He believed that the 
3(1925) p. 180. 
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alternations so assiduously sought by the constructors of indicators ignored qualitative 
differences between price and other variables. Prices were subject to longer swings than 
output variables, and hence attempts to de trend them were 'useless' because they 'could 
not properly be said to have any secular trend', More importantly, the extreme price 
fluctuations of the 1914-1918 period were omitted although these could have explained 
other fluctuations. Furthermore, 'trend' and 'cycle' were not separable components: the 
elimination of a 'supposed trend' discarded 'a part of the rise and fall which ... is so vital 
a factor'.4 
4.2.2. Experimental Work in the 1920s 
Early business-cycle research looked for 'causes' of what appeared to many as a 
phenomenon of irregular periodicity. First Jevons and later H.L. Moore believed that the 
superposition of waves could link cosmological phenomena with economic cycles. By the 
1920s frequency domain analysis of time series data was being actively pursued.s The 
time-domain analogue of this approach was a form of multiple 'correlation' analysis, as 
practised by Persons and the forecasting agencies. Among statisticians, however, there 
were many critics of both approaches, and their disillusionment produced some landmark 
literature. The strategy favoured by the latter was to generate data that resembled 
economic time series by Monte Carlo methods and then to investigate their time-series 
properties. Yule's 1926 paper considered moving averages of uniformly-distributed shocks 
whose first differences were either serially independent or serially correlated. Both types, 
because adjacent terms tended to be close in value, showed long nonstationary sequences. 
The analysis demonstrated that for such time series, small samples would have high 
4nte 1925 paper. Fisher argued (p. 181) that the rate of change, rather than the level, was the critical factor, and that 
inflation and deflation were largely responsible for variations in trade: a quantity-theoretic view, as might be expected. 
~H.L Moore, who believed that business cycles were 'caused' by crop cycles, which were in turn influenced by the rotation 
of the planet Venus. See Morgan [1990) pp. 26-34. 
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cross-correlations, whereas for the whole series both the theoretical and experimental 
cross-correlations tended to zero. 
Yule [1927] was an attempt to find naps for stationary series which would 
simulate the 'disturbed periodicities', e.g. as observed in Wolfer's sunspot numbers. He 
found that if the irregularities were the result merely of 'superposed fluctuations' - for 
example measurement errors - then the underlying periodicities would only be masked 
and would still be detectable by periodogram analysis. If, however, there occurred 'true' 
disturbances whose effects persist, the graph of the process would remain smooth but 
with wide variations in amplitude and with continuous phase shifts, a process which Yule 
described by analogy to boys pelting a pendulum with peas. Frequency domain analysis 
was not applicable in the latter case.6 Instead, Yule experimented with various 
autoregressive schemes and found the 'best' representation of the data to be damped 
harmonic oscillation, i.e., an AR(2) process with complex eigenvalues of modulus less 
than unity. This model, however, required external stimuli to maintain the oscillations, 
which implied the stochastic form Yr = 4>1 Yr-l + 4>2 Yr-2 + €r' where the €t are a sequence 
of serially independent shocks. Yule thought that the damped harmonic formula 
represented 'some physical reality', and that economic variables were probably subject to 
this type of disturbance, because economic systems responded to exogenous influences. 
The stochastic representation had also occurred to Eugen Slutsky in the course 
of research in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s. His 1927 paper looked explicitly at 
economic fluctuations for the first time in the context of time-series models.' He 
observed that all economic phenomena 'occur in sequences of rising and falling 
movements, like [irregular] waves', and asked whether it were possible that these 
irregularities could be approximated by Fourier series, i.e., by 'the summation of regular 
f>rrue disturbances most closely approximated the case of sunspot series. Morgan argues that the powerful association 
between sunspot and business cycles suggests implied criticism of frequency domain methods in the analysis of the latter. 
See [1990]. Section 3.1.1. 
'The English-language translation appeared in Econometrica in 1937. 
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sinusoidal fluctuations'. The periodogram method had for Slutsky one great disadvantage: 
it assumed that the observations are statistically independent, whereas in economic time 
series they are nearly always serially correlated, as implied by Yule's research. Slutsky was 
scornful of theories of regular periodicity in economic behaviour, such as Moore's 
eight-year period for the business cycle: for what force could explain the regularity of a 
'sinusoidal wave which rises and falls on the surface of the social ocean'? If applied 
uncritically, the wave hypothesis of economic behaviour was little better than superstition; 
to account for such regularities it would be necessary to appeal to the almighty - i.e., for 
'the eyes of the investigators [to be] raised to the celestial luminaries ... even now, as 
centuries ago'.8 Although such 'bold hypotheses' were admissible, the alternatives must 
also be considered. (In a footnote to this passage, Slutsky acknowledged that Yule [1926] 
'approaches our theme rather closely'.) 
Slutsky found, as had Yule, that moving sums of serially independent shocks (the 
'summation of random causes') could produce 'a system of more or less regular waves'. 
A ten-period moving sum was obtained from numbers drawn from the state lottery, a 
uniform distribution (Model I). Further moving sums were taken of Model I: a 
ten-period moving average of Model I (Model II); a succession of ten two-period 
averages (Model IVa), etc. The effect of applying successive filters was to make the 
autocorrelation functions approximate a Gaussian distribution up to a scale factor. When 
plotted, these autocorrelated series bore strong resemblances to business barometers (see 
Figure 4.2.1). Additionally, by taking frequency distributions of peak-to-peak and 
peak-to-trough distances in his artificial series, Slutsky found a correspondence between 
these distances and those in the turning points of Thorp's Annals for 12 countries (see 
8(1937] pp. 106-107. 
143 
Figure 4.2.2).9 This similarity in frequency, together with the tendency for first 
differences in artificial 'coherent' series to be small, implied not only 
that the summation of random causes may be the source of cyclic ... processes ... [but 
that] it must be so inevitably [emphasis in original]. ([1937] p. 114) 
Moreover, both abrupt and gradual changes in periodicity could be simulated by taking 
the deviations of the experimental series from their Fourier approximations. 
Slutsky argued that Yule's model of disturbances was equivalent to his moving 
average formulation. A stochastic process subject to periodic damped oscillations has a 
movement in two parts: first the impulse, determined by initial conditions, which damps 
out, and second, the 'summation of random causes', i.e., a moving average of shocks, as 
the propagating mechanism which maintains the oscillations. In the limit, if the 
disturbances are small enough, the process will converge to a sinusoidal form and can 
even explain, for example, planetary trajectories. Nevertheless, as Morgan has pointed 
out, Slutsky claimed only that his artificially constructed series could mimic business 
barometers, not that an MA process was the actual DGP for business cycles. 10 
Kuznets investigated the MA process further in a 1929 paper. He showed that 
even 'random' series will have either 'big clusters of deviations above or below the 
average, or single exceptional deviations', implying that cumulations or moving averages 
of such series will produce patterns resembling business cycles. 'Random causes' sampled 
from distributions which are non-uniform and skewed tend to produce the most clear-cut 
cyclical behaviour; and centrally-weighted moving averages the smoothest curves. Unlike 
Slutsky, however, Kuznets asked whether a 'reverse inference' could be drawn from these 
experiments: 
It has been shown that the summation of random causes yields cycles ... [By 
inverting the proposition] can one ... say that, therefore, cyclical oscillations may 
9However, Slutsky 'edited' his turning points by discarding the high rrequency fluctuations (which he called 'ripples') in 
his experimental series. 
lor1 990] p.82. 
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be conceived primarily as results of summation of random causes? ([1929], pp. 
273-4) 
He was cautious about such an inference, preferring to frame it as a 'significant but not 
exclusive' hypothesis, which if supported, would imply that the need for a single, recurrent 
'cause' of business cycles 'becomes supererogation'. If the responses to economic stimuli 
are in some way cumulative, then the Institutionalist interpretation of business cycles, 
favoured by Mitchell, could be justified. Because the shocks persist in their effects owing 
to the habituated behaviour of agents, the cumulation hypothesis would predict an 
inevitable 'cyclical' swing in the opposite direction sooner or later, given random 
impulses. Kuznets also observed that the smoothest such oscillations occur in index series, 
where repeated averaging of the components becomes the source of the smooth 
behaviour. On the other hand, volatile disaggregated series - New York Stock Exchange 
trading volume for example - do not have cumulative and persistent effects owing to 
their homogeneity and short sampling intervals. 
The experimental methods of the 1920s were, as Morgan has characterized them, 
'theory-free'. They were not designed to support or refute any business-cycle hypothesis, 
but rather were designed to show that a comparatively simple underlying process could 
produce the same behaviour as the cyclical indicators of the day. In the case of Yule's 
serially correlated first differences, such summations could also produce long sequences 
of increasing or decreasing levels in the series, so that for those naive enough to confuse 
artificial DGPs with real processes, it seemed that 'business cycles' could be explained in 
these elementary terms. Such explanations, of course, only held if the existence of the 
phenomenon was already accepted. Business barometers similarly relied on prior 
assumptions, and hence on heavily processed data whose turning point properties 
probably differed substantially from the original series. Furthermore, their function was 
not empirically to verify the existence of a cycle in general business conditions, which was 
'known' to exist, but rather to construct indices which moved in concert with the 'known' 
fluctuations. Such constructions therefore amounted to little more than simulations with 
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transformed empirical data. Although both lines of research were thus circular, their 
'results' were unfortunately highly suggestive. Their plausibility reinforced the existing 
opinion that fluctuations existed at business-cycle frequencies through 'separate causal 
influences' (that is, separable from long-run effects and noise); and this opinion was 
further reinforced by the crisis of 1929-1932, even though the barometers failed to 
predict it. ll 
4.3. MACRO-DYNAMIC MODELS OF BUSINESS CYCLES 
The term 'macro-dynamic' was used by Frisch in a 1933 paper to describe 
simultaneous-equation models of national economies in which the responses of variables 
to various stimuli are both contemporaneous and lagged, thereby creating endogenous 
cyclical behaviour.12 Frisch believed, as did Yule and Slutsky, that the irregular 
appearance of 'cycles' in time-series data suggested that they were driven by a 
combination of damped deterministic cycles and random innovations with persistent 
effects. Unlike them, he had attempted, without success, a more elaborate decomposition 
of economic series into waves of various frequencies, all of which were labelled as 
'trends'}3 His scheme for modelling fluctuations was second-order and stochastic: 
D 
y(t) = P(T).Yo+ O(T)jQ+ L O(Tk ) ek,whereTis a function of the distance oft from 
k=l 
the origin of the series. Frisch claimed that this was a synthesis of Yule's and Slutsky's 
formulations, the latter having not fully appreciated the 'accumulation of erratic 
lISchumpeter (1939] has suggested that Persons's curves did point to a crash, but that he did not have the courage of his 
convictions. 
12Ragnar Frisch, founding editor of Ecorwmelrica and for a time research director at the Cowles Commission. The article 
appeared in the Cassel memorial volume of essays. 
13Frisch's terminology was non-standard. See Morgan [1990] Section 3.3. A similar decomposition was also proposed by 
Schumpeter. 
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influences'.14 In any case, once the initial impulse had damped out, the linear operator 
Q(r) gave the further values of the series, with weights determined by the lag coefficients. 
Frisch strongly influenced Jan Tinbergen, the great pioneer of large-scale 
macroeconomic models. Tinbergen built and estimated simultaneous equation 
business-cycle models of the Dutch, American and British economies between 1936 and 
1951, each of them on the assumption that oscillations are damped harmonic and 
endogenously generated, but subject to exogenous shocks. Within this general dynamic 
framework the models were designed to test the business-cycle hypotheses then current 
(as discussed, for example, by HaberJer). Each model was a just-identified system with 
both linear and nonlinear relations. The data for the Dutch and US studies were 
transformed by a non-standard form of indexing. For example, the Dutch price indices 
for the years 1923-1935 were expressed relative to an average of the years 1923-1933; 
and indices of physical volume were expressed in units whose value 'averaged 1923/33 
cost Hfl1,754=100'Y All variables in the US model were expressed as deviations from 
the 'mean' of the whole sample period, 1919-1932, while UK data for the period 
1870-1914 were expressed as deviations from nine-year moving averages. 
Apart from tests of theory Tinbergen wanted to use the dynamics of his models 
as a basis for evaluating stabilization measures in the context of the depressed conditions 
of the 1930s. This required the isolation of the pure damped harmonic oscillations from 
the stochastic component to see how stable the economy would be under the impulses 
of contra-cyclical intervention. The idea was to find an 'autonomous' path, as Frisch had 
expressed it, whose dynamics would not be affected by structural changes, and which 
would describe the 'general characteristics of the business cycle'.16 These 'indirect 
relations' were deduced by a process of simplification, elimination and substitution from 
I~risch [1933] p. 199. It is likely that this is a misinterpretation of Slutsky. 
15(1959] p. 46, Table I. 
IttI939). Volume II. p. 129. The analysis is described in the Introduction and in Chapter VI of that volume. 
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the reduced form of the model, yielding a single, k-th order linear difference relation: 
the 'final equation'. Tinbergen interpreted the systematic oscillations as perturbations 
about an equilibrium path, but according to Morgan admitted that it was difficult to find 
the economic meaning of such a fine distillation. 17 The Dutch final equation was second 
order with complex eigenvalues: Z t = 0.15 Z t -1 + 0.26 Z r _ 2 - 34.7, where Z represented 
non-labour income. The US final equation was fourth order: 
ZtC = 0.398 Z/:I- 0.22 Zt~2 + 0.013 Z/~3 + ZI_4' with Z C the path of corporate profits. 
Goldberger (1959] has shown that the characteristic roots of this equation are a real pair, 
0.386 and -0.240, and a complex conjugate pair, 0.126±0.Sl1i. The first root contributes 
a monotonic component to the motion of the system (0.386)', the second a 'sawtooth' 
component (-0.240)', and the complex pair an harmonic oscillation with a period of five 
years and a damping factor (0.521)'. The UK model had second-order equations for the 
several cases considered. 
Tinbergen justified these elaborate procedures by arguing that the final equation 
'contains a theory of the cycle, i.e. of the cumulative process as well as of the turning 
point'. Without harmonic oscillation, the coefficients produce monotonic behaviour, and 
a 'separate theory of the turning point' would be necessary; but since the equations are 
all second order, the 'literary' theorists (whose number included Keynes) could not 
distinguish the two modes of behaviour by purely 'verbal treatment'. In the example, with 
an equation in Z/, cyclical behaviour gives Z2<Z3>Z4' etc. He then asks, 'with Mr. 
Keynes: how does the reversal come in?' It does not arise from exogenous factors, or 
reflecting barriers, or changes in structure, but rather from a change in the relative 
strengths of the positive and negative forces. 18 Tinbergen considered the weakness of 
non-mathematical theory to be that it cannot represent purely endogenous fluctuations, 
17(1990) p. 106. The approach became known as 'night train analysis'. 
18(1940) pp. 84-5. 
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but must appeal to outside forces. (Nevertheless, because his own equations were damped 
they required exogenous forcing functions to propagate the fluctuations.) 
Tinbergen later modified his position on single-equation dynamics, as shown by 
his treatment of the UK model after the war. In the Universities/NBER 1951 Conference 
on the Business Cycle volume he argued for the need to reformulate theories to take 
account of the complexities of 'cyclical' behaviour!9 Econometric models were by then 
becoming much larger, and for that reason 'unintelligible'. He proposed a system of 
sectoral models with an 'inner-circle' of aggregate variables and an 'outer-circle' of 
'supplementary relations meant to specify and analyse the inner-circle relations',2o This 
seems to indicate that different sectors have different dynamics, making the interpretation 
of a general path difficult; but also that in some way the aggregate relations can 
synthesize the cyclical behaviour for the whole economy. Johnston [1955], commenting 
on this passage, hoped that the inner circle of relations would not 'impose just as severe 
restrictions on the variety of behaviour ... as [did] the single aggregative model',2l 
Tinbergen's work presents other difficulties to those trying to assess empirical 
evidence for business cycles as a distinct class of phenomena. For a start, the sample 
periods on which the Dutch and US models were estimated were so short that little 
confidence could be placed in the parameter estimates. This was pointed out by Orcutt 
[1948], who found from examining autocorrelations that all of Tinbergen's endogenous 
variables can be well represented by the same Dap: Y, = 1.3 Y,-1 + 0,3 Y '-2' an AR(2) 
with a unit roOt.22 Even so, an examination of these series shows a dispersion of turning 
points even at the 'peak' of the 1920s boom, with less than half having local maxima in 
l~e volume containing the exchange between Burns and Marschak, discussed in Chapter 3 above. 
~1951) p.140. 
21[1955) p. 227. 
22Kendall [1953) described this as a 'remarkable result'. Wallis [19771 has shown how it can be obtained analytically from 
a decomposition of the coefficient matrix of predetermined variables. 
149 
1929 (33 ou t of 69).23 The same representation does not necessarily give the same turning 
points because of differences in innovations across the variables. In the case of the 
pre-1914 data used in estimating the UK model, moving average filtering can produce 
spurious peaks and phase shifts.24 Furthermore, Hoffmann's indices, on which the UK 
model relies, have subsequently been shown to be unreliable.25 
Kendall [1946] followed Yule in deriving periodic measures in models of damped 
harmonic oscillation as functions of the autocorrelations Pl and Pl , and hence of the lag 
coefficients. These were, specifically, mean distances between peaks and 'upcrosses', and 
the autoregressive period. ('Upcrosses' refers to the point as which the series crosses its 
mean in an increasing sequence.) A fourth measure, the mean length of upward 
monotonic sequences ('upruns'), was not found to have an analytical formulation. He also 
stochastically simulated four (stationary) AR(2) models and found empirical values for 
each of the above. In the case of m.d.(peaks), although the observed values were very 
close to the theoretical ones, he considered the use of this measure potentially misleading 
for two reasons. First, there was an unfortunate tendency for investigators to 'edit' the 
series, discarding peaks which appeared in inconvenient places on the basis of 'judgment' 
rather than on quantitative criteria. The leading example of this, as already mentioned 
in Chapter 3 above, was Beveridge's turning-point analysis of his industrial production 
series.26 
[Sir William] deduces from his main series a period of about 8 years by counting 
the occurrence of what he regards as the principal peaks; but to reach this result 
he has to ignore a number of minor ones. Had he included them all he would 
have found a 'period' of 4 years ... Now is it legitimate to exercise an individual 
judgment in the rejection of minor peaks[?] ... Sir William has rejected exactly 
~e data set is given in Tinbergen (1939) Appendix C, p. 205. 
24See the discussion of this problem in Section 4.5 below, especially Osborn (1993). 
25See Chapter 5 below. 
26prom Full Employment [1944]. 
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half the peaks (and hence doubled the mean-distance between peaks). The line 
of division is far from clear for Sir William has accepted one peak in the range 
100 but rejected seven with greater values. ([1946] p. 57) 
The difficulties associated with subjective selection become 
intensified if we allow ourselves to be influenced by other factors such as the 
existence of neighbouring peaks which are close together as corresponding to a 
single oscillatory maximum and hence to reject one of them. There is no 
justification for such a course, so far as I can see; and if it is pursued to any 
extent there will result too few short intervals and an excessively long 
m.d.(peaks), which is just the kind of thing we do observe in many inquiries. 
([1946] p. 58) 
Secondly, Kendall thought the m.d.(peaks) measure to be 'extraordinarily 
insensitive' to variations in the AR coefficients. Thus, for a sample of first-lag coefficients 
ranging from -0.8 to -1.2, and second lag coefficients from 0.4 to 0.8, m.d.(peaks) were 
found to be clustered in the range 4.96-5.13 time periods. For a 'wide range of values 
we shall find a m.d.(peaks) of between 4 and 6 units'. The measure could thus be 
misleading, as when applied, for example, to a study by Davis of the distribution of 
'cycles' in 17 countries, where the m.d.(peaks) is 5.2 years.27 
In my mind, this does not by any means inlply that there is any kind of rhythmic 
influence at work generating business oscillations with a mean period of about 
five years. It would be quite consistent. .. to suppose that [these economic 
structures were] capable of representation by [widely differing] autoregressive 
models ... ([1946] p.57) 
Other such studies were undertaken in the 1950s. The Klein-Goldberger [1955] 
model of the US economy was estimated from annual data for the period 1929-1952. Its 
dynamic properties were analysed in Goldberger [1959], with distinct final equations 
derived for the real and monetary sectors. The characteristic equation of the latter sector 
27H.T. Davis, The Analysis of Economic Time Series [1941 J. This work is discussed further by Morgan. 
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is given by A 2 - 1.393 A + 0.3942 = 0 with two real roots, whereas the real sector follows 
the process A 4 - 2.0886).,3 + 0.5774 A 2 - 0.4696 A + 0.0567 = 0 with two real roots and a 
pair of complex roots. The dynamics are thus mixed monotonic and damped cyclical. The 
Klein, Ball, Hazlewood and Vandome [1961] study of the UK economy, 1946-1956, 
produced a quarterly model with a final price equation in seventh order differences, of 
which the characteristic equation is A 7 - 0.097 (A 6 + A5 + A 4) + 0.097 ()., 2 + A + 1) = O. 
Reflecting strong postwar growth in the British economy, the KBHV final equation has 
a both a positive and a negative unit root, as well as a real root, and two pairs of complex 
roots, one on and one inside the unit circle, giving a time path of the trend-cycle type 
with a period of one year. However, because this equation was derived specifically to 
study the dynamics of inflation it was not intended to be a unique final equation. 
The K-G model had 'decomposable' dynamics, which implies the divergences in 
cyclical behaviour noted by Johnston [1955]. In 1959, Irma and Frank Adelman simulated 
this model, the object being to determine whether, and under what conditions, it could 
produce business-cycle-like behaviour. The Adelmans first ran a computer simulation of 
the systematic part of the model and found that the extrapolations were virtually 
monotonic. They next imposed occasional random errors on the values of the exogenous 
variables ('Type I' shocks) and these, although the paths departed from the linear, did 
not give fluctuations of sufficient magnitude. Finally, error terms were added to each 
equation ('Type II' shocks) and the model was stochastically simulated. The behaviour 
was found to be cyclical with 'reasonably realistic' properties. A 'reference cycle' was 
derived by finding the 'years' in which peaks and troughs were 'bunched': specifically 
those years with a modal number of specific-cycle turns, provided that at least ten like 
turns were found in a two-year period including the modal year.28 The average 
reference-cycle length was found to be about four years, conforming to NBER experience 
for the US economy in the period. However, an examination of these results shows that 
28[1959] p. 612. fll. 
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only about half the specific-cycle turns occurred in the year of the reference peak or 
trough, with about 30 percent spread equally one year on either side, and the final 20 
percent further dispersed. 
The Adelmans's results were analysed by Goldberger [1959]. He thought that the 
behaviour of the model might be a Slutskian 'summation of random causes', this being, 
as in Tinbergen's models, effectively the consequence of the MA-equivalent form. 
Goldberger also concluded that because of the dichotomy between the real and monetary 
sectors in the K-G model, Kendall's 'remarkable result. .. must be qualified', Thus, where 
the relevant matrix is 'decomposable, so that the variables are not really bound together 
[emphasis in original], then the dynamic properties need not be common to all the 
endogenous variables'.29 The implication of all research on large-scale models is that, 
both for artificial and empirical data, a dynamic path common to all variables is 
exceptional, and that such behaviour can only arise in the presence of very strong 
restrictions. Johnston [1955], for example, found divergences in the average duration of 
cycles in NBER data across five sectors of the US economy, which led him to argue that 
sectoral models which would capture the 'varying characteristics' of each sector are more 
appropriate.30 
4.4. MODELS OF ASYMMETRY 
An important feature noted by all business-cycle researchers is that amplitudes 
and durations of expansions appear asymmetrical with those of contractions in time-series 
data. Such behaviour can occur quite naturally in a model with a strong secular tendency. 
Baumol [1955], among others, demonstrated that a damped harmonic process with a 
positively sloped deterministic time-trend component has downswings shorter than 
29Goldberger (1959), p. 134. See also Wallis [1977], p. 1482. 
~1955) pp.222-227. 
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upswings. Over the years, however, there has been interest in isolating asymmetry 
characteristics from other behaviour in empirical data with unknown OOPs, and this has 
involved either stationary nonlinear models, or, where appropriate, the filtering of data 
to achieve stationarity, or both. An early example was the Radice [1936] model of the UK 
trade cycle which proposed an explanation of asymmetry as differential lags in investment 
between upswings and downswings - an hypothesis not supported by the data. 
In recent years Markov models with explicit regime switching have been fitted to 
US time-series data. In Neft~i [1984] it is argued that correlation properties are 
effectively asymmetric across various phases of the 'cycle' and that this might be 
incorporated into the probability structure as a function of regime switching. He examines 
postwar US employment data and proposes a test of the asymmetry hypothesis employing 
the theory of fini te-state Markov processes. Thus, let {X t ( W ) , t = 0,1 ,2, ... ; wEn} be 
a stochastic process, and suppose {X,} is pro-cyclical, linear and stationary with zero 
mean. Define {I,} to be 1,=+ 1, if ~>O, and 1,=-1, if ~::sO. The process {I,} will 
generally be positive during upswings and negative during downswings in the data. If the 
series appears to show sharp drops during contractions and more gradual rises during 
expansions, then {I,} would be expected to remain in the state + 1 longer than in the state 
-1, implying that the transition probability for moves from + 1 to + 1 is greater than that 
from -1 to -1. The test is implemented empirically with {I,} restricted to being stationary 
and second order Markov. The parameters of interest are the transition probabilities 
associated with consecutive declines and consecutive increases, denoted 1..00 and All 
respectively. The technique has been applied to three US employment series in levels: 
total unemployment, unemployment for insured workers and unemployment over 15 
weeks' duration. Neft~j's reasons for using these series were, first, that he thought they 
were a good proxy for 'the business cycle' and second, that they were 'trend free', making 
filtering unnecessary. The null hypothesis was 1..00 = All' and some evidence against this 
was found for all three series. Sichel [1989] found, however, that Neft~i's confidence 
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ellipsoids were wrongly calculated, reversing the latter's findings on asymmetry; but by 
restricting the model to be first-order Markov he confirmed Neft~i's results. 
Hamilton [1989] applied an extension ofthis model to US GNP growth rates (i.e., 
first differences of logs). It is assumed here that the general 'state' of the system is 
unobserved at any time t, and must thus be extracted as a signal from the observations, 
and that the series follows a stationary, nonlinear, autoregressive process. The 
nonlinearities in this case 
arise if the process is subject to discrete shifts in reginle - episodes across which 
the dynamic behaviour of the series is markedly different. ([1989] p. 358) 
The author argued that the advantage of his method is that it explicitly models 
nonlinearity in contrast to the current approaches - TS models and cointegration - both 
of which assume that growth rates for US GNP are stationary and linear. The 'Hamilton 
Filter' assumes that the process Y, has the AR representation 
which implies that the first and second moments (JL and ul) can vary with the operative 
regime, denoted as St. The regime is modeled as an unobserved, two state, first order 
Markov process with SI having the value either 0 or 1. Thus S, depends only upon S,_J; 
andILandacanbeparameterizedasJL(Sr) = i:rO+i:r1Sl' a(Sr) = wo+w1Sr·Thefilter 
is a five-step maximum likelihood algorithm for estimating the probability that the system 
is in state 0 or 1 at time t. 
Hamilton originally thought that his technique could formalize the interpretation 
of turning-points as events signifying structural changes in the economy. 'Long-term 
trends' might thus have been identified as differing regimes of fast or slow growth. The 
results, however, coincide quite closely with the NBER reference dates (see Table 5.3.2, 
Chapter 5 below). Hamilton also argued that the Markov representation 'encompasses' 
the ARlMA model in the sense of Hendry and Richard, but with growth rates and the 
heteroscedasticity of residuals at odds with those of the linear models. The Markov model 
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thus provides an alternative perspective on the effect of shocks on the business cycle. 
Linear models, for example, predict that a shock of about one percent to GNP will have 
a permanent effect between 0.8 and 1. 7 percent; whereas the Markov formulation predicts 
an asymmetric effect of +0.66 percent during an expansion but of -3.0 percent during a 
contraction, an example of a 'deepness' asymmetry. 
Other recent work involves the explicit modelling of these asymmetries. Unlike 
Hamilton, Falk [1986] found little evidence of asymmetry within the Markov framework 
when applied to US series other than employment. Luukkonen and Terasvirta [1991] 
carried out LM tests of linear versus ARCH representations for three nonlinear AR 
models: the self-exciting threshold autoregressive (SETAR), the smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) and the bilinear (BL); but found that the tests did not give results 
independent of the model specifications. For the US and Japan, unemployment series 
appear to be symmetric. The two countries with seeming nonlinear behaviour of the 
STAR type are France and West Germany. McQueen and Thorley [1993] tested US 
unemployment and industrial production series for 'steepness' (falls steeper than rises) 
and 'deepness' (troughs deeper than peaks) asymmetries and found the change in growth 
rates around NBER reference troughs to be significantly greater than around peaks. 
Changes from contraction to expansion are typically abrupt, whereas changes at peaks are 
more gradual. A three-state Markov chain is also applied, and it is shown that the 
transition probability of jumping from a contraction into an expansion is significantly 
greater than from an expansion to a contraction. The series are broken down into their 
constituent parts; and these show divergent behaviour, both from the aggregates and from 
each other. Additional tests suggest that asymmetries have been more pronounced in the 
postwar period. Sichel [1993] computes skewness coefficients for distributions of the 
cyclical 'components' of US time series. Evidence of deepness is strong in employment 
and industrial production data, but weaker for GNP. Steepness is found only for 
employment. Sichel suggests that the presence of these features in time series data 
implies that linear structural models with symmetric disturbances 'cannot represent the 
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observed stylized facts for these variables', and calls for further investigation of 
theoretical nonlinear DGPs. 
None of these results is particularly helpful in evaluating the basic business-cycle 
hypothesis of comovements among many economic variables. When series from several 
sectors are subject to the same tests, as in Sichel (1993], the results are mixed; nor is it 
obvious how the number of states in a switching model can be identified except on a 
priori grounds. Otherwise, what emerges is a case for further investigation of nonlinear 
representations of growth rates in specific macroeconomic variables. 
4.5. RECENT liNEAR REPRESENTATIONS OF SHORT-RUN FLUCfUATIONS 
As the postwar period unfolded and secular tendencies became the dominant 
macroeconomic feature, economists and econometricians became concerned more with 
the long-run empirical properties ofthe data than with the search for short-run statistical 
regularities. The question whether the data contain enough information to permit the 
decomposition of the two remains problematical. Increasingly, time series models of the 
unobserved ARIMA(p,d,q) form are being employed which allow both for structural, 
time-varying trends and for time-varying parameters. The main linear formulation is 
given by cfJ( L )il( L )y, = B( L )f" where 4>( L), il(L) and B( L) are the AR, difference 
and MA lag operator polynomials respectively. Two subclasses are the 'trend stationary' 
(TS) and 'difference stationary' (DS) (see next page). An extension of this is the state 
space form, which is applicable in the case of unobserved components and time-varying 
parameters. If, for example, y, = :r, + f" where only Yt is observed, or if Y, = x, f3, + 11" 
then these models can be rewritten in a two-equation form which permits ML estimation 
via the Kalman Filter: y, = X, f3, + £" the 'measurement' equation, and 
Pt = T,fJ t- t + R/lI t , the 'transition' equation. The £1 are error terms and the lIt are 
disturbances, both with zero mean. 
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4.5.1. Modelling the Nature and Persistence of Shocks 
With the renewed instabilities of the 1970s, attention was again drawn to the 
questions whether and how cumulative shocks propagate fluctuations. Blanchard and 
Fisher [1989] and others have suggested a decomposition into permanent and transitory 
shocks, the relative importance of which has become central to the debate between RBC 
and neo-Keynesian theory. The two most common models are thus ARIMA 
specifications with exogenous trends: the (TS) class with deterministic trend, and the unit 
root or (DS) class. The TS model has the form Y, = a+/3t+c" ~(L)c, = 6(L)u" 
u,-U.d(O,if); where c, represents deviations from trend, a and /3 are fixed parameters and 
~(L) and 6(L) are lag operator polynomials satisfying stationarity and invertibility 
conditions. The DS process is given by tl y, = /3 + d" ~ (L) d, = A (L) u" 
ut - 11: d (0,02). If the changes d, are serially uncorrelated, then the DS reduces to a 
random walk with drift. Both models treat low frequency components as deterministic 
(the time trend a + /3 t in the TS case, and the drift term /3 in the DS case). 
Like the Orcutt [1948] findings, most research has found that postwar 
macroeconomic time-series data have an 'integrated' representation, i.e., stationary in 
differences. It has been shown inter alia in Nelson and Plosser [1982] and Harvey [1985] 
that up to 1945, macroeconomic aggregates generally had stationary representations, but 
that subsequently the unit root hypothesis has been impossible to reject for most such 
series. Blanchard and Fisher (p. 10) argue that the dynamic response of the TS model to 
shocks indicates that the induced short-term fluctuations are transitory, whereas shocks 
to the DS model induce permanent effects. In Campbell and Mankiw [1987] it is shown 
that the quarterly US GNP series is well represented by the ARIMA(I,I,2) form, which 
implies that the rate of growth of the secular component is ARMA(I,2). The authors also 
examine the decomposition issue and find that both TS and DS representations give 
approximately the same fit. In Blanchard and Quah [1987] prior restrictions are placed 
on responses to the two types of disturbance, which gives the interpretation of permanent 
shocks affecting the supply side, and transitory shocks relating to the demand side. These 
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authors find also that when supply innovations are set to zero, output demand 
fluctuations closely follow NBER reference turns for the period 1950-1987. In Perron 
[1989], applying piecewise linear regression to the Nelson and Plosser data set, the null 
hypothesis of a DS model with possible non-zero drift term is tested against the 
alternative TS model. Both hypotheses allow for a one time structural break in the level 
or slope of the trend function. It is shown that the standard tests tend not to reject the 
unit root hypothesis if the true DGP is that of stationary fluctuations around a trend with 
a one time break. For the quarterly US GNP series, the break occurred as a consequence 
of the 1929 crash and brought a reduction in the level of the series, whereas for postwar 
real GNP, a break during the 1973 oil shock led to a change in slope. The author 
concludes that if the process is not modelled as time-invariant, then these two breaks can 
be exogenous and are the only shocks that persist. The TS representation is thus 
accepted. On the other hand, in Sims [1989] it is argued that persistence can be modelled 
by 
ARMA processes with unit roots, ARMA processes with explosive roots, 
processes with detemlinistic polynomial or exponential trends, fractionally 
integrated processes and covariance stationary ARMA processes with high power 
at low frequencies, among other possibilities. ([1989] pp. 3-4) 
Sims shows that models with exponentially explosive deterministic components can be 
approximated entirely within the class of stationary AR processes, but that because they 
lack predictive power they have been abandoned when data show trend-like behaviour. 
He concludes that the models should reflect the long run uncertainty of these processes 
rather than attempting to hide it. 
The King et al. 1987 paper extends the persistence-of-shocks analysis in a 
multivariate framework. Using a neoclassical model with permanent technology shocks, 
they test empirically the effect of such disturbances. This is implemented, as in the 1991 
paper discussed above, via a variant of the 'common trends' model, in which an n-
dimensional vector of variables X, is regressed on a k-dimensional vector of random walks 
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with drift. The model may be decomposed into a stationary component, which represents 
transitory fluctuations, and a nonstationary component representing the trend. In this case 
the restriction k<n is imposed, so that some of the elements of XI move together. There 
is thus some implied cointegration, with n-k cointegrating vectors, which gives the vector 
error correction representation A X t = a + B (L ) A X,_l - d (0" X t) + £" where a is n xl, 
d is n x (n-k), B(L) is an n Xn lag matrix, and a is an n X (n-k) matrix of cointegrating 
vectors. When applied to a model of consumption, investment and income, the unit root 
hypothesis is not rejected. The overall results suggest that transitory shocks account for 
two-thirds of postwar variation in US GNP. 
Blanchard and Watson [1986] and Blanchard [1989] investigate comovements in 
five macroeconomic variables -output, unemployment, prices, wages and nominal money 
- through the medium of a VAR with both contemporaneous and lagged relationships. 
By imposing a set of just-identifying restrictions to determine a set of five uncorrelated 
structural innovations from the reduced form disturbances, a 'Keynesian' model is 
obtained which includes aggregate demand, aggregate supply, price setting, money supply 
and fiscal relations. In the 1989 paper, the author finds that demand shocks account for 
most of the short run fluctuations, with positive shocks giving increases in nominal prices 
and wages. Supply shocks, on the other hand, dominate in the long run and lead to 
decreases in wages and prices. Additionally, correlations of GNP with the other variables 
at various leads and lags are measured for seven postwar cycles, the result showing 
considerable variation across episodes. 
Apart from identification problems there is also the question of bias in the 
estimates of low frequency components when filters are applied. For example, Chan, 
Haya and Ord [1977] concluded that fitting a linear time trend leads to • ... the low 
frequency portion of the spectrum [being] exaggerated and the high frequency portion 
attenuated' as compared to a first differencing transformation. Extending this line of 
enquiry, Nelson and Kang [1981] found evidence that such 'pseudo-periodicity' is a 
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function of sample size. Recently, Osborn [1993] has argued that spectral bias extends to 
DS processes when filtered by moving-average methods. Two famous examples of low 
frequency bias are 'evidence' of fifty-year economic cycles - the 'Kondratieff wave' -
and the 'long swing' hypothesis investigated by Kuznets [1961J. 
4.5.2. Index Models 
The common factor models implemented by King et al. are special cases of the 
unobserved-components type defined above. Such models in general fall into observable 
and unobservable sub-classes. The first is discussed in Sargent and Sims [1977]; 
Goldberger [1972] surveys applications of the second in the social sciences, giving the 
example of the Permanent Income Hypothesis, where the unobservable 'permanent 
income' is modelled in terms of two observable indicators, total income and consumption. 
The latter model is of interest owing to the recent work of Stock and Watson [1988, 1989, 
1991, 1992J, which attempts to formalize the NBER approach to business cycle tracking 
using a linear single index. Their formulation implicitly defines a variable that is thought 
of as the overall 'state of the economy', based on an interpretation very close to 
Marschak [1951], that a single unobserved process drives 'cyclical' fluctuations in many 
economic time series. The authors, however, claim their point of departure as the 1946 
Burns and Mitchell 'definition' (quoting from MBC, p. 3). The S-W interpretation of the 
derived single index is as a monthly proxy for GNP which, it is claimed, provides a formal 
rationalization for the heuristic dating methods of the NBER. Estimates of the 
unobserved index, constructed as a weighted sum of variables that move 
contemporaneously with 'overall activity', provide the basis for indices of coincident and 
leading indicators (XCI and XLI), and for an index which attempts to forecast recessions 
(XRI).31 Both are indicators of the NBER reference cycle, which is identified with 'the 
broad-based swings in economic activity known as the business cycle'.l2 However, the 
31These are now published monthly in the US. 
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authors concede that such a concept is not in keeping with the spirit of Burns and 
Mitchell, and so modify their formulation to take account of comovements. They propose 
a single-index model with observable vector of variables Xt composed of two unobserved 
components: Ct , a scalar representing the 'state of the economy', and an n-dimensional 
component U t which captures the 'idiosyncratic' movements of each variable. Because the 
structures are linear and stochastic, the nonlinearities arise 'extrinsically' from the time 
series properties of the indicator variables rather than from 'intrinsic macroeconomic 
shifts'.ll 
The main identifying assumption is that the comovements of the multiple time 
series arise from the single source Ct. The authors test several constituent series from the 
US Department of Commerce coincident indicator for the presence of cointegrating 
vectors, but find that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not strongly rejected. This 
requires them, like Hamilton, to work in growth rates for each variable. The mean of the 
single index Ct is calculated as an endogenously weighted average of the growth rates of 
four constituent series: total industrial production, personal income, total manufacturing 
and trade sales and non-agricultural hours worked. Residual series are found to have 
widely different AR representations. The single index is then converted to a levels series 
and compared to the DOC coincident indicator. The authors report that their index has 
a contemporaneous correlation of 0.936 with the DOC series, and that coherence with 
growth rates in the latter is high at low frequencies. The plot of the two indicators is 
shown in Figure 4.5.1. 
The recession index XRI, constructed as a V AR using the index ~ C" gives 
estimates of the probability of being in 'recession' k months hence, for various k. The 
authors define recession as a sequence of values of ~ C, falling below a specified cutoff 
level b., either for six consecutive months or for at least seven months in a nine-month 
311989] p.352. 
33[1989] p. 357. In this characterization the authors are following Slutsky rather than, for example, Hamilton or Neft\(i. 
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period. 'Expansions' are defined symmetrically, with boundary b.". Both phases are thus 
modelled as 'fuzzy' sets with a view to capturing the 'judgmental' approach of the NBER. 
Recession and expansion events are denoted R
" 
E
" 
respectively. The XRI is thus the 
c.d.f. P"lt of the economy being in recession in month T, given information available at 
month t. Computation of P"lt is by Monte Carlo methods, and is the proportion of 
occurrences of R, to total occurrences: i.e., the statistic # R t / ( # R t + # E,) ,where # 
is the number of occurrences of the event. 
These efforts have met with limited success. The XLI and XRI failed to predict 
the sharp downturn in the fourth quarter of 1990. The authors consider that the key 
difficulty lies in the choice of leading indicator variables, but argue that any changes in 
these variables could only have been made with hindsight. Wallis [1991] and others, in 
their discussion of the 1991 paper, have argued that the model itself may be 
inappropriate. Sims [1989] and Zarnowitz and Braun [1989] have both questioned the 
dependence of the S-W leading index on financial rather than real variables. Wallis 
suggests that forecasts of recession could have been improved by including traditional 
indicator variables, and also expresses reservations about the linearity of the model. Sims, 
on the other hand, believes that time-varying parameters should have been tried. 
4.5.3. Trend/Cycle Decompositions in Structural Models 
Harvey [1985, 1989] and Harvey and Jaeger [1993] have proposed a 'structural' 
version of the unobserved components model as an alternative to the Box-Jenkins 
approach. As described in Harvey [1985], this is the 'trend plus cycle' model 
trend is modelled as stochastic and linear, whereas the cycle is represented either by the 
explicit sinusoidal form 
I'" 'I [ cos A sin A I w'l • = p + • '" , - sin A cos A w, 
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or by damped harmonic oscillation: an AR(2) process with complex eigenvalues. When 
a~ = 0, however, the former is equivalent to the latter. As is demonstrated in Harvey 
[1985, 1989], all structural models have an ARIMA reduced form, but one on which 
'restrictions [are] imposed by a priori considerations'. For example, in the above case, 
when the variance a~ = 0, the reduced form is ARMA(2,1).34 It is claimed that the 
unobserved components of a structural model have a 'direct interpretation' - trend, 
cyclical and seasonal. The traditional Box-Jenkins strategy of selecting 'a parsimonious 
model...on the basis of the data themselves' is not followed. The purpose in estimating 
structural models is twofold: the first is to 'make forecasts'; and 'the second is to provide 
a way of presenting the "stylized facts"' associated with time-series data: i.e., the trend, 
cycle, seasonal and irregular components'. It is not 'intended to represent the underlying 
data generating process'. These components 'are of interest to economists in themselves' 
and are further claimed to follow the 'encompassing principle' of Hendry and Richard.3s 
Harvey finds that the 'cyclical trend' model, in which the cycle is modelled as part of the 
stochastic trend rather than independently, fits US GNP better than the trend plus cycle 
version. For industrial production a 'random walk with drift...may be the best one can 
do'.36 
Harvey and Jaeger [1993] have followed this philosophy in fitting structural 
models to US and Austrian GNP series. They criticize the Hodrick-Prescott approach 
because (as also argued by Kim and Pagan [1993]) it does not take account of the 
stochastic properties of the data and therefore induces 'spurious cycles' in the filtered 
components. However, they find that the US series, when the above trend-cycle model 
is fitted, 'yields a detrended series which is difficult to distinguish' from the output of the 
34See (1985] p. 220. 
35/bid., p.225. 
36/bid., p. 222. 
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H-P filter. The latter is thus 'tailor-made for extracting the business cycle component 
from US GNP'.37 This similarity does not obtain for the Austrian series. The authors also 
examine certain time series for evidence of cross correlations in the cyclical component, 
but find that these are spurioUS.38 The conclusion, as in Kim and Pagan, is that the H-P 
filter may bias estimates of the 'cyclical component' and of correlations in this component 
across time series. However, the structural model itself is subject to identifying 
restrictions: its reduced form is ARMA(2,1) with complex eigenvalues inside the unit 
cirde.39 
4.6. A MONTE CARLO SlUDY OF MEASURES OF ASYMMETRY 
Stock and Watson [1989] distinguish between models which generate fluctuations 
'intrinsically', through harmonic oscillation, and those whose swings are generated 
'extrinsically' by linear combinations of random influences. Empirical evidence favours 
the latter generating process - for example Orcutt's findings for Tinbergen's US series 
and the Adelmans's simulation of the K-G equations. What is certain is that all 
macroeconomic aggregates, as well as most of their constituents (with the exception of 
the interwar period in the United States) have exhibited strong secular tendencies since 
the beginnings of industrialization. As Baumol has shown, the superposition of a trend 
line on a known stationary DGP will noticeably alter its 'periodic' characteristics e.g., the 
distance between turning points, the symmetries of lengths of upswings with downswings, 
etc. 
There has been little specific investigation of the effects of trend upon the latter 
measures in time series models. The periodic properties of stationary damped harmonic 
37 Harvey and Jaeger [1993] p. 236. 
38/bid., p. 245. 
39/bid., p. 232 and Harvey [1985] p. 219. 
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processes were studied analytically by Yule and later by Kendall [1944, 1946], Johnston 
[1955] and Howrey [1968]. The advantages of this model have been shown by the above 
three authors: oscillations are generated endogenously, and expected values of periodic 
measures can be derived analytically from the autocorrelation coefficients. Since Kendall 
found the derivation of a theoretical measure for m.l.(upruns) intractable, this section 
attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by determining experimentally the effects of 
trend on such AR(2) models, expressed as, say, 
(or, in homogeneous form Y,- b Y,-1 - C Y,-2 = 0) where U, is a general error term, usually 
distributed as N(O,l), and T is a time trend. 
The basic experimental design is the Monte Carlo simulation of a group of AR(2) 
models with coefficients in the region bounded by the parabola b2=4c. Coverage of this 
space is effected by a 'grid' of models, as shown in Figure 4.6.1. First lag coefficients b 
are separated in the grid by 0.1, and second lag coefficients c by 0.2. The simulations test 
whether the position of the model in the space (i.e., the values of the coefficients) affects 
the behaviour of m.l.(upruns), m.l.(downruns) and their ratio as a deterministic trend is 
added to the model. In order to compare the effect of trend across models, it is necessary 
to adjust the slope coefficient a. Figure 4.6.2 shows the effect of adding a trend with 
a = 1.0 to realizations ofthe four Kendall [1946] models. The effects are disproportionate, 
with each resultant slope being different. In order to permit direct comparisons across 
models, the slopes are adjusted by subtracting the 'mean' of the process, i.e., the trend. 
Suppose the original model is, say, Y, = at + 4>1 Y,-1 + 4>2 Y,-2' Subtracting the 'mean' IL=bt 
gives 
Yr ILl = 4>1 (Yl-l - JL I-l) + 4>2 (Yt-2 - JL I-2) 
~ y, = b t-4>1 (b(t-l» - 4>2 (b(t- 2» +4>1 Y'-1 + 4>zYI-z . 
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Then, by comparing coefficients, a = b(1-tP1-tP2 ), which gives a scaled 'trend-in-mean' 
b= a .40 The effect of this can be seen in Figure 4.6.3 showing the same Kendall 
I-tP1 -cP2 
models with equal 'trends-in-mean' rather than 'trends-in-intercept'. 
The simulation routines are implemented using a FORTRAN program. For this 
exercise, each of the models was iterated 550 times, with the first 50 observations 
discarded to allow for non-random effects. Each simulation included 500 cycles of the 
above, giving a run of 250,000 observations for each model. For each cycle, the program 
calculates each of the above measures. The algorithm for finding peaks is based in this 
case on a 'window length' of three observations as in Kendall [1946]: thus Y, is a peak iff 
Y'-I<Y'>Y'+I' 'Upruns' and 'downruns' are found by the program as monotonic sequences 
of increasing and decreasing values respectively. In addition, the mean ratio of uprun-
to downrun-Iength was computed. over the 500 cycles of the program for each model. 
Originally, the plan was to compute the above measures at window lengths of three to 13. 
However, it was found in practice that because of the asymmetries induced by the 
introduction of a trend, turning points tended to vanish at higher window lengths so 
quickly that the scope for cross-model comparisons became severely restricted. An 
example of the effects of a steep slope on turning points is given in Figure 4.6.4, where 
the series becomes monotonic. The m.l.(upruns)/m.l.(downruns) ratio is unity for all 
simulations of stationary processes and hence serves as a reference for assessing 
asymmetries. Because an increase in the trend-in-mean also produces rapidly vanishing 
turning points, the trend coefficient is set at unity and mean adjustments are made for 
each model in the study. 
As the measures being studied vary considerably across the grid of models, 
changes associated with the imposition of the trend are calculated as percentages. The 
results are summarized as 'response surfaces' in Figures 4.6.5 - 4.6.7. These are in the 
same orientation as the coefficient-space diagrams above, but with the addition of a 
~e author is indebted to Professor Ken Wallis for suggesting this metric. 
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vertical axis showing rates of change. An hypothesis of this study is that the asymmetries 
induced by trend vary as the autocorrelations PJ and P2 or with the output variance of 
the series. However, the graphs show clearly that for m.l.(upruns), 
m.l.(upruns)/m.l.(downruns) and their mean variances, the sensitivity of response is 
directly proportional to the values of the coefficients rather than to some intermediate 
function. The degree of change is also directly proportional to (a) the value of the 
mean-adjusted slope and (b) to the degree of positive autocorrelation in the stationary 
process. These measures vary in the same way: they increase in magnitude (shown as 
percentages on the vertical axes) as the values both of band c increase, with the rate of 
increase in the standard deviations approximately double that of the means. The position 
of the boundary of cyclical behaviour depends upon the value of the slope coefficient a, 
moving to the left as a increases. As the boundary beyond which behaviour is monotonic 
is approached, the rate of increase is explosive, making the analysis of rates of change by 
a specific functional form difficult. 
The experimental results suggest that, apart from changes in the sensitivity of 
these 'periodic' measures to changes in coefficients of the artificial DGP, the asymmetries 
between upward and downward sequences are functions of the strength of the trend. An 
obvious question is whether the results of such an experiment can be extended to 
empirical data. The ratio m.l.(upruns)/m.l.(downruns) can be calculated, but because of 
the comparatively short 'sample periods' in empirical series, inferences from the results 
of such an exercise must be made with some caution. For example, UK macroeconomic 
series are recorded quarterly from 1948 at the earliest, and US data from 1947, giving at 
most only 45 years of observations - less than 10 percent of the length of the Monte 
Carlo runs. Furthermore, macroeconomic series, as noted by Perron and others, are 
subject to structural breaks which would be equivalent to changes in both trend slope and 
AR coefficients in the experimental models. The real US GNP and UK GDP series, for 
example, exhibit frequent changes in rates of growth as well as in the frequencies of 
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turning points and, during the 'long boom' of the 1950s and 1960s were essentially 
monotonic in levels. Such variations within a series are typical. 
Nevertheless it is possible to extract some information from the application of the 
Kendall [1946] measures to such data, even though the possible structural heterogeneity 
renders the relationship between periodic measures and 'trend' slopes in empirical series 
less tractable than for artificially-generated data. However, the application of these 
measures permits at least tentative cross-series comparisons to be made, and may reveal 
correlations between asymmetric behaviour and growth. Additionally, differences in 
asymmetries across series can give some indication whether the 'divergences' in economic 
behaviour among the various sectors noted by Burns and Mitchell actually exist. Such 
analysis is mainly of historical value, since structural changes are largely unpredictable. 
Also, because of the small sample size it is not certain that differences in the empirical 
magnitudes of these measures will be statistically significant. 
For exemplary purposes 15 quarterly macroeconomic series have been examined: 
eight series for the UK from 1955 to 1993; and seven for the US from 1947 to 1983. They 
are: 
US GNP 
US residential construction 
US producers durable equipment 
production 
US nondurable goods production 
US nonresidential construction 
US durable goods production 
US government purchases 
UKGDP 
UK engineering and related production 
UK chemical and man-made fibre 
production 
UK textile and related production 
UK mining and quarrying 
UK food and drink processing 
UK total manufacturing 
UK fuel processing 
These have been chosen for the diversity of their behaviour rather than as representative 
of the macroeconomy as a whole, and are shown in Figures 4.6.8 and 4.6.9. US residential 
construction shows very little in the way of net growth during the period, but very large 
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short-run fluctuations. UK textiles shows a similar lack of overall growth, but in this case 
there is a 'head and shoulders' pattern in the middle period, spanning the period of the 
two Labour governments, and possibly representing two different policy regimes. On the 
other hand, US nondurable goods production is virtually monotonic and shows strong 
growth. The two GNP series are less noisy in general than their constituents.41 
Periodic measures are calculated for each series using a window length of five. 
(That is, a peak y, is greater in value than the two previous and two subsequent 
observations. The reasons for this choice are discussed fully in the next chapter in the 
context of an analysis of historical macroeconomic data.) Table 4.6.1 shows the periodic 
measures for each series. The m.l.(uprun)/m.l.( downrun) ratio appears loosely correlated 
with average growth rates over the sample period, as shown in Table 4.6.2 and plotted 
in Figures 4.6.10 and 4.6.11. It is possible that, were more series of longer duration 
available, a linear regression line with positive slope - or possibly several lines - could 
be fitted to such data. This particular type of asymmetry seems to be present in empirical 
time series, its degree related to secular tendencies in the data just as in the experimental 
series, but with larger variances. It can also be argued that average growth rates are 
problematical measures for economic series because of their sensitivity to the choice of 
sample period and because of variations within series; but the present exercise is not 
intended as definitive, and no doubt more precise measures of empirical trend can be 
found. Nevertheless, the character of the time-series plots indicates considerable 
divergences across the sectors of both economies; and despite the high variances, the 
ratio m.l.(upruns )/m.l.( downruns) appears asymmetrical and to vary with secular strengths. 
Investigations of a larger number of series might reveal stronger regression relations. 
41These historical variations are analysed in Chapter 5 below. 
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Table 4.6.1(a}. Summary of Periodic Measures: Eight Quarterly UK Time Series 
Series M.L.(upruns) Standard M.L.(downruns) Standard M.L.(upruns)/ 
Deviation Deviations M.L.(downruns) 
M.L.(upruns) M.L.(downruns) 
GOP 10.0 9.6 2.2 1.9 4.5 
Engineering 5.5 5.0 33 1.7 4.2 
industries 
Chemicals and 16.0 16.4 3.8 1.7 1.7 
man-made 
fibres 
Textiles, etc. 4.4 3.4 4.7 23 0.9 
Mining and 4.6 2.4 5.7 4.4 0.8 
Quarrying 
Total 65 5.0 4.1 2.9 1.6 
manufacturing 
Food & drink 4.9 4.5 4.0 4.5 1.2 
Fuel processing 5.0 3.6 5.7 3.6 0.9 
17 1 
Table 4.6.1(b). Summary of Periodic Measures: Seven Quarterly US Time Series 
Series M.L(upruns) Standard M.L(downruns) Standard M.L(upruns)/ 
Deviation Deviation M.L(downruns) 
M.L(upruns) M.L(downruns) 
GNP 16.0 9.0 2.7 1.3 5.9 
Residential 6.3 3.5 5.3 2.9 1.2 
structures 
Producers 9.9 7.1 3.3 1.4 3.0 
durable 
equipment 
Nondurable 33.3 N/A 7.7 N/A 4.3 
goods 
Government 8.2 5.1 4.7 3.9 1.7 
purchases 
Nonresidential 8.2 5.1 4.7 3.9 1.7 
structures 
Durable goods 5.4 3.9 5.2 4.4 1.0 
Table 4.6.2. Asymmetries and Growth 
SERIES AVERAGE ANNUAL GROW11i RATB M.L.(UPRUNS) / M.L.(DOWNRUNS) 
(%) 
US residen tial structures 3.1 1.2 
US nondurable goods production 3.1 4.3 
US GNP 3.3 5 .9 
US producers durab le equipment 3.9 3.0 
production 
US government 3.7 2.2 
purchases 
US nonresidential st ructu res 2.7 1.7 
US durable goods 4.8 1.0 
UK textiles 0.2 1.1 
UK engineering 1.6 1.7 
UKGDP 2.3 4.5 
UK chemicals and man-made fibres 4.6 4.2 
UK mining & quarrying -0.9 0.8 
UK total manufacturing 1.8 1.6 
UK food & drink 1.8 2.3 
UK fuel processing 35 0.9 
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4.7. SUMMARY 
Empirical business cycle research originated in early twentieth century forecasting 
methods - the 'business barometers' - whose popularity was eclipsed by the 1929 stock 
market crash. The approach assumed that the forces driving short- and long-run 
behaviour were separable, which, because the latter was nonstationary, required filtering 
to 'remove' unwanted components. This in turn required the identifying assumptions of 
'trend', 'cyclical', 'seasonal' and 'irregular' components. The approach has changed since 
the 1920s only to the extent that the techniques employed in the construction of the 
business barometers do not yield MMSE estimates of the components of interest and 
have therefore been rejected in favour of explicit probability models. However, all 
unobserved ARIMA models and their equivalent representations still rely on identifying 
assumptions, e.g., those of Stock and Watson, and Harvey. In the latter case the author 
does not even attempt to represent the underlying DGP, but assumes a priori that 
business cycles are separable from other components. 
It can be argued that S-W and Hamilton are actually modelling long-run rather 
than short-run behaviour, since both work in growth-rate transformations of levels series. 
In Hamilton [1989] the objective of analysing growth patterns is explicit. As Sargent and 
Sims argue, the index model is a method of summarizing the covariance among the 
component variables; and when the latter are, as in the present case, growth-rate series, 
the model is actually picking up growth fluctuations rather than cycles in levels. The S-W 
plot of their exponentiated coincident index, e AC, against that of the DOC index also 
shows an emphasis on secular tendencies: both consist in a strong upward movement over 
time of very much greater magnitude than the 'business-cycle' type fluctuations (see 
Figure 4.5.1). This suggests that time-series models may reveal more about long-run 
tendencies than about short-run fluctuations. 
Nor do linear models address the asymmetry issue. As has been demonstrated 
above, this property can be simulated for a linear process only by the superposition of a 
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nonstationary component. The Harvey structural model normally represents cyclical 
components as AR(2) with complex roots whose residuals must be symmetrical, and 
which hence will require the trend component to induce upswings greater than 
downswings. Asymmeties in the S-W coincident index also appear to be a function of 
growth, that is, in the exponentiated form. Evidence from nonlinear models is mixed and 
does not address the comovement issue because it largely relates to the behaviour of 
aggregates.42 Hamilton suggests that 'permanent' effects are the major contributor to 
short-run growth fluctuations, but in aggregate US GNP rather than in 'many variables'. 
Kim and Pagan argue that models need to take account of such effects in levels, that 
these can only be captured by a stochastic trend, and that estimates of a separate cyclical 
component will be distorted if such a trend is actually a feature of the data. 
Empirical evidence has been mixed. Tinbergen and others found that the 
dynamics of large-scale models tended to be decomposable, suggesting that the sectors 
represented were only loosely correlated. Harvey [1985] finds that the '<.)'clical trend' 
model is on balance favoured over the trend plus cycle variant for certain UK data, so 
that optimal representations would not separate trend from <.)'c1e. Stock and Watson 
failed to predict the 1990 downturn in the US economy, which implies that index models 
do not capture structural changes in behaviour - in this case of the financial markets. 
The strongest evidence of asymmetries from nonlinear models is from those in growth 
rates, per Hamilton [1989]. The difficulty in assessing such evidence has been the same 
since business barometers were first published: the 'cycle' is identified a priori so any 
inferences about its behaviour are circular. 
Both experimental and empirical evidence indicates functional relations between 
asymmetries and the 'slopes' of 'secular components'. Of course, in empirical data the 
nGPs are not known, and secular tendencies are subject to structural changes, so 
confirmation of any such relations can only be tentative. The evidence, suggests, however, 
4~one or the papers discussed above analyse comovements in the degree of detail of some RBC studies as, for example, 
in Shapiro [1987]. 
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that linear models cannot capture such behaviour independently of the secular tendency 
in the data, which casts further doubt on the traditional decomposition into 'trend' and 
'cycle', 
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Figure 4.2.2. Frequency Distributions of Lengths of Waves and Half-Waves 
A: business cycles of 12 countries, not including the UK (Mitchell-Thorp); 
B, 10 B4 : Models II, IVa, [Vb and JVc respectively 
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CHAPTERS 
HISTORICAL BUSINESS CYCLES: TIIE TIME-SERIES EVIDENCE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The historiography of business cycles emerged from philosophical roots in the 
nineteenth century and became accepted before any serious attempt was made to 
measure output variables. When finally such estimates were made, beginning in the early 
1900s, the idea of cycles had become so intuitively plausible that the statistics were 
tailored to produce the desired cyclical effect, Beveridge's 1909 'Pulse of the Nation' and 
the business barometers being cases in point. The usual decomposition of such data is 
quatra-partite: trend, seasonal, cyclical and irregular. In interwar and early postwar 
research, because of 'depressed' conditions, the emphasis was on 'cycle' rather than on 
'trend'. When full employment returned in the late 1940s attention shifted to the 
investigation of fluctuations and structural breaks in growth paths: the 'growth cycles' and 
'climacterics' thought to have occurred at various times since the beginnings of 
industrialization. The doubts expressed by Mitchell as early as 1927 about the 
pervasiveness of 'general business conditions' have therefore not been addressed, 
although much of the published work comes close to discarding the traditional 
assumption of separate naps for each component. In the particular case of cycles, the 
scientific method would require evidence of a kernel of behaviour common to all 
historical episodes, rather than merely an a priori assumption. This implies direct 
observation, if possible, from time-series data rather than 'indirect' inference from 
statistical decompositions requiring identifying assumptions. It moreover requires that the 
underlying structure of the econo~y remain sufficiently similar to permit comparisons 
across episodes. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate these issues by evaluating objectively 
the time-series evidence for short-period fluctuations in general business conditions as 
'real' and not merely superficially recurrent phenomena in the era since industrialization. 
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Section 5.2 discusses the postwar historical literature and shows how its authors have 
come increasingly to question the pervasiveness of 'cycles'. Section 5.3 proposes an 
unrestricted metric (the turning point) for tracking them. Section 5.4 presents empirical 
evidence of 'turning points' and timing relations in economic time series for the pre-1914 
and post-1945 periods. Section 5.5 assesses the magnitude of structural change during the 
two eras in the UK and compares time-series data to nineteenth century 'annals'. 
5.2. DATA-fIANDUNG AND INfERPRETATION BY ECONOMIC HISTORIANS SINCE 1944 
The main concern of economists in the closing stages of World War II was to 
avoid a return to mass unemployment. Such an outcome was not implausible. It had 
happened after 1918 and was perceived as a political threat when contrasted with the 
success of command economics during the war. The business-cycle literature of the time 
initially assumed that conditions of the 1930s were 'normal' if deplorable, but changed 
its emphasis as it became apparent that 'Keynesian' expedients - a combination of 
reconstruction, mass consumerism and Cold War rearmament - could forestall a return 
to depressed conditions and actually promote strong economic growth. The filtering and 
interpretation of time-series data reflected these concerns and the change of emphasis 
as the postwar reconstruction progressed. Beveridge'S Full Employment in a Free Society 
[1944], published at the close of a period of peacetime economic collapse and wartime 
economic boom, emphasized the 'cyclical' concerns of the early postwar transition. The 
theoretical framework was still quantity-theoretic, a 'regular feature of the trade cycle' 
being the comovement of prices, nominal outpu t and employment.1 The cyclical character 
of conditions was reflected in the 'new index of industrial activity from 1785 to 1938' 
published in Appendix A, pp. 275-314. These estimates, both for the aggregate and its 
constituents, were presented as percentages of a 'trend ordinate', where the latter was 
1 (1944) p. 287. 
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either a straight line or polynomial cUlVe fitted by OLS. The findings were artifacts of the 
statistical methods common at the time: the practice of , de trending' and the subjective 
approach to turning point identification. Although these techniques have from time to 
time been questioned they have until comparatively recently been accepted as correct, 
thus reinforcing the accepted view of 'business cycles'. 
Experience of the 'social possibilities of war' led to a shift of political orientation 
in the 1940s from laissez-faire to command economics. Rostow [1948] is the earliest of 
the 'Keynesian' revisionists to re-interpret nineteenth century 'business cycles' against this 
novel background of full employment, scarce resources and rising prices in peacetime.2 
Rostow maintained the assumption of a decomposition into 'trend' and 'cycle': Chapters 
I and II discuss these components separately. Chapter I identified five periods of differing 
'trends' (i.e., growth rates) ending in the years 1815, 1847, 1873, 1900 and 1912. Each of 
these epochs was chosen to conform to price trends over the whole period - an 
unconscious echo of the Quantity Theory, perhaps. The composition and weighting of 
Beveridge'S index were criticized. Chapter II proposed an alternative set of cyclical 
turning points; but Beveridge's central hypothesis of 'the existence of a persistent trade 
cycle in Great Britain from the close of the eighteenth century' seems to have been 
accepted.3 
Rostow found 24 cycles from 1790 to 1913, an average duration of 5.25 years. He 
distinguished, however, 14 'major' and ten minor cycles, with expansion phases in the 
former type distinguished by full employment and by growth in long-term investment. 
Although the average duration was thus more nearly in line with Kendall's 1946 estimate 
than with Beveridge's own findings, such analytical details are important only for what 
they reveal about the circular interaction of statistical evidence with the theoretical priors 
of the researchers. The 'existence of a persistent trade cycle' was not so much an 
2[1948] p. 2. 
3Ibid., p. 34 rn. 
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empirical inference as a starting point for the manipulation of the data into a form which 
would permit the desired inference to be drawn. In the late 1940s there was still little 
doubt about the nature of 'business cycles'. 
Rostow collaborated with Anna Schwartz and Professor Gayer on a two-volume 
statistical study of the British economy (GRS) which applied the analytical techniques of 
Burns and Mitchell (the only such example outside the NBER). This work also 
distinguished between 'major' and 'minor' cycles, but found that the 'precise timing and 
intensity of minor cycle expansions and contractions cannot be easily generalized'. Output 
may actually increase during such a contraction; but in any case, general recovery, 
depending upon investment, arises out of a variety of conditions, no one of which is 'both 
necessary and sufficient', and any of which mayor may not be present at any particular 
moment. The analysis of 'typical' behaviour over the several cycles, given in Chapter III 
of Volume II, showed large numbers of irregularities, especially in the war years up to 
1815. Specific cycle peaks were usually spread over several years, but the authors 
considered them to be merely 'random in character' and not 'violating' the basic 
structure.4 
The theoretical structure of GRS was classically Keynesian, with lags in 
price-adjustment and investment, and with the statistical evidence designed to test this 
hypothesis. Matthews, in a 1954 critique of GRS in the OEP, raised strong objections to 
the idea of 'general trade conditions', especially but not exclusively in the war period. 
Different sectors 'often enjoyed very different fortunes at the same time'; so that for the 
war period at least the idea of a 'general level of business activity' had to be employed 
'with very great caution'.s The problems of interpreting 'uneven' fluctuations were further 
discussed in Matthews's Study in Trade Cycle History [1954b], an account of the British 
economy from 1833 to 1842. Although the period could be divided into five 'phases', 
4 Volume II, p. 614. 
S(1954a] p. 14. 
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there was no general agreement about their timing: for example, Beveridge and Rostow 
found a double 'peak' in 1836 and 1839/40, whereas Thorp classified the years 1838-1842 
as all depressed.6 Matthews argued that the period 1837-42 can be interpreted 'as 
forming a single cyclical contraction phase', albeit one which appears 'long, confused and 
heterogeneous', There were a number of 'complicating factors': (1) the revulsion from 
the mania of 1836, (2) business fluctuations in the US, (3) long lead times for investment 
projects which came on stream weIl after the boom, and (4) exogenous shocks to the 
supply of grain. The boom itself also appeared heterogeneous. Although it could be 
explained to an extent by 'a cumulative interaction ... between investment and income', 
there also seem to have been a number of 'circumstances of an extraneous or even 
fortuitous character'.7 The abiding impression was that the upswing was more complicated 
than the downswing, but that the latter was also 'interrupted and confused by a variety 
of complicating factors.'s 
In the final section Matthews discussed the 'pervasiveness of the cycle', concluding 
that 'especially in the years 1837-40' there was 'a good deal of divergence between the 
timing of fluctuations in different industries'.9 He found, for example, that the peak for 
textiles occurred in 1836, for coal in 1838, and for shipbuilding in 1839-40. The regional 
discrepancies were 'more striking', for example in the statistics for brick production. 
Underlying these industrial fluctuations were movements in food supplies and prices, in 
these years largely exogenous. The only instances of 'pervasiveness' were at the temporal 
extremes, that is the end of the 'mania' in 1836 and the 'depression' of 1842; yet even in 
the latter instance the matter was not that clear cut. 
6 (1954bJ p. 1 and fn. 
7lbid., p. 218. 
Slbid., p. 218. 
9lbid., p. 224. 
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Hughes's 1960 study dealt with the period 1848-1860. 1848 was seen as a year of 
'depression', but 'mixed in its effect, with not all sectors ... equally hard hit'.tO The harvest 
failure in Ireland in 1846 led to 'large-scale unemployment and falling income', a marked 
decline in exports and a 40 percent decrease in industrial prices. At the same time cotton 
exports were increasing, which 'may have mitigated some of the adverse effects of the 
depression in home demand'. A 'recovery and boom' took place from 1849 to 1853, and 
was 'the most pervasive economic expansion of the 1850s'; but even here the evidence 
was conflicting. A rise in business failures, falling prices and 'scattered trade complaints' 
during 1851 were seen as less persuasive an indicator than the evidence of continuing 
investment in textile plant, a strong expansion of bills of exchange and evidence of new 
investment in basic industries. The period of the Crimean War was on the whole 
prosperous; yet textiles were 'depressed' from the fourth quarter of 1853. 1854 and 1855 
were years of wartime boom; yet iron and coal prices had begun to fall by the end of the 
period. 1856 saw a revival of exports, but unaccompanied by any revival in domestic 
investment. The shipbuilding and construction industries were depressed by 1856, and this 
finally became 'general' by the autumn of 1857. Although 1858 was 'judged as one of the 
worst depressions of the nineteenth century', some industries, textiles primarily, were in 
'full production' by the year-end. The recovery of 1859-60 was 'uneven'. 
Dornbusch and Frenkel (1984] analyse the credit crisis of 1847 in the context of 
the operation of the classical gold standard. The origins of the crisis are seen as diverse: 
partly 'real'; partly 'autonomous', as the effects of the Irish famine put pressure on the 
domestic bullion supply; and partly 'financial'. The latter was a consequence of the 
former: a collapse of short-term credit resulting from a large external payments deficit, 
and from the railway speculation of 1845. The 1847 crisis differed both from that of 1857 
and that of 1836-41, being actually two crises in the same year. The first, in April, arose 
from a tightening of credit by the Bank of England; while the second, in October, ensued 
10 [1960] p.28. 
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from a loss of confidence in the convertibility of bank deposits owing to the operation of 
the 1844 Act.ll 
Rostow [1972] extends the GRS analysis of the dating of nineteenth century 
British cycles to the period 1790-1914. Again, doubts are raised about the pervasiveness 
of cycles, about long-term comparability of conditions and, for the first time, about the 
turning-point dates themselves. In fact, the discussion suggests that this author had 
encountered the same problems of identifying reference dates as had Burns and Mitchell 
in the 1930s. 
No two cycles, of course, are quite the same; and one can trace as well, certain 
long-period changes in the character of the cycles ... It should be emphasized that 
the year designated [as a turning point] is, in many cases, a matter for judgment. 
The processes involved in the cyclical turning-points are complex; and they are 
woven in each case into unique historical circumstances ... ([1972] p. 74) 
Rostow also questioned the amplitude criteria for 'the marking off of a formal trade 
cycle'. On some occasions, as in 1823 for example, only exports declined, whereas in 
1801-2 some indicators expanded while others contracted. In order to find a cycle 
chronology the analyst is hence constrained to make 
arbitrary judgements, no matter how large or superficially comforting the mass 
of statistics with which he is able to surround hinlself. ([1972] p. 78) 
The GRS chronology thus left 'untidy points of demarcation' because of ambiguities in 
the data. The average duration was 'not particularly meaningful' since 'these cycles 
differed significantly in character among themselves'. 
There was also a strong sense of structural change. In the earlier period 
fluctuations of an 'inventory cycle' type were in evidence which could be traced 'back 
even to medieval times'. From the 1780s, on the other hand, longer swings in investment 
became pronounced; yet it is only from the 1860s that the 'short cycle' could not only be 
11 [1984] p. 236. 
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'detected ... but. .. had sufficient power to produce distinguishable general movements ... 12 
The 'shift in the ... structure' of all economies from agriculture to industry changed the 
'character of cyclical fluctuations' between 1790 and 1910. By the end of this period a far 
greater percentage of the population 'felt the impact of the trade cycle' than at the 
beginning.13 
Price and output movements were complex, especially during the 'Great 
Depression'. For example, in the supposedly depressed years 1873-1879 average 
unemployment was 3.1 percent, compared with 4.7 percent for the whole period 
1850-1914}4 Prices, interest rates and profits fell in the 1870s, but house and ship 
building and 'other domestic enterprise of low expected yield' flourished. In Rostow's 
view, commonly held in the 1970s, the main feature of this depression was the lack of 
investment opportunities at high rates of return, so that while the speculative instabilities 
of earlier periods were conspicuous by their absence, industry continued to grow. IS 
Statistical estimates of nineteenth century British economic output developed in 
parallel with national income accounts in the postwar period. Beveridge's industrial 
production series were the earliest of these; all were subject to 'detrending' and 
smoothing. The Hoffmann [1955] index of industrial production was subsequently found 
to be unsatisfactory in some of its weightings. Aldcroft and Fearon [1972] applied a 
nine-year moving average to the Hoffmann index and also expressed the resultant series 
as deviations from 'trend'. In any case, by the 1960s, in response to the long postwar 
reconstruction boom, interest had shifted from short-period fluctuations to the sources 
of growth. Deane and Cole [1962] gave estimates for the British economy from 1688; but 
12 [1972] p. 83. 
13/bid., p. 85. 
14/bid., p. 89. 
lS/bid., p. 290. 
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it has been the work of Feinstein and Lewis in the late 1960s and early 1970s to which 
most attention has subsequently been paid. 
Feinstein's UK estimates for the period 1855-1980, which appeared in 1972, were 
the first designed to conform to national income accounting definitions. They were, 
however, subject to certain unfortunate 'adjustments' which reduce their reliability for 
present purposes (see below, Section 5.3.1). Lewis's Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913 
appeared in 1978, but the statistical appendix on which it is based was completed in 1967 
and circulated in manuscript. Its objective was initially to reconcile conflicts in average 
growth rates in various other series, e.g., Hoffmann's and Prest's, the result being a new 
aggregate UK industrial production index with fourteen constituents. The raw estimates 
contained 'unlikely annual fluctuations', and so the iron and steel, iron and steel 
products, building, printing and chemicals series were 'smoothed' by means of three-year 
and nine-year moving averages.16 Lewis also produced current and constant price 
estimates for 15 UK GDP constituents, as well as some price indices. He was principally 
interested in the 'speed and regularity' of growth in four 'core' economies: the US, the 
UK, France and Germany.17 On the other hand, the existence of a 'trade cycle' driven 
by separate forces was viewed with scepticism: 
[Trade-cycle] models, while they explain the past satisfactorily, always fail to 
predict the future with reasonably accuracy. If the term 'cycle' is to be confined 
to a movement whose future can be predicted from its own past, then the 
movements of industrial production, though wave-like, are not cycles; and the 
models which can explain them backwards but not predict them forwards have 
to be viewed with suspicion. ([1978] p.l8) 
Ford [1981] also applied nine-year moving averages to data on income, 
investment and unemployment at current prices and calculates peaks and troughs from 
16 [1978) pp. 253-258. 
17/bid., p. 15. 
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the residuals after subtracting the 'trend'. He found conformity in the turning points in 
these residuals, a result different in character from most other studies of the nineteenth 
century UK 'trade cycle' in which the data are in constant prices. Nevertheless Ford, in 
common with other investigators, found it 'difficult to specify a typical British fluctuation 
or cycle'; each episode had 'unique institutional and geographical features ... apart from 
varied behaviour patterns'.18 
This sceptical tone is evident in the recent literature. Eichengreen [1983], who 
considers cycles and their 'causes' in Victorian Britain, distinguishes the 'real' theories, 
such as those of Lewis and Rostow, from the 'monetary' ones, as proposed by Bordo, 
Friedman and Schwartz. Nevertheless, the 
proponents of these various explanations for the trade cycle face a common 
challenge. To build a convincing case, they must do more than merely 
demonstrate that fluctuations in certain real or monetary variables coincided with 
fluctuations in British national income. Such coincidences could have resulted 
from the impact of other factors on both national income and the supposed 
explanatory variable ... ([1983] p. 146) 
Eichengreen questions the use of structural models originating from economic theory, as 
estimated e.g. by Tinbergen, as a 'basis for convincing tests of the various theories' 
because of the circularities inherent in such strategies. It is not empirically obvious which 
variables are autonomous, nor how their 'impulses are transmitted'; yet when the model 
is supposed to 'identify the channels through which the cyclical impulses are transmitted' 
such a 'procedure is tantamount to assuming one's conclusions'.19 
Eichengreen's model is a five-dimensional V AR, the dependent variables being 
output, prices, exports, residential construction and money stock, and with a sample 
period 1833-1913. The evidence of the model is of structural change: up to 1869 prices 
are found to be correlated negatively with changes in output, and neither exports nor the 
18 (1981 I p. 134. 
19[1983] p. 153. 
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monetary base are related in their movements to the 'subsequent paths of real incomes 
or prices'.20 In the later period the results are 'strikingly different'. Export shocks have 
a significant effect on domestic prices, as does residential construction; yet the latter has 
no effect on real incomes, and its movements are no longer a leading indicator of price 
level changes. Explanations for this somewhat confusing picture are sought in the possible 
emergence of a 'law of one price' in the world trading economy and in rigidities imposed 
by the general adoption of the gold standard. 
Solomou [1987] deals exclusively with variations in growth patterns, but 
nevertheless identifies many of the problems of generality encountered in conventional 
business-cycle research. This paper assesses the evidence for 'Kuznets' long swings (14 
to 22 years) and 'Kondratieff waves (about 50 years) in British economic growth from 
1850 to 1973. The Kuznets swings are thought to be 'generated by a more complicated 
historical process than has been recognized'.21 For example, during much of the pre-1914 
period there was an 'inverse relationship between investment levels and the rate of 
growth of output in the British economy'. Despite high levels of investment in the 1870s 
and 1890s, the economic processes in these two periods were very different; in the first 
growth was declining while in the second an 'upward adjustment was taking place'.22 In 
general the evidence suggests that 'the swings were episodic rather than endogenous'; nor 
were they 'the result of a systematic exogenous variable'. For example, although climatic 
variations 'are important in explaining the long swings' in investment, the effects of these 
are 'filtered out' by structural change. In any case, the sectors whose fluctuations 
accounted for the swings 'were very different over time'.23 
20Ibid ., p. 159. 
21[1987) p. 11. 
22Ibid., p. 104. 
23 Ibid., p. 130. 
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Solomou [1994] further assesses evidence for long swings and discusses the 
problems of modelling unobserved components in British historical data. 
Much of the existing historical research on business cycles makes the assumption 
that an economic variable ... can be decomposed into three parts: trend, cycle and 
a residual of random influences. If such a simple perspective were wholly valid 
all one would have to do to identify the cycle would be to fit a long-run trend 
to the data and then take the pattern of absolute or relative deviations about the 
trend. But the procedure makes strong econometric assumptions, which may be 
misleading ... ([1994] p. 248) 
An even greater problem is inaccuracies in the data arising from interpolation, from the 
use of proxies, from imprecise adjustments and in the case of Lewis, from the imposition 
of a nine-year cycle on the data. 
Just how complex can be the problem of identification of unobserved components 
is demonstrated in Crafts, Leybourne and Mills (1989] (eLM). The authors construct a 
revised index of industrial production for the UK for the years 1700-1913. Using 
state-space methods they fit various structural models to this series as well as to the 
original Hoffmann index from which it is derived and also to a third variant, concluding 
that 'there is no strong evidence against analysing the three series as though they are DS 
processes .. .'24 The 'underlying trends are stochastic rather than linearly deterministic'. 
However, 'conventional Box-Jenkins identification' of the implied reduced form yields 
an ARIMA(O,I,I) specification for all three series with constant trend growth rate and 
. no cyclical component.2S This is, in fact, 'at odds with the received historiography of the 
sample period and the generally accepted behaviour of series for industrial output'. 
ARlMA(2,1,3) and (2,2,4) specifications are also fitted. The first improves the fit but still 
imposes a constant trend component. The second, allowing both stochastic trend and 
24 (1989) p. 49. 
2Slbid., p. 55. 
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cycle components, has a worse fit but more favourable Q* statistics for a higher number 
of residual autocorrelations. The authors argue, following Harvey [1985], that 
such ... models are not intended as parsimonious representations of the underlying 
data generation process but aim to present the historiography of the series in 
temls of a decomposition into trend, cycle and irregular components. ([1989] p. 
56) 
Although these decompositions perhaps present a 'clear and intuitively sensible 
description of the evolution of industrial output during the 18th and 19th centuries', it 
is not possible to reject, from the evidence presented, alternative decompositions that may 
or may not have a cyclical component. 
Crafts and Harley [1992] pursue the problem of trend rates of growth in the 
nineteenth century. A revised estimate of industrial production shows a steadily rising 
growth rate to a maximum of about 3.5 percent in the 1840s, and thereafter a steady 
decline in growth to about 1.5 percent by the 1880s.26 Crafts and Mills [1995] consider 
the problem of structural breaks in the DGP for industrial production over the course of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the implications of these for calibrating 
trends. Tests for structural breaks 'strongly suggest that both the difference stationary and 
segmented linear trend stationary models are inadequate processes for explaining the 
behaviour of industrial production'.27 A more satisfactory representation is via a 
'segmented quadratic trend plus a shifting cyclical component'. The latter reflects inter 
alia the view that the 
growth process was disturbed by technological surprises which could change the 
trend rate of growth. ([1995] p. 20) 
Further comments on the diversity of 'cyclical' behaviour are given in Friedman 
[1986] and Dimsdale [1990]. Friedman, in a study of the financial markets and their 
relationship to business cycles in the United States, finds that structural changes in US 
2~is paper addresses the question of variations in growth rates in the UK since 1700, and the effect of revised estimates 
of these on the historiography of the industrial revolution. 
27[1995] p. 2. 
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financial markets render the search for recurrent quantitative relationships between real 
and monetary variables obscure and problematical. 'Qualitative' regularities - the 
'procyclical behavior of money, credit and interest rates' and evidence of the 'tendency 
of money and credit growth to "lead" real economic growth at major business cycle 
turning points' - have 'not corresponded to persistent regularities in the quantitative 
[emphasis in original] relationships that constitute the main focus of modern business 
cycle analysis'.28 Dimsdale, in an analysis of cycles in Britain since 1830, has similar 
problems of interpretation. The 
pre-1870 cycles differed from those which followed later in the century ... During 
the early cycles the recovery culminated typically in a domestic financial crisis as 
in 1839, 1847, 1857 and 1866. In the later cycles domestic financial disturbances 
played a much less important role on account of the increasing stability of the 
monetary system as indicated by the absence of major internal banking crises 
after 1870. ([1990] p. 154)29 
Shocks figure prominently in this author's perception of the cycle-phenomenon; e.g., from 
overseas financial crises in 1873 and 1907 and from the 'massive gold inflow' of the 
1890s.30 The general conclusion is that, like Friedman, the evidence points to a 'complex 
variety of shocks generating the British cycle'.31 
28 (1986) p. 396. 
2"1bis is certainly an overstatement. There were at least two more great bank failures in the UK: the City of Glasgow in 
1882 and Barings in 1890. 
30(1990) p. 176. Dimsdale also investigates the diversity of postwar 'cycles'. These are divided into four of the 'stop-go' 
variety and the two associated with Oil-price shocks, 1971-75 and 1979-81. A further 'distorted' cycle is thought to have 
occurred from 1961 to 1967. (See p. 180.) 
31lbid., p. 188. 
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5.3. SHORT-PERIOD FLUCTUATIONS: AN ATTEMPT AT OBJECI1VE ASSESSMENT 
Evidence for and against the existence of a general business-cycle phenomenon 
appears, at best, evenly balanced. The literature emphasizes the difficulties of 
identification, in both the technical and general senses, and it appears that short-period 
fluctuations may be dominated by non-recurring, episodic elements. Circularity is 
apparent in all analytical treatments up to Lewis's: the authors assume the existence of 
the business or trade cycle a priori and then make the evidence fit that view. The bias has 
been compounded over the years by Mitchell's hypothesis being taken as a 'definition'; 
and the analysis is further obscured by the use of 'judgment' in measuring the length of 
each episode, especially in the use of the 'reference cycle' as a base metric against which 
specific time-series evidence is evaluated. Even the 'optimal' estimating techniques 
associated with the fitting of structural models require identifying assumptions and 
restrictions on parameter spaces as, for example, in Harvey [1985], CLM and Harvey and 
Jaeger [1994]. As Harvey [1985] indeed argues, such exercises are intended to model 
'stylized facts' rather than underlying DGPS.32 
Mitchell argued that the concentration of turning points is a necessary condition 
for the existence of business cycles (though not, perhaps, a sufficient one); yet the 
admission of 'leading' and 'lagging' indicators implies some dispersion. This is the effect 
of Burns's 'unseen' cycle: stable leads and lags building to a concentration at the peaks 
and troughs of a 'general cycle'. Indeed, it is possible to have a species of 'cycle' whose 
turning points are completely dispersed: all that is required is regular frequencies for all 
variables, and with phase-shifts such that an equal number of variables reach peaks or 
troughs in each time period. The juxtaposition of the 'concentration' hypothesis with 
possible stable lead/lag relations is potentially contradictory for any empirical verification 
of business-cycle behaviour. Zarnowitz's correlation criteria are nowadays substituted for 
32 (1985) p. 225. 
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bare 'clustering', but as suggested by Stadler [1994], these may be misleading when 
applied to macroeconomic time series. 
Model-based methods may be more methodologically consistent than NBER 
procedure, for example, but are unfortunately not free of specification problems, 
especially given the comparatively low power of diagnostic tests associated with the 
Box-Jenkins selection technique.33 Structural models do not address this problem in the 
case of 'business cycles' because of the required identifying assumptions and parameter 
restrictions. Decompositions of the ARIMA type are perhaps more appropriate for 
identifying long-run variations in the data than they are for picking out short-period 
fluctuations, as the recent work of Crafts et al. seems to indicate. Whatever the formal 
technique, all model-based studies of business cycles rely on turning points in filtered or 
decomposed time series data to identify the empirical regularities of interest, e.g., 
duration, conformity, etc. The purpose of this section is to investigate short-period 
behaviour of turning points in time series that have been subject only to deflation and in 
some cases seasonal adjustment, and which thus have not had a priori restrictions or 
filters imposed on them. 
5.3.1. A Proposed Metric 
The obvious questions raised by all these doubts are (a) whether a more objective 
metric, not relying on specific priors, would validate the hypothesis of generalized 
comovements and (b) how such a metric might be defined. Would such an approach, 
when applied without restrictions, produce the relative concentration of 'peaks' and 
'troughs' in time series seen as a necessary condition? Alternatively, would it produce 
'unseen' cycles with stable timing relations? The Bry-Boschan algorithm filters out 'false 
signals' which, as has been shown in Chapter 4 above, gives rise to other anomalies. The 
weakness of existing technique is its circularity: specifically (a) in the imposition of a 
33Por a discussion of this point, see inter alia Harvey [1990] pp. 212-13 and Harvey (1981) Chapter 6, Section 2. 
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single set of reference dates on a whole macroeconomy and (b) in forcing both reference 
and specific peaks and troughs to alternate. An unrestricted version of Bry-Boschan 
would rather define turning points strictly as local time-series maxima or minima, as 
follows: 
a local maximum in a time series X, occurs iff (X,>max{x,-Ic>"',x/_/}) and 
(X/>max{X/+/, ... ,x/+k}); a local minimum occurs as above, but with 
>max{ ... } replaced by <min{ ... }. 
Multiple and non-alternating turning points need also to be defined for these purposes, 
as these cannot now be filtered out. For annual data, multiples occur when, for some t, 
Xt=Xl+l; and for quarterly data, when X,=X'+I and X,=X'+k' for some k. Plateaux and 
valleys in quarterly data would be captured by allowing k>t a range of values, i.e., 
X,=XI+I='" =X,+k' The sampling interval t is necessarily annual for pre-1914 data, but a 
matter of choice for the post-1945 period. Mitchell thought that the interval should be 
monthly, and this frequency has been observed with some difficulty by the NBER for US 
reference-cycle dating purposes. In the UK the CSO have recently abandoned monthly 
for quarterly reference tracking (although they are now reported to be developing a 
monthly GOP series). 
Macroeconomic data are subject to error, as acknowledged by every investigator 
who has ever tried to estimate them, whether contemporaneously or retrospectively. For 
example, the CSO post-1955 error estimates range from ±21f2 percent in the case of 
aggregates such as GDP to as much as ±71f2 percent for some other series.34 The problem 
is still more serious for pre-1914 data: not only have moving averages and other 
'adjustments' been imposed, but according to Feinstein [1972], serious additional types 
of error are inherent. In Section 1.4 of Chapter 1 he identifies at least five sources of 
error: (1) inaccuracies in the basic data; (2) mistakes in allocating constituents across 
more than one variable; (3) adapting data to serve an unsuitable purpose for which it was 
34See CSO United Kingdom National Accounts, Sources and Metlwds, HMSO, third edition. 
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never intended; (4) inaccurate estimates when no source data are available; and (5) 
inaccuracies introduced by the investigator.35 His 'bes t guess' at margins of error is given 
by the following table: 
Table 5.3.1. Feinstein's Reliability Estimates, 1855-1913 (± percent) 
Series 1890-1913 1870-1889 pre-1870 
Income from employment 5-15 15-25 15-25 
Income from self-employment 15-25 15-25 >25 
Gross trading prolits of companies 5-15 15-25 >25 
Rent 5-15 5-15 5-15 
Net property income from abroad 5-15 15-25 15-25 
Consumers' expenditure 5-15 15-25 -
Public authorities' current expenditure 5-15 5-15 
-
GDFCF 15-25 15-25 15-25 
Stocks and work in progress 15-25 15- 15 15-25 
Exports 5-15 5-15 15-25 
Imports 5-15 5-15 15-25 
Taxes on expenditure <5 5-15 
-
Source: Feinstein [1972] Table 1.9, p. 21 
There is, however, yet a further source of error in these estimates: in assessing their 
reliability Feinstein compares his GDP turning points with the NBER and Thorp [1926] 
chronologies and then 'adjusts' them to conform to the 'reference' dates. In practice this 
involves increasing or decreasing levels when the data clashes with descriptions in the 
Annals, the amounts varying from +£143 to -£78 million (±8 percent on average), while 
leaving average levels unchanged. Given the reliability of the Annals as discussed above, 
it would have been better to use the quantitative estimates to adjust the reference dates 
- in other words, to work the oth~r way round. Crafts and Harley [1992] also call their 
new UK industrial production index a 'best guess', acknowledging the difficulty of making 
35 (1972) pp. 19-20. 
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accurate estimates. Any inferences are thus subject to some uncertainty, and these will 
be greater at higher sampling frequencies because of possible contamination by noise. 
Quarterly frequencies have been chosen for the postwar period. If the expected 
concentration of turning points does not occur at quarterly frequencies it will certainly 
not be found in monthly series (and if indeed found at the lower sampling frequencies 
further analyses can then be carried out). The proposed algorithm does not force peaks 
and troughs to alternate, as does Bry-Boschan. No a priori reference dates are set. The 
value of k is unity for annual data, while for quarterly data, the value chosen should 
ensure that no two maxima or minima should be any closer than Mitchell's hypothetical 
minimum of about one year, i.e., k'O?2. Any shorter window length would pick up noise 
as well, whereas a longer length could exclude fluctuations of a single year's duration. 
Otherwise, calibrating k for quarterly data must have an empirical basis, an issue 
considered in Section 5.3.3 below. 
5.3.2. Description of the Available Data Sets 
In the interests of testing the comovement hypothesis, constituents of each 
aggregate should be available, as well as the aggregate itself. In order to determine how 
pervasive the movements are, price, real expenditure and output variables should be used, 
rather than relying, as for example, do the CSO, on such 'confidence' indicators as CBI 
survey data or other such proxies. Nineteenth century price data are available from UK 
Board of Trade statistics for the period 1871-1913, in both aggregate and constituent 
form. (The latest industrial production estimates of CLM and Crafts-Harley are not 
suitable because they are only published as aggregates.) Other sets for the pre-1914 UK 
economy are Feinstein's estimates of 13 industrial production, ten investment and six 
GNP (expenditure) series; Lewis's 15 industrial production, 15 GOP constituent, and 
eight commodity price series; and Beveridge's four industrial production series. Postwar 
data are available from official sources for the US and the UK. The ten US series, 
1947-1983, are given in the appendix to R.J Gordon (ed.) [1986]; while the 23 series that 
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have been selected from the CSO Database cover the longest available time period for 
the postwar quarterly UK GOP series -1955 to 1993. Details of these data sets are given 
in Appendix 5A. 
Feinstein's industrial production series are plotted in Figure 5.3.1; the Feinstein 
and Pollard investment series in Figure 5.3.2.36 Expenditure estimates of GNP and 
constituents are shown in Figure 5.3.3. Plots of Lewis's industrial production series are 
given in Figure 5.3.4; and his GDP components in Figure 5.3.5. The Board of Trade 
prices series are shown in Chapter 2 above and the UK and US postwar series in Chapter 
4. Lewis's price data for the same period are given in Figure 5.3.6. Inspection of the plots 
reveals diverse behaviour of the constituents, both in relation to each other and to the 
aggregate. A number of the Lewis GDP sectors have monotonic or virtually monotonic 
behaviour over the period 1852-1913. The Feinstein and Pollard investment series are 
volatile, as are Lewis's building and construction series. Feinstein's series for agricultural 
output shows fluctuations which at times appear random, and seems to reflect the effects 
of exogenous climatic factors. The one series showing 'business-cycle' behaviour 
(apparent stationarity, with short-period fluctuations dominating) is unemployment; but 
in this case, because it includes only statistics for trades union members, it is incomplete. 
(Railway investment looks stationary but perhaps heteroscedastic.) Price data show 
general falls to the mid-1890s, with rises thereafter; but prices are in general volatile. 
'Coherence' across series at low frequencies, associated with a 'trend' component, appears 
weak. 
5.3.3. Calibrating the Programmed Approach 
Because of the large number of data sets, computer programs have been written 
to find (unrestricted) turning points. Unfortunately, no such approach can be entirely free 
of assumptions. In this case, the shortest elapsed time between unlike turning points (i.e., 
36AII graphics for this chapter are shown in Appendix SB. 
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local maximum or minimum values) for annual data has been set at one year, and for like 
turning points, two years. This follows most of the existing research, but does not reject 
any turning points on non-mathematical criteria, and does not distinguish between 
'major' and 'minor' turning points. Multiples are also catered for, and are signalled in the 
output files. For quarterly data, the minimum window length is assumed to be four 
quarters (Le., the program searches ± two quarters from time t) following NBER practice 
and, if multiples, plateaux or valleys are encountered, they are signalled. A multiple peak 
or trough occurs in {X,} when X,=X'+l or X,=X'+2 and a plateaux or valley occurs when 
X,=Xt+l=X'+2' The idea is to approach as close as possible the accepted methods of 
finding these local extrema while avoiding subjective judgments or the Burns and Mitchell 
practice of 'weeding out'; and this, as will be shown in the results section, produces 
multiple turns in most of the quarterly series. 
The above values conform to the MBC 'definition' and could thus be criticized 
for circularity. However, turning points for the US GNP series 1947-1983 found by the 
program, employing the minimum window length of ± two quarters (shown in Table 
5.3.2) are remarkably similar to the NBER reference dates and those found by Hamilton 
[1989] and Romer [1992]. The number of turning points is the same with all methods for 
equivalent periods: differences in timing are minor, peaks and troughs naturally alternate, 
and no multiples are found by the program. The discrepancies in dates can probably be 
explained by the differing nature of the sources: the NBER dating committee do not have 
GNP data available when making their assessments, as described above in Chapter 3. 
Romer uses an industrial production index and Hamilton works in GNP growth rates. 
The exercise shows that, at least for the US GNP, the turning points found directly by the 
program are nearly the same as those found by 'indirect' methods. The window length 
is hence justified empirically, and has been used for all series in the study for comparative 
purposes. This result also quite strongly suggests that the 'indirect' dating procedures are 
tracking US aggregate fluctuations in levels (and perhaps growth-rate regimes as well) 
rather than comovements. 
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Table 5.3.2. Turning Points in the US 'Reference Cycle', GNP and Other Measures, 1947-1983 
NBER Romer 
(Year: Quarter) (Year: Quarter) 
Peaks Troughs Peaks 
1948:4 1949:4 1948:4 
1953:3 1954:2 1953:3 
1957:3 1958:2 1957:3 
1960:2 1961:1 1960:2 
1969:4 1970:4 1969:4 
1973:4 1975:1 1973:4 
1980:1 1980:3 1980:1 
1981:3 1982:4 1981:3 
Sources: 
NBER and Romer dates: Romer [1992] Table 2. 
Hamilton dates: Hamilton [1989] Table II. 
GNP: program output. 
Troughs 
1949:4 
1954:3 
1958:2 
1961:1 
1970:4 
1975:3 
1980:3 
1983:2 
Hamilton 
(Year: Quarter) 
Peaks Troughs 
NA NA 
1953:3 1954:2 
1957:1 1958:1 
1960:2 1960:4 
1969:3 1970:4 
1974:1 1975:1 
1979:2 1980:3 
1981:2 1982:4 
GNP (program) 
(Year: Quarter) 
Peaks Troughs 
1948:4 1949:2 
1953:2 1954:4 
1957:3 1958:1 
1960:1 1960:4 
1969:3 1970:1 
1973:4 1975:1 
1980:1 1980:2 
1981:3 1982:3 
Some idea of how the algorithm performs can be inferred from its findings of 
average 'cycle' length for the various series, or, in this case, the mean distance between 
peaks and troughs. For the main UK aggregates of Feinstein and Lewis, m.d.(peaks) and 
m.d.(troughs) are in the range four to six years, but with large sample standard deviations 
from, in all cases, very small samples. The GOP and industrial production specific-cycle 
lengths differ by about 33 percent. This may not be significant; if it is, however, it would 
indicate that specific fluctuations are not generally in phase. These results accord well 
with Kendall's findings and those in Rostow's later work, both of which show m.d.(peaks) 
of the order of five to 5114 years. Details are presented in Table 5.3.3. 
Although emphasis on the 'clustering' of turning points is complicated by the need 
to address the issue of leads and lags it nevertheless remains central. Clustering or 
'comovement' implies that the majority of series, both aggregates and constituents (apart 
from 'inverted' series such as unemployment), must have local maxima and minima in the 
same years. If such behaviour were observed in the actual data, the distribution of the 
number of years in the sample period for each annual turning point frequency would 
show a large number of years with no turning points, and some years in which all turning 
points are concentrated. Frequency distributions for annual data with perfect clustering 
are shown as histograms in Figure 5.3.7(a). The assumption is made of ten annual series 
with regular cycles over a 60-year sample period. All series reach peaks and trough in the 
same years; and distributions for four- , six- and eight-year cycles are shown. Thus, for 
example, for the four-year cycle the graph shows half the years (30) with zero turning 
points and half with ten - the maximum number. (Numbers of years for each frequency 
are shown on or above the bars.) To give effect to the possibility of lead/lag relations, a 
similar analysis for 16 series with eight-years cycles, showing clustered, dispersed and 
'unseen' cycle behaviour, is given in Figure 5.3.7(b). The assumption here is that in each 
half-cycle of four years the unseen cycle has one, two, five and eight turning points 
respectively, thus building to concentrations of half the total number of series at 
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four-year intelVals. (A perfectly uniform distribution of leads and lags over time would 
also produce the 'spiked' histogram indistinguishable from that of randomly-dispersed 
tuning points.) 
Table 5.3.3. UK Macroeconomic Series 1852-1913 
Distance between Peak and Troughs 
Series M.D.(peaks) M.D.(troughs) 
(Standard Devia tion) (standard Deviation) 
GDP (Lewis) 6.40 6.25 
(5.20) (3.23) 
Industrial Production (Lewis) 4.64 4.42 
(4.29) (2.90) 
Industrial Production (Feinstein) 4.20 5.56 
(3.60) (3.72) 
Manufacturing (Feinstein) 4.27 4.17 
(3.89) (2.61) 
For quarterly data the distribution is slightly more complicated because 
assumptions must be made about the incidence of turning points within the year. An 
example of this is shown in Figure 5.3.8 for 16 series over a 120-quarter sample period 
with a four-year cycle. Distributions are shown for the following assumed behaviour: (1) 
all series turn in the third quarter of years in which turns occur; (2) half the series turn 
in the second and third quarters respectively; and (3) five series turn in quarters II and 
III, and three in quarters I and IV. In this case the graph also shows the frequency with 
no clustering (i.e., with an equal number of turns in all quarters of the sample period). 
5.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the analysis of unrestricted turning-point 
incidences for the data sets listed in Appendix SA. Section 5.4.1 shows the frequency 
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distributions of turning points per period, while Section 5.4.2 analyses lead!Iag relations 
within data sets and across aggregates. 
5.4.1. Turning-Point Frequency Distributions 
The summaries of the turning point frequencies for nine annual UK data sets for 
the pre-1914 period are shown in Figures 5.4.1 to 5.4.10. For purposes of comparison, 
distributions for systematic behaviour - clustered and dispersed - for the same number 
of series over the same sample period are also given by way of comparison, with the 
assumption of a four-year cycle.37 Although these data sets are diverse in character, most 
have comparatively flat distributions, truncated at the upper end. These distributions 
indicate the most important feature of empirical behaviour: that the numbers of 
(unrestricted) turning points varies markedly in series from the same data set and across 
data sets: the 'extra' or 'missing' turns commonly 'weeded out'. Some pre-1914 series 
have instances of multiple peaks and troughs, though not occurring frequently enough to 
alter the general results, as shown in Figure 5.4.11 for the Feinstein GNP expenditure 
series. The latter are also analysed for the period 1948-1980, and show a similar pattern 
of turning points (Figure 5.4.12), but no extra turns are found. With the exception of US 
GNP, all the UK and US postwar quarterly series have non-alternating turning points 
and multiple peaks and troughs. Distributions are shown both with and without these 
anomalies in Figures 5.4.13 to 5.4.16, with systematic behaviour shown for a four-year 
cycle. As above, assumptions are made about the pattern of turning points in the quarters 
of the year. For the eleven US series, all turns are assumed to cluster in quarter III of 
the given year; whereas for the 23 UK series, double the number, turns are assumed to 
be spread equally over quarters II and III. Again, the number of multiple turns in each 
sample is not sufficient to change the result: both sets appear to show behaviour similar 
to the annual series for the earlier period. 
37 
Where the length of the cycle does not divide the number of series the dispersion of turning points is imperfect, since 
the number of turning points is an integer function. 
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5.4.2. Analysis of Leads and Lags 
Ever since the Burns and Mitchell 1938 study of leading indicators, the 
identification of stable timing relations among variables, leading, coincident or lagging, 
has been among the principal concerns of empirical business-cycle research. The 
necessary condition for such leadllag behaviour, that all series have equal numbers of 
turning points so that direct comparisons can be made, is not found empirically in any 
of the data sets in the present study, as can be seen from the first columns of Tables 
5.4.2(a) to 5.4.8(a). As the above frequency distributions reveal, different series have 
'extra', 'missing' or multiple peaks and troughs - the problem earlier identified by Bry 
and Boschan - and this applies both across aggregates and between aggregates and their 
constituent series. It is a familiar result in historical business-cycle research: for example, 
Aldcroft and Fearon found 22 turning points in UK GNP against 25 in industrial 
production for the period 1836-1913.38 
This section analyses pre-1914 and post-1945 time-series data for evidence of 
stable leads and lags between aggregates and their supporting series. As these are defined 
only when both series have the same number of peaks and troughs, and as such behaviour 
is seldom found in the 'real world', two approaches are employed here. The first 
evaluates pairwise conformity of turns when none are excluded; the second analyses 
timing relations when the 'extra', non-equivalent, turns in the noisier series are edited 
out. ('Conformity' is here defined in a narrow sense: those turning points that either 
coincide or else occupy the same positions in their respective sequences.)39 The latter 
approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, because non-conformity is the rule rather 
than the exception empirically; and second, because the search for conforming turns 
requires some degree of subjective 'judgment' and is therefore likely to induce 'observer 
bias'. Thus the 'editing' of turning points must be treated with caution: it was the 
3s,ne series in question were taken from Feinstein [1972]. pp. 9, 12. 
3~e series with the smallest number of turning points is taken as a reference. and the turns in the other series which 
most closely coincide with these reference turns are retained. Coincident turns in the two series are thus emphasized. 
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approach employed by both Mitchell and Beveridge with disappointing and ambiguous 
consequences. 
Results for nineteenth century (annual) data are shown in Tables 5.4.1 to 5.4.5. 
The wide variation in numbers of unedited turning points make them poor 
contemporaneous predictors of peaks and troughs in the aggregates. Turning points for 
Feinstein's GNP expenditure series and its consumers expenditure constituent (whose 
value is approximately 80 percent of the aggregate) are given for the period 1830-1913 
in Table 5.4.1. Consumption is somewhat smoother than GNP over this period (see plot 
in Figure 5.4.17). With the first (unedited) approach the proportion of coincident turning 
points is 0.5, or approximately that which would occur randomly (because in this case 
there are no instances of lags); and the proportion of leads is 0.14.40 Because of the 
different number of turns, the 'odds' on the turns being equivalent are about 0.6 (Le., 
22/36). Differences in 'smoothness' can be indicated by the average amplitude and 
duration of downturns (i.e., from peaks to troughs). The average decline is approximately 
4 % times greater in GNP than in consumption; and the average duration of downturns 
is about 30 percent greater. 
This result suggests a lack of system in timing relations which is reflected in other 
data sets. Examples of these are Feinstein's aggregates, industrial production and 
investment series, 1855-1913 (Tables 5.4.2(a) to 5.4.4(a»; and the Board of Trade 
commodity price series, 1871-1913 (Table 5.4.5(a». With their turning points unedited 
few show a score sufficiently high to classify them as indicators of the aggregate. When 
the second approach is applied, peaks and troughs in GNP (expenditure) and 
consumption coincide in about 80 percent of occurrences; but this is exceptional. For 
other nineteenth century data, shown in tables 5.4.2(b) to 5.4.5(b), there is no strong 
evidence of consistent timing relations across the variables. The exceptions are 
manufacturing and transport and communications (Table 5.4.4(b », both of which coincide 
40ne proportions are calculated by scoring + 1 for a coincidence, lead or lag, and 0 otherwise. 'Extra' turning points are 
scored as O's. The proportion is then the arithmetic mean of the sequence of zeros and units. 
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with the industrial production aggregate in about 80 percent of cases; and food and drink 
prices (Table 5.4.5(b», with a 'hit rate' of 74 percent. In the latter case, because the 
series has the same number of (unedited) turns as the aggregate, it is the only adequate 
natural coincident indicator of all the pre-1914 series tested. 
The postwar data sets, shown in Tables 5.4.6, 5.4.7 and 5.4.8, reveal similar 
non-systematic behaviour. US variables tend to have as few as two-thirds and as many 
as 2% times the number of turning points as GNP, which makes them even less effective 
contemporaneous predictors than UK series. When restricted to equivalent peaks and 
troughs, turns tend to be evenly spread among coincidences, leads and lags. Only exports, 
whose lags are 71 percent of the total, and durable goods, with 64 percent leads, 
approach consistency. UK variables are similar, but with the proportions of leads, lags 
and coincidences even more evenly spread for equivalent turns (Table 5.4.7(b». UK 
industrial production series show a reasonably close coincidence between total 
manufacturing and the aggregate, and a leading relationship between the aggregate and 
transport and communication (Table 5.4.8(b». However, even though these two series 
have the same number of unedited peaks and troughs, these are not all equivalent: for 
example, the peaks in manufacturing in 1961, 1965 and 1978, the peak in production in 
1973, and trough in manufacturing 1979, and in production in 1985, are not matched in 
the other series (shown in bold type in Table 5.4.9). 
As a rule, behaviour changes over time, as can be seen from tables 5.4.10,5.4.11 
and 5.4.12. Both US and UK variables (in both periods) tend to show unpredictable 
movements from leads to coincidences to lags. The length of leads and lags can be 
volatile, as shown in the examples of pairwise timing relations for postwar UK and US 
quarterly time series (Figures 5.4.18 to 5.4.30). Most leads and lags fall within ±4 
quarters for the US data, but in four of the comparisons rise to as much as ±9 quarters. 
The UK is more volatile, with leads or lags as great as 15 quarters. Both economies have 
unstable timing relations, moving from leads to coincidences to lags. When common 
turning points among more than two variables are considered, the analysis breaks down. 
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In the UK, for example, only one conforming turning point (in 1979) was found for five 
industrial production series: the aggregate, total manufacturing, construction, distribution 
and transport and communication. 
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Table 5.4.1. !Wal GNP (Expenditure) and Consumption Turning Points, 1830-1913 
GNP Consumption 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
1831 1832 - -
1836 1837 1836 1837 
1839 1842 1839 1842 
1846 1847 1846 1847 
1849 1850 1849 1850 
1857 1858 1854 1855 
1859 1860 1857 1858 
1871 1872 - -
1874 1877 - -
1878 1879 1878 1879 
1880 1881 1880 1881 
1884 1885 - -
1891 1893 1891 1892 
1896 1897 - -
1899 1900 1899 1900 
1901 1903 - -
1907 1908 1907 1908 
1911 1912 - -
Total Thrning Points: 36 TOlal Thrning Points: 22 
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Table 5.4.2. TIming Relations, Feinstein's UK Aggregates 1855-1913'1 
(a): Unedited (b): Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate of: Proportion to Aggregate of: 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags 
Thming Points 
GNP (expenditure) 27 
Consumers expenditure 14 035 0.19 0.00 0.64 036 0.00 
Industrial production 14 031 0.15 0.08 057 0.29 0.14 
Investment 15 0.00 0.27 031 0.00 050 050 
Unemployment 19 0.19 0.19 031 0.28 0.28 0.44 
41Source: Feinstein [1972). 
Table 5.4.3. TIming Relations, Feinstein and Pollard Investment Series 1855-1913 
(a): Unedited (b): Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate Proportion to Aggregate 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags 
Thrning Points 
Manufacturing investment 15 0.40 0.13 0.47 0.40 0.13 0.47 
Railway investment 17 0.21 026 0.21 031 038 0.31 
Agricultural investment 13 0.16 0.26 0.11 030 050 0.20 
Investment in dwellings 19 032 0.14 0.09 058 0.25 0.17 
Mining and quarrying investment 18 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.18 036 0.45 
Distributive investment 8 0.18 0.18 0.00 051 050 0.00 
Transport and Communication 25 0.20 0.40 0.00 033 0.67 0.00 
investment 
-
Table 5.4.4. Timing Relations, Feinstein's Industrial Production Series 1855-1913 
(a): Unedited (b) : Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate of: Proportion to Aggregate of: 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags 
Thrning Points 
All Industries 14 
Manufacturing 22 059 0.00 0.05 0.85 0.07 0.07 
Chemicals 18 0.20 035 0.05 033 033 033 
Metals 26 0.19 0.19 0.15 036 036 0.28 
Engineering 22 035 0.22 0.43 057 036 0.07 
Textiles 25 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.42 029 0.29 
Food 22 032 0.09 023 050 0.14 036 
Other Manufacturing 12 050 0.06 0.06 0.80 0.10 0.10 
Building 20 0.40 0.20 0.10 057 0.29 0.14 
T ransport and Communications 10 057 0.14 0.00 0.80 020 0.00 
Table 5.4.5. TIming Relations, Board of Trade Price Series 1871-1913 
(a): Unedited (b): Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate of: Proportion to Aggregate of: 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags 
Turning Points 
Aggregate 20 
Textiles 20 0.40 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.50 0.10 
Coal 14 035 0.10 0.24 0.50 0.14 036 
Food and Drink 19 0.70 0.05 0.20 0.74 0.05 0.21 
Miscellaneous Materials 15 050 0.20 0.05 0.79 0.21 0.00 
Corn 17 038 029 0.05 050 038 0.06 
Table 5.4.6. Timing Relations, US MacroecoTWmic Time Series 1947-1983 
(a): Unedited (b): Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate of: Proportion to Aggregate of: 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags I 
Turning Points 
GNP 14 
Producers durable equipment 26 0.19 0.00 035 036 0.00 0.64 
Residential structures 24 0.13 0.29 0.17 0.21 050 0.29 
Nonresidential structures 25 0.15 0.04 0.26 033 0.08 058 
Durable goods 36 0.03 0.25 0.11 0.07 0.64 029 
Nondurable goods 9 0.21 029 0.07 038 050 0.13 
Government expenditure 21 0.00 033 033 0.00 050 050 
Exports 30 0.07 0.07 033 0.14 0.14 0.71 
Imports 33 0.09 0.18 0.15 021 0.43 036 
Table 5.4.7. TIming Relations, UK Macroeconomic TIme Series 1955-1993 
(a): Unedited (b): Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate of: Proportion to Aggregate of: 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags I 
Thrning Points 
GDP 23 
Retail sales 30 0.17 0.14 0.20 033 0.28 039 
Industrial production 31 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.45 030 0.25 
Government final consumption 36 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.14 036 050 
Total manufacturing 31 031 0.14 0.09 058 0.26 0.16 
Vacancies at job centres 49 0.02 0.12 0.25 0.05 030 0.65 
Table 5.4.8. Timing Relations, UK Industrial Production Series 1955-1993 
(a): Unedited (b): Edited 
Proportion to Aggregate of: Proportion to Aggregate of: 
Series Number of Coincidences Leads Lags Coincidences Leads Lags 
Thrning Points 
Aggregate 31 
Total manufacturing 31 054 0.06 020 0.70 0.07 0.22 
Engineering 40 037 0.05 023 057 0.07 036 
Chemicals 23 0.22 0.1 1 0.17 0.44 0.22 033 
Textiles 40 024 037 0.12 033 050 0.17 
Construction 32 0.08 026 032 0.12 0.40 0.48 
Distribution 23 0.11 026 0.17 021 0.47 032 
Transport and communication 21 0.13 038 0.13 020 0.60 020 
Table 5.4.9. UK Industrial Production and Manllfacturing: Turning Point.s 1955- / 992 
Industrial Production Total Manufactu ring 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
19580 3 195803 
1961Q2 
196101 
196104 196201 196201 
19620 3 19620 3 
... ... ... .. . 
1965Ql 
19660 3 196601 
19660 4 196604 
.. . ... ... .. . 
197201 197201 
1973Q3 
197401 197401 
... ... ... .. . 
197703 197703 
1978Q3 1979Ql 
197901 19790 2 
... ... ... ... 
19850 2 1985Q4 19890 2 
19900 2 19900 2 
(Not all turning points are shown; gaps are indicated by ellipses. Non- equivalent turning points are shown in bold type.) 
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Table 5.4.10. Feinstein's Aggregates: Changes in Timing against GNp, 1855-1913 
Variab le Period Relation 
Consumers Expenditure 1855-1860 Leading 
(1860-1878 No turning points in either series) 
1878-1891 Coincident 
1891-1898 No turns 
1898-1913 oincident 
Industrial Production 1855-1858 Coincident 
1858-1878 Leading 
1878-1902 Alternate leading and lagging 
1902-1913 oincident 
Investment 1855-1877 Leading 
1877-1883 Lagging 
1883-1886 Leading 
1886-1913 Lagging 
Unemployment 1855-1865 Alternate coincident, leading and 
lagging 
1865-1872 Leading 
1872-1886 Lagging 
1886-1900 Alternate coincident, leading and 
lagging 
1900-1906 lagg ing 
1906-1913 Coincident 
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Table 5.4.11. US Data: Changes in Timing against GNp, 1947- 1983 
Variable Period Relation 
Producers Durable Equipment 1948-1958 Alternating leads, lags and 
coincidences 
1958-1969, 1970- 1975 Lagging 
1969, 1980 Coincident 
Nonresidential structures 1948-1960 Lagging 
1960-1992 Alternating 
Durable Goods 1948- 1958 Leading 
1958- 1961 Lagging 
1961-1982 Alternating 
Nondurable Goods 1947- 1983 Alternating 
Government Expenditure 1948- 1957 Lagging 
1957- 1970 Coincident 
1970- 1982 Alternating (Ieadllag) 
Exports 1947-1954 Lagging 
1954- 1960 Alternating (coincidenl/lead) 
1960- 1983 Lagging 
Imports 1947- 1983 Alternating 
Table 5.4.12. UK Data: Changes in Timing against GDp, 1955- 1992 
Variable Period Type 
Retail Sales 1955- 1992 Alternating 
Industrial Production 1955- 1957 Leading 
1957- 1962 Lagging 
1962- 1992 Alternating (coincidenl/lead) 
Goverrunent Expenditure 1956-1974 Alternating 
1974-1992 Lagging 
Total Mfg. 1955-1992 Alternating 
Vacancies at Job Centres 1956-1962 Alternating 
1962-1985 Lagging 
1985-1992 Alternating (Ieadllag) 
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5.5. SHOCKS, STRUCTIJRAL CHANGES AND SUBJECIlVE ASSESSMENTS 
This section attempts to assess the issue of the recurrence of fluctuations (a) by 
showing evidence of structural change in the US and UK economies over time (which 
raises questions of comparability across episodes), and (b) by comparing time-series data 
with Thorp's annals for the period 1855-1913. 
5.5.1. Structural Changes over the Sample Periods 
The industrial economies were growing at a rapid, albeit uneven, rate during the 
half-century up to 1914. Structural changes which occurred can be thought of in three 
main categories: changes in regime, qualitative and quantitative changes. Regime changes 
in the UK are evident e.g. in agriculture, with the repeal of the Corn Laws, in trade with 
the general lowering of tariffs and in the increasing stability of the banking system after 
1870. Quantitatively, sectoral shares in total output varied considerably, and such changes 
give an indication of the evolution of economic structure. As discussed by Crafts and 
Mills [1995], there were also structural instabilities in nineteenth century UK growth rates 
which are 'unlikely to be characterized by a single shift in a linear trend function'. 
Qualitative changes occurred in technology, e.g., in faster and more productive land and 
sea transport and in the mechanization of manufacturing industry. This process has been 
described in the above paper as the effect of 'technological surprises which could change 
the trend rate of growth' but which are not 'fully endogenous'. The revolutionary 
'macroinventions', those which emerged cab nihilo', produced initial productivity shocks; 
but the development process for a given technology, the 'microinventions', was subject 
to diminishing returns, which meant that the effects of growth innovations would 
eventually damp out. 
For quantitative assessments, sectoral shares of total UK output are available for 
the pre-1914 period (Lewis), and for the post-1950 period in the annual Blue Book 
estimates. Additionally, shares of total investment in the UK have been calculated by 
Feinstein and Pollard for the period 1855-1913. Most of these data are in current prices, 
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and so comparisons over time are shown in percentage terms. Table 5.5.1 gives the 
proportions of GDP for the period 1852-1912 at decennial intervals from Lewis [1978]. 
The largest fa ll was in agricu lture, from about 20 percent in 1852 to less than seven 
percent in 1913, the importance of which on employment and geographical consumption 
patterns cannot be over-estimated. The share of the distributive industries grew by about 
one-quarter over the period. Manufacturing, which already accounted for 26 pe rcent in 
1852, grew by nearly 30 pe rcent in share of total output (from 26 to 34 percent). Income 
from rents, the mainstay of the middle class according to Keynes, fe ll by three-eights in 
share from a base level of about 13 percent in 1852. Such shifts in the proportions of 
output, together with changes in the size and longevity of the population, and in 
technology and infrastructure make comparisons over more than a ~ w years 
problematical; and certainly suggest that to treat the entire period as a sample from a 
single population is stretching a point if not testing it to destruction.42 
Table 5.5.1. Lewis's UK GDP onsliluenl Series 
Percent of GDP at Decennia/Intervals 1852-1912 
Series 1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 
Manufacturing 26.0 27.4 31.0 32.6 31.3 32.5 33.8 
and mining 
Distribution 12.8 13.6 14.7 15.2 15.6 15.7 16.1 
Rent 13.0 11 .8 10.6 9.9 9.4 8.5 8.1 
Construction 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.1 3.7 5.1 3.1 
Transport of 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 
Goods 
Professions 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.7 5.3 5.4 5.9 
Agricu lture 19.7 17.0 13.4 10.7 10.1 7.9 6.7 
Table 5.5.2 shows the changes in sectoral shares of total UK investme nt to 1913. 
The figures confirm the impression of rapid change, but here the shares of the total are 
volatile, with only railway and agricultural investment showing persistent declines . In the 
period since 1945, shown in Table 5.5.3, agriculture has continued to decline, but so has 
42 
Cf. the Rostow [1 972] assessmen t of structural changes in the UK economy up to 1914. 
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manufacturing, by about 35 percent in share. The public and financial selVices sectors 
have grown by 175 and 600 percent respectively, wh ile the selVice sectors appear to have 
maintained relatively stable shares. 
Table 5.5.2. Feinsleil! and Pollard UK GDFCF Series 
Percell I of Tolal al DecelJllialllllcfVals 1853-/ 913 
Series 1853 1863 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913 
Manufacturing 21.5 173 16.8 14.6 18.4 253 25 .2 
Transport and 11.2 14.5 14 .3 23.2 16.7 17.5 26.9 
Communication 
Railway 16.8 233 14.4 153 12.9 9.0 7.0 
Investment 
Dwellings 22.9 15.1 203 19.6 19.5 19.1 8.1 
Agriculture 13.0 13.6 10.2 9.8 7 .5 4.3 5.7 
Public Se rvice 3.6 5 .2 7.0 6.5 10.4 8.1 7.1 
Distribu tion 4.0 5.6 9.0 6.0 8.6 6.9 9.4 
Gas, Water and 4.6 2 .8 2.9 3.6 5 .3 7.9 5.1 
Electricity 
Mining 2.4 2.6 5.4 1.5 0 .9 2 .0 5.6 
Table 5.5.3. UK GDP Constituent Estimates 
Percent of TOlal al Dece"niaiinlervals 1952-1992 
Series 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 
Manufacturing 34.5 34.2 3 1.2 25.8 223 
Publ ic Sector 9.9 10.1 13.0 16.0 17.3 
Financia l Services 2.6 3.4 7 .9 11 .7 16.4 
Mining and Quarrying 3.7 3.0 1.4 7.4 1.9 
Agriculture 5.6 3.9 2.8 23 1.8 
Distribution 12.6 11.9 11.1 12.9 14.1 
Transport and COllllllunication 8.7 8.4 8.4 7.5 8.1 
Construction 5.5 6.4 7.8 6.0 6.2 
5.5.2. Shocks and Annals 
Mitchell's reference dates, were largely derived from Thorp's Annals and do not 
correspond all that well with the historical data sets. F igure 5.5.1 shows Lewis's GDP 
series for the UK with the years of acknowledged crisis and Thorp's years of 'depression' . 
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In general, a crisis was followed by a depressed sequence wherein the level of GDP 
tended to decline for a few years thereafter, but this was not universal. 1873 was a crisis 
year and one of strong growth, and after 1857 growth continued with a one-year 
interruption of small magnitude. Volatility increases in magnitude over time, but some 
of the 'depressed' years have strong growth. Figure 5.5.2 shows the same analysis for the 
Crafts-Harley [1992] industrial production series from 1811 to 1913. Again, volatility 
increases in the latter period, but here growth is strong throughout, and increasing. The 
depressed years show less conformity with industrial production, but it must be 
remembered that up to 1900, this represented less than half of total output. 
The conformity with constituent series is even less persuasive than with the 
aggregates. For Feinstein's GDP series, his aggregate industrial production and its 
constituents from 1855 to 1913, only about half conform to Thorp's years of economic 
stress, i.e., of 'recession' or 'depression'. ('Conformity' here is defined by the series 
having an annual change in levels of + 1.0 percent or less in those years.) However, 87 
percent conform in prosperous years. This is either an indication of the known 
asymmetries associated with persistent economic growth, as analysed in Chapter 4 above, 
or perhaps of the 'adjustments' made by Feinstein to conform to Thorp. Conditions in 
a little less than half (42 percent) of these years were stressful, which is another 
indication of asymmetry but not a very strong one. Significantly, all the distressed years 
had rising unemployment according to the Feinstein index (i.e., rising among trades union 
members). As previously discussed, prices and profits fell until about the mid-1890s with 
the same persistence with which real activity tended to rise, and contemporary opinion 
about conditions seems to have been decisively influenced by these nominal factors. 
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5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has attempted to assess whether directly-observable quantitative 
evidence supports the comovement hypothesis; or alternatively, whether such fluctuations 
are unique historical episodes without a kernel of empirical regularities. The postwar 
historical literature, which deals in the main with the nineteenth century UK economy, 
initially assumed that the nature of short-run fluctuations was as described by Burns and 
Mitchell and by Beveridge. Matthews and Hughes, in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
questioned their 'pervasiveness'; Aldcroft and Fearon found different numbers of turning 
points in two UK aggregates, suggesting a lack of conformity in short-run dynamics. 
Rostow, who originally accepted the traditional historiography, by the 1970s also had 
second thoughts about the generality of such behaviour, finding, for example, 
contradictory conditions during the 'Great Depression' of the late nineteenth century. He 
concluded that fixing a business-cycle chronology requires considerable exercise of 
'judgment' because the 'points of demarcation' are 'untidy'; and that furthermore, the 
marked structural changes over the period 1790-1914 made comparisons across episodes 
difficult. 
Eichengreen in the 1980s pointed out the circularity of argument in all discussions 
of 'business cycles' and presented a model which also indicated structural change in the 
late nineteenth century. Such scepticism is also evident in later research by inter alia 
Friedman, Solomou and Dimsdale. The work of Crafts et af. is as much about the 
(considerable) structural changes in growth rates over the course of the nineteenth 
century as about short-run 'cycles'. The CLM analysis of cycles is limited to three 
estimates of aggregate industrial production. It is not clear whether the same structural 
model fitted to a different aggregate - GDP, for example -would produce a conforming 
turning-point chronology. 
The main results given in Section 5.4 are in accord with much that is at least 
implicit in the historical literature. There is a wide variation in numbers of turning points 
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across many economic time series when these are found objectively. This is the essential 
difference between 'real-world' behaviour and the behaviour of unobserved-components 
models. It applies both to nominal and to real series and accounts for the comparatively 
flat histograms shown in Figures 5.4.1 to 5.4.16. The subjective assessment of business 
conditions, Thorp's Annals, which was the basis of the NBER 'reference' chronology, is 
not supported by recent time-series estimates. Even the presence of deliberate bias 
towards conformity with existing reference dates - as in Lewis's and Feinstein's data -
does not yield strong evidence of comovements. Timing relations are volatile, with most 
constituents showing a mixture of lags, coincidences and leads, and with the lengths of 
leads and lags also showing wide variation; this result despite the editing of turning points 
which emphasizes conformity. Evidence of structural change reinforces the view of an 
episodic rather than recurrent nature of short-run fluctuations. 
The difficulty with all such inferences is that the data are inaccurately estimated 
in the sense discussed by Feinstein [1972]. Apart from prices, they may even be too 
inaccurate to be of any use in finding turning points, owing to the magnitude of the 
published margins of error. This, however, represents a counsel of perfection; in the 
current instance the similarity of turning-point behaviour in a large number of data sets 
gives at least an indication of divergence which cannot be completely ignored. Likewise 
the general instabilities in timing relations must be tentatively acknowledged. Whether 
more accurate data would confirm or deny such irregularities is moot. However, the 
similarity of results across data sets suggests, subject to the above 'health warning', that 
the comovement hypothesis, as proposed on page 3 of MBe, and on which subsequent 
business-cycle research has largely been based, is not supported by time-series data. 
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APPENDIX SA 
D ETAILS OF DATA S ETS 
De tails of each empirica l data s tare as follows: 
Table SA . I. Feinsteill 's UK Constituent Series 1855-19/3 
Macroeconomic43 Investment (GDFCF)44 
Aggregate industrial producti on Agriculture 
Agricultural output Mining and quarrying 
Constructi on Manufacturing 
Chemica l industries Gas, water and electricity 
Distributive trades Distribution and other services 
Engineering industries Railways 
Food processing Other transport and communica ti ons 
Gas generation Public and social ervices 
Metal industri es Dwell ings 
Total manufacturing Aggrega te GDF F 
Mining and quarrying 
Other industri es 
Transport and communica tion 
T extiles 
Unemployment 
Gross domestic product 
GNP 1830-1913 and 1948-1 98OU 
R eal GNP (expenditure) at market 
prices 
Consumers expenditure 
Public authoriti es current expenditure 
Value of physica l increase in stocks 
Net exports 
GDFCF 
4JSource: Feinstein (1972). 
44Source: Feinstein and Pollard (1988). Append ix Table IX. 
4SSource: Mitchell [1 988) 'National Accounts 6'. pp. 837-844. 
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Table 5A .2. Lewis's UK Macroecolwmic Series 1852-191346 
GDP Seri es lndustrial Production Seri es 
Aggrega te Aggregate 
Agriculture Iron and steel 
Manufacturing and mining Iron and steel products 
Construction hipbuilding 
Shipping Building materials and construction 
Transport of goods Houses 
Transport of people ommercial building 
Distribution Other construction 
Finance Clothing 
Professions Textile fin ishing 
Ca tering Printing and materials 
Domestic service hemicals 
Government Electricity 
Defence Food manufacture 
Rent Gas 
Miscellaneous services 
Table 5A.3. Price Series 1871 - 191:r7 
Lewis [1978] 
Manufactured goods 
Wheat 
Cotton 
Wool 
Coffee 
Tropical crops 
Cereals 
Freights 
46Source: Lewis (1978), Appendix I, Tables A1 and A 3. 
47Source: Mitchell [1988) hapter XlV, Table 5. 
Boa rd of Trade 
Wholesa le aggrega te 
Food and drink 
Textiles 
oa l 
Miscellaneous materials 
Com 
Animal products 
Sugar 
Wine 
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Table 5A.4. Central Statistical Office Real Quarterly Macroeconomic Series 
1957-199jM 
Series CSO 
Identifier 
GDP DKHJ 
Index of output: agriculture CKAP 
Index of output: distribution, hotels and catering CKAQ 
Index of output: transport and communication CKAR 
Index of output: other services CKAS 
Index of output: total service industries CKCE 
Index of output: construction DVJO 
Total production DVZI 
Mining and quarrying DVZJ 
Total manufacturing DVZK 
Food, drink and tobacco DVZL 
Textiles, clothing and footwear DVZM 
Fuels DVZN 
Chemicals and man-made fibres DVZO 
Engineering industries DVZQ 
Other manufacturing DVZR 
Gas, electricity and water supply DVZS 
New car registrations DKBY 
General government fina l consumption DIAT 
Level of manufacturing stocks DKCl 
Manufacturing investment DKCK 
Retail sales volume FAAM 
Vacancies at job centres BeOM 
48Source: eso Databank, July 1994. 
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Table 5A.5. Official US Macroeconomic Series 
1947-198~9 
GNP 
Changes in business inventories 
Durable goods consumption 
Non-durable goods consumption 
Residenti al structures 
Non-residential structures 
Producers durable equipment 
Exports 
Imports 
Government purchases 
49Source: RJ. Gordon (cd.) [1 986) Appendix B. 
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Figure 5.3.1. Feinstein 's UK Industrial Production Series 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.3.2. The Feinstein and Pollard Investment Series 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.3.2 (Continued) 
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Figure 5.3.3(a). Feinstein's GNP (Expenditure) Estimates (1830-1913) 
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Figure 5.3.3(b). Feinstein's GNP (Expenditure) Estimates 1948-1980 (1980 Prices) 
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Figure 5.3.4. Lewis's Industrial Production Series 1852-1913 
Aggregate industrial Iron products 
129 production 129 
99 
69 
39 
9 9 
1879 1899 1919 1879 1899 1919 
129 Iron and steel 169 Building Materials 
and construction 
99 129 
69 
1879 1899 1919 1879 1899 1919 
COMMercial huilding 129 CheMicals 
1879 1899 1919 1879 1899 1910 
246 
Figure 5.3.4 (Continued) 
Clothing Food processing 
129 129 
99 
69 
39 
9 9 
1879 1899 1919 1879 1899 1919 
House building Pl'inting and Materials 
159 and repair 129 
1879 1899 1919 1879 1899 1919 
249 Other construction 129 Textile finishing 
1875 1895 1915 1879 1899 1919 
247 
2599 GDP 
2999 
.1599 
.1999 
..1999 
369 Distribution 
279 
.189 
99 
9L'-------------L------------~--------
99 
60 
30 
~999 
T:ransport o£ 
peopl.e 
9
L
' ____________ -L ____________ -4 ______ __ 
~990 
Figure 5.3.5. Lewis's UK CDP Series 1852-1913 
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Figure 5.3.5 (Continued) 
PlC'oCessions CatelC'ing 
69 
49 
29 
9 
.1999 1990 
DeCence. ~89 Rent 
159 
129 
99 
1999 1999 
J.69 
J.59 
J.29 
69' 
J.59 
J.29 
99 
69~ 
P:rice o£ 
Manu£actu:res 
J.899 J.9.1.9 
Wool 
J.899 J.9J.9 
Ce:reals 
V~-
J.899 J.9J.9 
Figure 5.3.6. Lewis's UK Price Series 1871-1913 
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Figure 5.3.7 (a). Frequency Distributions, Annual Data: Perfect Clustering of Turning Points 
Hypothetical Four-, Six- and Eight-year Cycles, Ten Series, 60-year Sample Period 
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Figure 5.3.7(b). Frequency Distributions, Annual Data, Various Turning-Point Incidences 
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Figure 5.3.B. Frequency Distributions, Quarterly Data: 16 Series, Four-year Cycle 
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Figure 5.4.1. Beveridge's UK Industrial Production Series 1785-1913: Turning Point Frequencies 
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Figure 5.4.2. Feinstein's 13 UK Industrial Production Series 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.4.3. Feinstein's 12 UK GDP Series 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.4.4. Feinstein and Pollard Ten UK Investment Series 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.4.5. Feinstein (and Pollard) Industrial Production and Investment Series 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.4.6. Lewis's UK Industrial Production Series 1852-1913 
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Figure 5.4.7. Seven Lewis UK GDP Constituent Series with Fluctuations 1852-1913 
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Figure 5.4.8. Lewis's Commodity Price Series 1852-1913 
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Figure 5.4.9. Board of Trade UK Price Series 1871-1913 
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Fig. 5.4.10. Feinstein's UK GNP (Expenditure) Series and Constituents 1830-1913 
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Fig. 5.4.11. Feinstein's UK GNP (Expenditure) Series and Constituents 1830-1913 
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Fig. 5.4.12. Feinstein's UK GNP (Expenditure) Series and Constituents 1948-1980 
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Figure 5.4.13. Eleven Quarterly US Macroeconomic Time Series 1947-1983: 
Turning Point Frequencies (Multiple Turns Included) 
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Figure 5.4.14. Eleven Quarterly US Macroeconomic Series 1947-1983: 
Turning Point Frequencies (Multiple Turns Excluded) 
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Figure 5.4.15.23 Quarterly UK Macroeconomic Series 1957-1992: 
Turning Point Frequencies (Multiple Turns Included) 
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Figure 5.4.16.23 Quarterly UK Macroeconomic Series 1957-1992: 
Turning Point Frequencies (Multiple Turns Excluded) 
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Figure 5.4.17. UK Real GNP and Consumers Expenditure, 1855-1913 
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Figure 5.4.18. Pabwise Comparisons of Leads and Lags 
Producers Durable Equipment against US GNP 
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Figure 5.4.19. Pairwise Comparisons of Leads and Lags 
Residential Structures against US GNP 
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Figure 5.4.20. Pairwise Comparison of Leads and Lags 
Nonresidential Structures against US GNP 
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Figure 5.4.21. Pairwise Comparison of Leads and Lags 
Durable Goods against US GNP 
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Figure 5.4.22. Pairwise Comparison of Leads and Lags 
Nondurable Goods against US GNP 
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Figure 5.4.23. Pairwise Comparison of Leads and Lags 
Government Expenditure against US GNP 
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Figure 5.4.24. Pairwise Comparison of (Postwar) Leads and Lags 
UK Industrial Production against GDP 
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Figure 5.4.25. Pairwise Comparison of (Postwar) Leads and Lags 
UK Retail Sales against GDP 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction to this thesis proposed seven general areas of enquiry. These 
1. How did nineteenth-century experience condition later research? 
2. What was the contribution of Mitchell and the NBER to business-cycle theory 
and what was its influence on later research? 
3. What were the results of Mitchell's programme? 
4. How have the interpretations of these ideas and results influenced the 
understanding of business cycles? 
5. What has been the contribution of econometric ideas? 
6. How does the analysis of modern time-series data affect the understanding of 
short-run fluctuations? 
7. What, therefore, can be inferred about their nature? 
The answers to these questions that have emerged from Chapters 2 to 5 are summarized 
below. 
1. The hypothesis of recurrent and general short-run fluctuations originated in 
the nineteenth century with the occurrence of financial crisis in the United Kingdom 
approximately every ten years. Explanations of these disturbances focused on 
quantity-theoretic relations among prices, the monetary circulation and the volume of 
output. As the century progressed short-run fluctuations in the real and nominal sectors 
were increasingly perceived to be distinct, as for example in Marshall's evidence to the 
Gold and Silver Commission and in Juglar's 1900 pamphlet. Nevertheless, by 1914 
explanations had crystallized into a'transitional' dynamics within the framework oflrving 
Fisher's equation of exchange; that is, that short-term instabilities are driven by price 
fluctuations transmitted through profits via money to output. In the 1920s Mitchell 
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proposed a time-subscripted version of the Fisher equation as a theory of business cycles. 
The modern empirical description of business cycles, as first proposed by Mitchell and 
Thorp in 1926, became the consensus view in the business-cycle literature until the late 
1940s. It later evolved into the 'reference cycle' which is still followed by the NBER 
dating committee. The empirical findings of MBC, although designed to test Mitchell's 
theory, were later interpreted as 'measurement without theory' by the Cowles 
Commission. Marschak's re-interpretation of MBC as a single, unobserved common 
factor driving all economic fluctuations prepared the ground for, and may have influenced 
Lucas's conclusion that 'business cycles are all alike'. 
2. Burns and Mitchell did not find the evidence of homogeneous business cycles 
attributed to them by Lucas. In fact, Mitchell concluded that behavioural divergences 
were more likely than conformities; that all historical episodes were effectively 'unique'; 
and that short-run fluctuations might actually be a function of 'accelerations and 
retardations' of the 'more fundamental process' of economic growth. Mitchell's 
ambiguities and methodological lapses unfortunately complicated later interpretations of 
his empirical results. Far greater confusion has been caused by ignoring his interest in 
theory, because his research programme was designed as empirical verification of a 
quantity-theoretic hypothesis and can be properly understood only in this context. His 
four-phase cycle, subdivided into eight stages, was followed only by GRS, a contemporary 
study. It was quickly abandoned after his death and is consequently nowadays only of 
historical interest. However, the core of the MBC 'definition' - recurrent 'comovements' 
in 'many economic activities' - has been accepted as 'fact' based on the evidence of that 
volume. All later research, whether theoretical and empirical, follows this interpretation 
of Burns and Mitchell by assuming a cycle in 'general business conditions' as 
fundamental. The modern NBER reference-dating procedure follows methods originally 
laid down in MBC, according to Romer (1992]; yet although claiming to identify the US . 
'business cycle' the dating committee appears instead, from the evidence of Table 5.3.2, 
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to be tracking GNP turning points. This is done with great skill and accuracy but is 
nevertheless a process which falls outside the NBER's own business-cycle definition, as 
articulated by Zarnowitz. 
3. Time-series models of economic fluctuations have traditionally made the 
identifying assumption of three or four (unobserved) components: 'trend', 'cyclical', 
irregular and in some cases seasonal. Originally heuristic, these assumptions were later 
justified by the 'evidence' of comovements in MBC; but since this was based a 
misunderstanding of Burns and Mitchell's results, the process of identification has 
become effectively circular. Recent research has departed from this approach by arguing 
that trend-cycle decompositions are no longer designed to represent underlying empirical 
DGPs, but rather to represent what is 'known' about business cycles (as in Harvey [1985], 
Harvey and Jaeger (1993], CLM [1989]). They cannot therefore be treated as empirical 
'evidence'. In a similar manner, RBC studies which simulate business-cycle-style 
fluctuations in model economies are designed to show that such behaviour can arise in 
conditions of competitive equilibrium with optimizing agents, rather than to capture 
empirical behaviour up to an error term with known properties (for example Cooley and 
Prescott [1995] and the several Kydland and Prescott papers). 
4. The asymmetries between short-period expansions and contractions observed 
in empirical data are not captured by any of the linear models of trend and cycle 
discussed above. Evidence from the experimental and empirical results of the present 
study suggests that asymmetric behaviour may be a function of secular tendencies rather 
than an intrinsic property of a separable cyclical component. This lends weight to the 
hypothesis of trend and cycle as integral and stochastic, and also calls into question the 
idea that the two can be sensibly decomposed, especially in linear models. Evidence of 
this from recent empirical research is mixed. Some supports the integrated representation: 
Harvey (1985] finds that a unit-root is not rejected for postwar US GNP; and the 
evidence of King et af. (1991] favours a common stochastic trend representation for its 
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set of US economic variables while Stock and Watson [1989] find that, for a different 
data set, cointegration is not accepted. On the other hand, Crafts and Mills [1995] find 
that a nonlinear, deterministic trend representation is not rejected by nineteenth century 
industrial production data for the UK economy; but here a cyclical component is 
identified only for the period 1874-1913. 
5. Time-series output data may not be sufficiently accurate to permit inferences 
to be drawn about short-run fluctuations from the statistical analysis of durations and 
amplitudes of turning points, particularly when strong secular tendencies are present. The 
nineteenth century presents special difficulties and output estimates such as those of 
Feinstein [1972J and Crafts-Harley [1992] are consequently described as 'best guesses'. 
The Feinstein reliability table shows margins of error ranging from> ±5 percent to > ±25 
percent. Other distortions are evident: Beveridge 'detrended' his series; Lewis filtered his 
by moving averages; and Feinstein 'adjusted' his expenditure estimates to take account 
of Thorp's Annals, any of which practices may induce bias. However, recent data also 
present problems: CSO postwar UK series have error estimates on the order of ±21f2 -
±71f2 percent. Such wide margins can subsume most if not all turning points in output 
data since the amplitudes of fluctuations marked off by such peaks and troughs are 
normally small in comparison both to growth rates and to the acknowledged error 
margins. As discussed above, peaks and troughs in US GNP alternate naturally and, for 
quarterly economic time-series data, exceptionally. The behaviour of short-run 
fluctuations in general cannot be hence inferred from that of the US aggregate, whether 
or not its levels have been measured accurately. Economic data contain, perhaps, better 
information about long-run (growth) features, such as the presence or absence of 
cointegrating vectors, than about short-run variability. The problem of distinguishing the 
short- from long-run is not addressed by current decomposition practices - either the 
filters used in theoretical research or the identifying assumptions employed in structural 
time-series models. 
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6. Although there is agreement in the current literature about empirical 
'business-cycle facts', there are divergent explanations of the phenomena among theorists. 
These divergences concern the character of impulse and propagation mechanisms and the 
importance of microfoundations. In all cases, the 'facts' are assumed to be the 
generalized comovements believed to have been documented by Burns and Mitchell. For 
this reason most empirical evaluations of RBC v. neo-Keynesian hypotheses have 
employed significant levels of sectoral disaggregation (e.g. Shapiro [1987] and Kydland 
and Prescott [1990)). Empirical evaluation of the nature and persistence of shocks from 
the evidence of Solow residuals is problematical; for as Stadler has pointed out, these are 
difficult to estimate and are interpretable only against the maintained assumption of 
competitive equilibrium. Despite such debates, recent research appears to be moving 
towards the more consensual view (either implicit or explicit) that rather than being 
driven by separate forces, short-run fluctuations are integral with the dynamics of growth. 
Investigations of Solow residuals as impulse mechanisms for 'real business cycles' are 
actually assessing the effects of growth-rate innovations. Recent RBC literature, such as 
Cooley and Prescott [1995], appears to be treating growth and 'cycles' as generated by 
the same process in a theoretical model. The time-series models of Stock and Watson 
and Hamilton are also formulated in growth rates rather than in levels. Indeed, 
Hamilton's turning points (Table 5.3.2) suggest that in the case of US GNP, growth-rate 
fluctuations are asymmetric and that their peaks and troughs are virtually coincident with 
those in the levels series. Zarnowitz is the exception, distinguishing 'growth cycles' from 
'business cycles' in levels; but he does not propose a distortion-free decomposition of 
'trend' and 'cycle'. 
7. Evidence from the application to a large number of data sets of an unrestricted 
turning-point algorithm suggests that the hypothesis of comovements in levels is not 
supported (subject to the above 'health warning' about accuracy). Nor are there stable 
timing relations within or across data sets. There is a wide variation in numbers of turning 
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points in time series within the same data set, and this variation occurs in all data sets in 
the present study. The relatively flat frequency distributions of turning points consequent 
upon these 'extra' peaks and troughs appear both in price and output data, suggesting 
that they are a common behavioural feature. Although the specific dating of turns in 
output series cannot be relied upon because of measurement error and other 
inaccuracies, it can nevertheless be tentatively inferred that divergences in numbers of 
turning points are the rule rather than the exception in time-series data. The implication 
for policy analysis is that the nature of macroeconomic fluctuations is better understood 
if examined sector by sector rather than inferred from the behaviour of aggregates. 
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